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Adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are widely regarded to exhibit 
difficulties inferring the internal states of others; known as ‘mentalizing’. However, 
the existing literature is inconsistent regarding the nature of the mentalizing 
difficulties experienced by adults with ASD. Two neural systems; the mirror neuron 
system (MNS) and the mentalizing system, are both thought to play important roles 
in inferring others’ internal states from their actions but the precise roles of these 
systems and the nature of the interaction between them are unknown. The aim of this 
thesis was to explore the nature of mentalizing deficits associated with ASD, 
delineate between existing models of MNS involvement in mentalizing and identify 
the neural basis of mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD. The first empirical 
chapter presents two behavioural experiments which found adults with ASD were 
impaired at explicitly inferring the intentions of others from their actions. The 
second empirical chapter presents a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
experiment which identified mentalizing-induced modulation of MNS activity, at the 
end of observed actions, in typically developing participants. The third empirical 
chapter presents an experiment which used TMS and electroencephalography (EEG) 
to measure MNS activation in adults with ASD when mentalizing and found higher 
levels of autistic traits predicted lower right-lateralised MNS activity. The final 
empirical chapter presents a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
experiment which identified higher levels of autistic traits predicted reduced 
functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system. Collectively, 
these data suggest that connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system is 
higher when inferring intentions of others from their actions, the interaction between 
the two systems may be best conceptualised within a predictive coding framework 
and reduced connectivity between these systems may underlie the mentalizing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Understanding others’ actions  
The ability to interpret others’ behaviour as well as predict their future actions is 
both evolutionarily vital and important for successful social interaction. The motor 
simulation theory states that we understand the actions of others’ by internally 
simulating these actions in our own motor system (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; 
Landmann et al., 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007; Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, 
& Haselager, 2011). It is thought that we simulate observed actions and compare 
these actions to stored representations of our own actions and their consequences. 
This allows us to predict upcoming trajectories and goals of observed actions e.g. 
when observing an arm reaching towards a glass, we can use the initial action 
kinematics to predict the timing of the upcoming movement and infer that the goal is 
to pick up the glass to drink from it rather than pick it up to place it elsewhere 
(deKlerk et al., 2016; Stapel et al., 2012; Messier 1999; Graf et al., 2007). Evidence 
for the internal simulation of others’ actions has been provided by behavioural 
studies in which irrelevant actions were shown during a task; if observed movements 
were incongruent to the movements required in order to complete the task, reaction 
times were significantly slower (Brass et al., 2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 
2003; Liepelt, Cramon, & Brass, 2008). This is termed the ‘interference effect’. 
Additionally, if transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is applied to the primary 
motor cortex, the induced muscle activation in the recipient’s hand is larger if they 
are observing a hand action compared to when TMS is applied at rest (Luciano 
Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005a; Patuzzo, Fiaschi, & Manganotti, 2003; 
Strafella & Paus, 2000). The increased muscle activation in the hand of the observer 
is specific to the muscles involved in the observed action (Fadiga et al., 2005; Fadiga 
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et al., 1995; Urgesi et al., 2006); this provides evidence that observed hand actions 
are internally simulated by the observer. 
Although it is widely accepted that observing others’ actions is sufficient in 
order to predict their immediate goals, it is disputed whether other levels of intention 
can be inferred from kinematic information. Jacob and Jeannerod have outlined four 
types of intentions; ‘motor intention’, ‘prior intention’, ‘social intention’ and 
‘communicative intention’ (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). A motor intention refers to 
the actor’s immediate goal (e.g. pick up a scalpel). An actor’s prior intention refers 
to the intention of the actor before movement has been initiated (e.g. perform a 
surgical incision). A social intention refers to the intended impact on others (e.g. to 
help or to harm). Finally, a communicative intention is the intent to convey 
information to another person (e.g. point to the clock to signal that the time allocated 
for the operation is nearly over). Jacob and Jeannerod argue that processing the 
visual kinematics of others’ actions allows motor intentions to be inferred but not 
other levels of intention. Instead, Jacob and Jeannerod suggest that it is necessary to 
process the surrounding context (e.g. a surgeon in an operating theatre) in order to 
infer prior, social and communicative intentions. In contradiction to this argument, 
the kinematics of hand actions have been shown to differ depending on the actors’ 
prior (Ansuini et al., 2006; Egmose & Koppe, 2017; Johnson-Frey et al., 2004), 
social (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & 
Castiello, 2011) and communicative (Peeters et al., 2013; Peeters et al., 2015; Sartori 
et al., 2009) intentions. Furthermore, when shown videos of hand actions that were 
prematurely ended so that the action outcomes were not revealed, participants could 
still determine the actor’s social intentions despite the fact that these hand actions 
were shown without surrounding context (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & 
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Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). These data suggest that 
processing kinematic differences via motor simulation may be sufficient in order to 
infer others’ social, prior and communicative intentions.  
Motor simulation may also have a role in inferring other aspects of another’s 
internal state such as their emotions, beliefs or desires which can all be vital in order 
to predict upcoming actions (Wolpert et al., 2003). These internal state inferences are 
collectively referred to as ‘mentalizing’ (Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2014; Denny, 
Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Frith & Frith, 2006; Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003). 
Internal state inferences can either be made without being instructed to do so 
(‘implicit mentalizing’) or when directly asked to do so (‘explicit mentalizing’; 
Rosenblau, Kliemann, Heekeren, & Dziobek, 2015; Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 
2014; Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). The majority of mentalizing in 
everyday life is implicit but conversely, the majority of the mentalizing literature has 
studied explicit mentalizing (Nijhof, Brass, Bardi, & Wiersema, 2016). Level 2 
visual perspective taking (VPT-2) is a mentalizing task which involves inferring how 
another individual perceives elements in their surrounding environment (Hamilton et 
al., 2009; Kessler & Rutherford, 2010). Response times are longer on VPT-2 tasks if 
the observer’s body position is at an incongruent orientation to the individual they 
are making inferences about (Kessler, Cao, O’Shea, & Wang, 2014; Kessler & 
Rutherford, 2010). This suggests that one’s own body is mentally rotated to match 
the other individual’s orientation in order to infer how the other person perceives 
their environment. These data support the importance of internal simulation when 
inferring others’ internal states. The kinematics of actions have also been shown to 
differ depending on the actor’s emotions (Atkinson et al., 2004; Dael et al., 2012; 
Pollick et al., 2001; Li et al., 2016) and these kinematic differences can be used to 
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successfully infer others’ emotions (Atkinson et al., 2004; Dael et al., 2012; Pollick 
et al., 2001; Li et al., 2016). Individuals with depression are also more likely to rate 
actions as more negative, suggesting that errors in emotion attribution arise due to 
not inhibiting one’s own emotions sufficiently during the internal simulation of 
others’ emotional actions (Kaletsch et al., 2014). Differences in action kinematics 
can also be used to identify whether an actor is being truthful or deceptive about the 
weight of an object (Finisguerra, Amoruso, Makris, & Urgesi, 2016) and whether a 
movement was made out of free choice or whether the actor was instructed to 
perform a certain movement (Pesquita, Chapman, & Enns, 2016). Collectively, these 
data suggest that motor simulation may have a broad role in mentalizing. 
Mentalizing can occur in the presence or absence of action information; it is 
possible that the extent to which motor simulation is involved in mentalizing is 
related to the amount of action information available. In addition to motor simulation 
theory, another form of simulation theory is ‘mental simulation’. This theory 
suggests that predictions about the internal states of others, based on prior 
knowledge and contextual information, are internally simulated and used to predict 
their upcoming actions (Hegarty, 2004; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). It is possible 
that mental simulation and motor simulation are not distinct processes; these 
processes may inform each other and the degree to which mentalizing relies on one 
of these processes over the other may depend on the amount of action information 
available. Alternatively, it is possible that mentalizing only relies on mental 
simulation, not motor simulation, regardless of the presence or absence of action 
information. A limitation of the theory that motor simulation alone, not mental 
simulation, is the basis for mentalizing is that motor simulation can only account for 
abilities to infer others’ internal states which are directly related to observable action 
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information (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Humans are able to infer intentions, 
beliefs, emotions and desires that are not directly related to observed actions and it 
has been suggested that motor simulation alone may be inadequate to infer these 
more abstract internal states (Csibra & Gergely., 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). 
Mental simulation allows for internal states to be inferred in the absence of action 
information and for internal states that are far removed from observable actions to be 
inferred. Csibra extends motor simulation theory by suggesting that predictions 
about an actor’s internal state are first inferred based contextual information before 
motor simulation. This allows more abstract inferences to be made and upcoming 
actions to be efficiently predicted. According to Csibra’s model, motor simulation is 
then used to compare the actual kinematics of the ongoing actions to the predicted 
upcoming actions. Discrepancies between the predicted actions and actual actions 
are used to update inferences made regarding the individual’s internal state. 
Therefore, Csibra’s model suggests that action monitoring via motor simulation is 
involved in inferring higher-level aspects of others’ internal state from their actions 
(particularly, updating internal state inferences during ongoing actions) but it is not 
sufficient alone in order to do so. 
Some alternative theories for the basis of mentalizing suggest simulation, in 
any form, is not required in order to infer others’ internal states. Theory theory 
suggests that humans have either an innate or learnt ability to infer the internal states 
of others using lawlike generalisations (Goldman, 2012). Rationality theory states 
that contextual information and prior knowledge about the individual are used to 
infer the internal state underlying someone’s actions (Goldman, 2006; Goldman 
2012). Both theory theory and rationality theory therefore suggest that humans can 
mentalize without needing to internally simulate others’ actions. However, the 
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existence of poorer mentalizing abilities in individuals whom experience motor 
inhibition deficits or display hyperimitation (Chasiotis, 2006; Spengler, Bird, & 
Brass, 2010) as well as reduced empathy and poorer emotion recognition abilities in 
children with motor coordination disorders (Cummins, Piek, & Dyck, 2005; 
Efstratopoulo et al., 2016) imply motor simulation plays an important role in 
mentalizing. These data also raise the possibility that dysfunction or delayed 
development of the cortical system involved in motor simulation may result in 
mentalizing difficulties.  
1.2 The mirror neuron system 
The cortical system associated with motor simulation is the mirror neuron system 
(MNS; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). The MNS is a 
collection of brain regions that contain neurons that show similar activation patterns 
during both the performance and observation of actions (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). It 
is thought that by displaying similar activation patterns during the observation of 
actions as when performing similar actions, this system is the mechanism in which 
observed actions are simulated in the observer’s own motor system (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004). The main components of the human MNS are thought to be the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). MNS activation has been reliably 
found when inferring others’ internal states from their actions such as their 
communicative intentions (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Xu 
et al., 2009), prior intentions (Spunt & Lieberman, 2011), social intentions (Becchio 
et al., 2012), motor intentions (Buccino et al., 2007; de Lange, Spronk, Willems, 
Toni, & Bekkering, 2008), emotions (Hadjikhani et al., 2009; Spunt & Lieberman, 
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2012a) and beliefs (Grezes, Frith & Passingham, 2004) supporting a role of motor 
simulation in mentalizing in the presence of human action. Temporary lesions to IFG 
via direct current stimulation (Herbet, Lafargue, Bonnetblanc, et al., 2014) and IFG 
lesions in brain damaged patients (Besharati et al., 2016; Dal Monte et al., 2014) also 
result in poorer mentalizing performances, providing further support for a vital role 
of these regions during mentalizing tasks. However, although MNS activation has 
been consistently found during mentalizing tasks in the presence of human action, 
the role of this system in mentalizing is debated. 
1.3 Proposed models of the role of the MNS in mentalizing 
There are a number of different theories regarding the possible role of the 
MNS in mentalizing in the presence of human action: 1. The motor simulation 
theory states that MNS activity alone, reflecting motor simulation of observed 
actions, is sufficient to mentalize (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007). The motor 
simulation theory is based on empirical evidence showing action kinematics differ 
depending on the internal state of the actor and these kinematic profiles alone can be 
used to infer  the internal states of others (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & 
Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). 2. A dual-process hypothesis 
has been proposed which suggests that pre-reflective processing of others’ internal 
states based on kinematic differences occurs in the MNS but this system is not 
involved in actively interpreting intentional information (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, 
Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & 
Keenan, 2007). The dual-process hypothesis was generated based on social 
psychology theory of social causal attribution which states that when inferring 
internal states from actions, incoming sensory information must be translated into 
internal state information (Gilbert, 1998).  fMRI data has provided evidence that IFG 
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encodes action information which indicates the actors’ intentions (Iacoboni et al., 
2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2008), making this area a likely candidate for a brain 
area involved in translating motor information into internal state information. 
Additionally, fMRI studies have shown increased connectivity between the MNS 
and the mentalizing system when inferring internal states from actions but only 
mentalizing system activation increased in response to increased mentalizing 
demand of experimental tasks (Spunt & Lieberman, 2011; Spunt & Lieberman, 
2012a; 2012b). Spunt and Lieberman hypothesised that the MNS translates 
kinematic information into internal state information at the subconscious level and 
passes internal state information to the mentalizing system for this to be actively 
interpreted. 3. The ‘mirroring-first’ model implies that processing action kinematics 
in the MNS is a vital prerequisite for mentalizing but this system is not directly 
involved in processing others’ internal states (Hamilton & Marsh, 2013; Spunt, 
Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). This model was based on evidence showing that 
although connectivity between MNS and the mentalizing system increased when 
mentalizing, viewing actions with unusual intentions increased activation in the 
mentalizing system, not the MNS (Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008). Instead, 
increased MNS was found when the kinematics of observed actions were unusual (de 
Lange et al., 2008). These data suggest that action processing in the MNS is 
important for mentalizing but this system does not process internal state information.  
In opposition to all these theories of MNS involvement in mentalizing, the 
visual inference model suggests that the internal states underlying others’ actions are 
inferred in the mentalizing system immediately after actions are visual processed in 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial temporal gyrus (MTG), without 
requiring the intermediate step of motor simulation in the MNS (Hamilton & Marsh, 
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2013). Therefore, the visual inference model suggests the MNS is not required in 
order to infer internal states underlying others’ actions. In support of the visual 
inference theory, MNS activity has not been found during some mentalizing tasks 
that do not involve human action processing, suggesting the MNS may not play an 
important role in inferring others’ internal states (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 
2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 
2011; Van Overwalle et al., 2009; White, Frith, Rellecke, Al-Noor, & Gilbert, 2014). 
Additionally, some studies have found equivalent levels of MNS activity when 
inferring others’ internal states from their actions compared to when viewing the 
same actions and not actively mentalizing (de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012b). Finally, equivalent levels of MNS activity have been found 
during the observation of gestures with communicative intent as during the 
observation of non-communicative gestures (Mainieri, Heim, Straube, Binkofski, & 
Kircher, 2013). These data provide evidence against the motor simulation theory, as 
these data imply that the MNS activation alone is not sufficient in order to infer 
others’ internal states. 
However, the studies providing evidence against MNS involvement in 
mentalizing are not without their limitations; it is possible that when not actively 
mentalizing, observing the same actions shown during mentalizing tasks induces 
implicit mentalizing. Equivalent levels of MNS activity across both mentalizing and 
non-mentalizing conditions would therefore reflect involvement of MNS in both 
implicitly and explicitly inferring internal states from others’ actions. The stimuli 
used in the mentalizing tasks that did not observe MNS activation were simplistic 
cartoon still images or animations and therefore, inferring the internal states of these 
characters may not have required the same complex information to be processed as 
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when inferring the internal states of others in naturalistic situations e.g. contextual 
information, prior knowledge about the individual, facial expression and eye gaze 
(Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; 
Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011; Van Overwalle et al., 2009; White, Frith, 
Rellecke, Al-Noor, & Gilbert, 2014). Finally, when observing ‘non-communicative 
intentions’ it is possible that participants were attempting to infer communicative 
intent from the unusual actions shown and therefore MNS activation may reflect 
attempts to mentalize. 
Data from other previous studies show MNS activity is modulated by the 
intentions of observed actions (Canessa et al., 2012; Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, 
Bara, & Walter, 2014; de Lange et al., 2008) and MNS activity is higher if observed 
actions are social rather than non-social (Bucchioni et al., 2013; Centelles et al., 
2011; Enticott et al., 2013). These results suggest that the MNS does encode others’ 
internal states, which contradicts the both the visual inference model and the 
mirroring-first hypothesis. However, different levels of MNS activation during 
actions with different intentions could reflect the different kinematic profiles or 
increased complexity associated with social compared to non-social actions. Despite 
this, individuals with MNS lesions (Besharati et al., 2016; Dal Monte et al., 2014), 
atypical MNS functioning (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Holt et al., 2014; Kana et al., 
2014) or delayed MNS development (Bastiaansen et al., 2011) also display poorer 
mentalizing abilities, supporting the importance of the MNS in inferring others’ 
internal states. 
Despite evidence that the MNS has a role in processing others’ internal 
states, equivalent MNS activity has been found when actively inferring others’ 
intentions compared to when passively viewing actions which portray the actor’s 
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intention (de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). These data suggest that 
although the MNS may process internal state information, this system is not likely to 
be involved in actively interpreting this information; this supports the dual-process 
hypothesis. However, the dual-process hypothesis cannot account for data from 
different studies which have shown higher levels of MNS activity when explicitly 
inferring the internal states of others’ compared to passively observing the same 
actions (Buccino et al., 2007; Schippers et al., 2009). Consequently, the role of the 
MNS in inferring others’ internal states is still debated.  
1.4 Methods of measuring MNS activity and their limitations 
The most common neuroscience techniques used to measure activity in the 
human MNS are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; Hobson 
& Bishop., 2016; Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Maeda et al., 2002).  FMRI has the highest 
spatial resolution of these techniques (Crosson et al., 2010). In fMRI studies,  the 
location of MNS areas are either determined  using a functional localiser task 
(Sperduti et al., 2014; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012c) or anatomically defined using 
coordinates of areas traditionally associated with the MNS from previous studies, 
meta-analyses, or brain atlases as a reference (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & 
Walter, 2014; Fishman, Keown, Lincoln, Pineda, & Müller, 2014; Liew et al., 2011; 
Mainieri, Heim, Straube, Binkofski, & Kircher, 2013). Functional localiser tasks 
usually involve participants both moving their right hand and also observing another 
person move their right hand in the same way; brain areas which are active during 
both of these tasks are considered to exhibit mirror properties. Defining MNS areas 
anatomically potentially elicits a problem known as ‘the reverse inference’ (Hutzler, 
2014; Poldrack., 2011). This is when certain cognitive processes are assumed based 
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on the neuroimaging data. Brain areas have multiple functions and therefore it is not 
accurate to assume certain cognitive processes (e.g. ‘mirroring’) based on 
neuroimaging data (Poldrack, 2006). Even when MNS areas are functionally defined 
in fMRI studies using a localiser task; it cannot be determined whether the same 
neurons in the identified areas are activated during both tasks. It is possible that 
neighbouring populations of neurons respond to either the performance or 
observation of a movement and therefore the neurons do not display mirror 
properties. Consequently, researchers should be cautious when drawing conclusions 
regarding mirroring properties of brain areas. 
EEG studies quantify levels of MNS activity by measuring the degree to 
which brain activity in the alpha frequency band (8-12Hz) is suppressed when 
observing the actions of others compared to rest. This is known as mu suppression 
(Fox et al., 2016; Frenkel-Toledo, Bentin, Perry, Liebermann, & Soroker, 2014; 
Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007). When performing or observing actions, 
large amplitude oscillations in the 8-12Hz frequency range over sensorimotor cortex 
(mu rhythm) are suppressed (Fox et al., 2016; Frenkel-Toledo, Bentin, Perry, 
Liebermann, & Soroker, 2014; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007). 
Therefore, mu suppression is taken as an index of MNS activity. However, the 
source of mu suppression is unknown; a study which combined both EEG and fMRI 
showed that mu suppression correlated with activity in multiple cortical areas, not 
just areas associated with the mirror neuron system (Yin et al., 2016) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies have suggested that the source of mu 
suppression may be the somatosensory cortex, rather than core MNS areas (Cheyne 
et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2009). Therefore, the reliability of mu suppression as a 
measure of core MNS activity has been questioned (Hobson & Bishop, 2016). 
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Finally, TMS indirectly measures MNS activity by applying single-pulses to 
the primary motor cortex (M1) and measuring changes in corticospinal activity in 
contralateral hand muscles via electromyography ( EMG; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, 
Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005). Applying 
single TMS pulses to M1 induces increased activity in contralateral hand muscles 
(known as motor evoked potentials; MEPs), which are larger when viewing hand 
actions than when at rest. These increased MEP sizes when viewing hand actions are 
thought to reflect increased excitability in M1 as the result of excitatory cortico-
cortical connections from prefrontal MNS areas (IFG/vPMC). The degree to which 
MEP sizes increase during action observation is therefore regarded as an index of 
MNS activity (Luciano Fadiga et al., 2005a; Patuzzo et al., 2003; Strafella & Paus, 
2000). Although this technique provides high temporal resolution, it only generates a 
transient measure of MNS activation. This means that if an experimental task 
modulates MNS activity in a temporally specific manner, MNS activity must be 
measured at precisely the time of MNS modulation. MEP sizes also show a high 
degree of variability (Kiers et al., 1993; Ellaway et al., 1998) which could result 
from experimental error e.g. slight changes to coil location and orientation (Barker et 
al., 1987; Hashemirad et al., 2017), However, as this index of MNS activity is an 
indirect measure of MNS activation, changes to the state of the corticospinal tract or 
the muscles recording from could also influence MEP sizes (Gruet et al., 2013). 
Consequently, changes in motor cortex excitability signalled by changes in MEP 
sizes are confounded by slight changes in stimulation administration and subcortical 
excitability. 
Despite all three of these techniques providing useful indices of MNS 
activity, without direct neural recordings, MNS activity cannot be conclusively 
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identified in humans (Hickok, 2009; Kilner & Lemon., 2013). Therefore, researchers 
should be cautious when making conclusions regarding MNS activity and consider 
the spatial and temporal limitations of these techniques. 
1.5 The mentalizing system and connectivity with the MNS 
In addition to the MNS, another cortical system referred to as the ‘mentalizing 
system’ is activated when inferring the internal states of others (Denny et al., 2012; 
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009). The core regions of the mentalizing system are considered to be the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the 
temporal poles (Frith & Frith, 2006). These two systems are thought to have distinct 
roles during mentalizing tasks; in comparison to motor simulation in the MNS, the 
mentalizing system is thought to use action context and prior experience to infer 
others’ internal states (Chambon et al., 2017b; de Lange et al., 2008; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2007; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). The more unusual, abstract or further 
removed the internal states being inferred are from the observed actions or the more 
limited the action information available, the greater the considered reliance on the 
mentalizing system (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Chambon et al., 
2017a; Liepelt, Von Cramon, & Brass, 2008). 
The mPFC can be separated into distinct subregions and review papers have 
noted that activity in different mPFC subregions is associated with different aspects 
of mentalizing (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Sallet et al., 2007; 
Wilson, Gaffan, Browning, & Baxter, 2010). Methods used to separate mPFC into 
different subregions have differed across tasks but the mPFC has most commonly 
been divided into dorsal and ventral subregions (Bzdok et al., 2013). Activity in 
dorsal mPFC (dmPFC) is specifically associated with mentalizing in the presence of 
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human action (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Sallet et al., 2013). 
Additionally, the dmPFC shows greater connectivity with areas of the MNS than 
ventral mPFC (vmPFC; Bzdok et al., 2013). Therefore, it is likely that connectivity 
between the MNS and this region of the mPFC is particularly important when 
mentalizing in the presence of human action.  
Despite reliable activation in both mirror neuron and mentalizing systems 
during mentalizing tasks, the nature of the interaction between these two systems is 
uncertain. Numerous studies have shown increased connectivity between areas of the 
MNS and areas of the mentalizing system when inferring the internal states of others 
from their actions (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Lombardo et 
al., 2010; Marsh et al., 2010; Sperduti, Guionnet, Fossati, & Nadel, 2014; Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012b; Trapp et al., 2014; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith, & Braun, 
2009) and when not directly engaged in mentalizing tasks but when observing social 
actions compared to non-social actions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2009). 
However, the areas that have been reported to display increased functional 
connectivity differ across studies. Increased connectivity has been found between 
right IFG and dmPFC when inferring prior intentions from actions (Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012b), increased connectivity between left IFG and dlPFC has been 
reported in one study (Xu et al., 2009) and between dmPFC and bilateral premotor 
cortex and aIPS in another study (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014) when inferring 
communicative intentions from hand actions. Right IFG shows increased 
connectivity with dmPFC as well as bilateral TPJ when inferring the underlying 
cause of displays of emotion in movie clips (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a). Finally, 
increased connectivity has been found between right IFG and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) when passively viewing emotional facial expressions (Rudie et al., 
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2012).  It is likely that different areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system are 
functionally connected depending on the mentalizing task being performed and 
therefore connectivity between these two systems cannot be generalised across 
mentalizing tasks. The limited existing data regarding functional connectivity 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system during mentalizing tasks mean it is not 
possible to characterise the connections which are important for different tasks. 
However, connectivity between the right IFG and the mPFC seems to be the most 
commonly reported connection when inferring the internal states of others’ from 
their actions (Rudie et al., 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; Spunt & Lieberman, 
2012b; Tettamanti et al., 2017). 
Only one study to date has investigated functional connectivity when 
inferring others’ social intentions from their actions (Chambon et al., 2017). This 
study did not find increased connectivity between areas of the MNS and the 
mentalizing system which was unexpected as increased functional connectivity 
between these systems has been consistently reported when inferring internal states 
of others’ from their actions (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; 
Lombardo et al., 2010; Marsh et al., 2010; Sperduti, Guionnet, Fossati, & Nadel, 
2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b; Trapp et al., 2014; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith, 
& Braun, 2009) and increased activity in both systems was reported in this study 
when inferring social intentions (Chambon, Domenech, et al., 2017a). The lack of 
increased functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system in 
this study may have been due to the area of the mentalizing system which was 
seeded for the functional connectivity analysis. The authors seeded a region of the 
vmPFC rather than dmPFC. An area of dmPFC showed higher activation when 
inferring social intentions compared to more ventral activation when inferring non-
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social intentions but the authors decided to seed an area of the vmPFC for their 
connectivity analysis which was activated across all tasks in their study (Chambon, 
Domenech, et al., 2017a). The dmPFC is specifically associated with inferring 
internal states of others from their actions (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 
2006; Sallet et al., 2013), processing social information (Apps & Ramnani, 2017; 
Chambon et al., 2017b; Lotze, Veit, Anders, & Birbaumer, 2007; Sallet et al., 2013) 
and perspective taking (Bzdok et al., 2013). In comparison, the ventral mPFC is 
associated with judgements about non-social actions, self-relevant information and 
the value of action outcomes (Apps & Ramnani, 2017; Bzdok et al., 2013; Chambon 
et al., 2017a; Glacher, Hampton, & O ’doherty, 2009). Therefore, if the dmPFC had 
been seeded then this region may have shown increased functional connectivity with 
areas of the MNS when inferring social intentions. 
In addition to the inconsistency regarding which areas of the MNS and the 
mentalizing system display increased functional connectivity when mentalizing, the 
direction of connectivity between these two systems is uncertain. The mirroring-first 
theory and the dual-process hypothesis propose exclusively ‘bottom-up’ connectivity 
from the MNS to the mentalizing system when mentalizing in the presence of human 
action (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Hamilton & Marash, 
2013). In support of this, Spunt and colleagues found that MNS activity preceded 
mentalizing system activity when participants inferred others’ emotions from their 
facial expressions (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a). Additionally, increased functional 
connectivity from IFG to mPFC has been shown when inferring the communicative 
intentions of others (Tettamanti et al., 2017) and inferring superordinate compared to 
basic intentions has been found to increase connectivity from supplementary motor 
area (SMA; part of the extended MNS) to the mPFC (Chambon, Domenech, et al., 
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2017b). These data support the bottom-up up flow of information from the MNS to 
the mentalizing system when inferring internal of others from their actions.  
In contrast to the theory of exclusively bottom-up connectivity between the 
MNS and mentalizing system when mentalizing, the predictive coding model of 
MNS functioning in combination with the predicted response outcome model of 
mPFC function, propose the importance of top-down connectivity from mPFC to the 
MNS. The predictive coding theory of MNS functioning states that action context is 
signalled to the MNS prior to motor simulation, in order for predictions to be made 
about the outcome of upcoming actions (Kilner et al., 2007). This model of MNS 
functioning was based on empirical evidence showing that when observing actions, 
EEG signals reflecting motor preparation are generated (Kilner et al., 2004), 
suggesting the intended outcome of observed actions are predicted in order to 
prepare the appropriate response. Additionally, increased muscle activation in 
observer’s mouths has been found when observing grasp-to-eat actions but not 
grasp-to –place actions before the outcome of the actions are shown (Cattaneo et al., 
2007). This suggests that predicted intentions of observed actions are encoded in the 
observer’s MNS. The predictive coding model would suggest that predictions 
regarding upcoming actions are formed based on action context outside of the 
MNSand this information is signalled to the MNS via top-down connectivity (Kilner, 
Friston, & Frith, 2007). As the action unfolds, the kinematics of the observed action 
are compared to the predictions made and discrepancies, known as ‘prediction 
errors’, are formed in the MNS and signalled to higher areas (Kilner et al., 2007; 
Urgen & Miller, 2015).  The predicted response outcome model by Alexander and 
Brown suggests that the mPFC makes predictions about the outcomes of upcoming 
actions based on action context and prior experience (Alexander & Brown, 2011). 
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Additionally, neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that action context and 
prior expectations about an upcoming action are processed in the mPFC (Alexander 
& Brown, 2011; Becchio et al., 2012; Chambon et al., 2017b; Cooper, Kreps, Wiebe, 
Pirkl, & Knutson, 2010; Ferdinand & Opitz, 2014; Fogelson, Shah, Scabini, & 
Knight, 2009; Forster & Brown, 2011; Jahn, Nee, Alexander, & Brown, 2014; Leue, 
Cano Rodilla, & Beauducel, 2015; Schiffer, Krause, & Schubotz, 2014). Therefore, 
the mPFC is a likely candidate for the area signalling predicted intentions of 
upcoming actions to the MNS, within the predictive coding framework, in order for 
comparisons to be made between actual and predicted intentions (Alexander & 
Brown, 2011). Top-down signalling of predictions regarding the upcoming action 
are suggested to be important in order to react sufficiently quickly in certain contexts 
e.g. potentially dangerous situations (Alexander & Brown, 2011). Often, it is 
necessary to respond before another’s action has been completed, both for successful 
social interaction and survival. MNS activation is associated with action preparation 
(Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Newman-Norlund, van Schie, 
van Zuijlen, & Bekkering, 2007). Therefore, if predicted intentions formed in the 
mPFC suggest a potential risk then signalling from mPFC to the MNS at an early 
stage during action observation may allow a sufficiently quick response.   
Previous neuroimaging studies have provided evidence to support this 
predictive coding model; first, MNS activity has been shown to be modulated by 
action context (Amoruso & Urgesi, 2016; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, 
Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005), prior expectation (Fontana et al., 2012) and whether 
participants are explicitly told to mentalize (Buccino et al., 2007; Schippers, 
Gazzola, Goebel, & Keysers, 2009). These data collectively imply the presence of 
top-down connectivity to the MNS. Second, a functional magnetic resonance 
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imaging (fMRI) study found that when observing hand actions of others, activation 
levels in the mPFC and IFG were different depending on whether the actions had 
individual intent or social intent, even though the outcome of the actions were not 
seen (Becchio et al., 2012). This suggests that predictions about upcoming actions 
based on inferred social intentions, which are likely formed in the mPFC, are 
signalled to the IFG. 
The evidence implying the presence of top-down connectivity from the 
mentalizing system suggest that neither the mirroring-first theory nor the dual-
process hypothesis are likely to be full accounts of information processing during 
mentalizing tasks. It is possible that an extended version of the dual-process model 
which incorporates aspects of the predictive coding hypothesis (e.g. top-down 
signalling of action predictions based on contextual information prior to motor 
simulation) could provide a more complete picture of the interaction between the 
MNS and the mentalizing system when mentalizing in the presence of human action. 
Therefore, the direction of mentalizing-induced increased functional connectivity is 
likely to be temporally specific.   
1.6 Autism spectrum disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder which is strongly 
associated with mentalizing impairments (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997; Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2014; Frith, 2001; Holt et al., 2014; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Mentalizing abilities are even assessed in some 
diagnostic and screening tools for ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Lord et al., 2000). There are two diagnostic classification 
systems used in the UK: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
fifth edition (DSM-V) and the International Classification of Diseases, version 10 
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(ICD-10). The DSM-V uses the term ASD to describe a number of 
neurodevelopmental disorders, classified according to core deficits in social 
communication as well as restricted and repetitive interests (Wing, Gould, & 
Gillberg, 2011). The disorders previously referred to as autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder and persuasive disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) in the 
preceding DSM edition are now all classified as ASD (Lee, Thomas, & Lee, 2015; 
Tsai & Ghaziuddin, 2014). The term Asperger’s is still widely used and is included 
in the ICD-10 despite being removed from the DSM-V (Tsai, 2013). A diagnosis of 
Asperger’s reflects typical language and cognitive abilities without developmental 
delays (Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network, 2007; Volkmar, Klin, Schultz, 
Rubin, & Bronen, 2000). In this thesis, the term ‘ASD’ will typically be used but 
‘Asperger’s’ will be used if researchers have specifically recruited individuals with 
this diagnosis in order to control for differences in cognitive abilities and language 
development.  
As ASD is a spectrum disorder, individuals with and without a diagnosis 
display varying degrees of autistic traits. Individuals with relatively high but not 
clinically significant levels of autistic traits have been shown to display subtler 
versions of the behavioural and neurological characteristics associated with ASD 
(Best, Arora, Porter, & Doherty, 2015; Di Martino et al., 2009; Lindell, Notice, & 
Withers, 2009; Ridley, Homewood, & Walters, 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013) 
including mentalizing deficits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; 
Chung et al., 2014b; Happé, 1994; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014; 
Moran et al., 2011). There are a number of psychological assessments that can be 
used to measure the level of autistic traits that individuals display, either using 
questionnaires or observational measures (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et 
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al., 2001; Constantino et al., 2003; Lord et al., 2000; Lord, Rutter, & Couteur, 1994; 
McDonald et al., 2006; Wigham, McConachie, Tandos, & Le Couteur, 2012). 
Therefore, researchers investigating the nature of mentalizing impairments 
associated with ASD have sometimes assessed the relationship between mentalizing 
abilities and levels of autistic traits rather than examining potential group differences 
between clinical and non-clinical populations (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, 
Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016; Nijhof, 
Brass, Bardi, & Wiersema, 2016). This method allows behavioural or neurological 
characteristics associated with ASD to be examined across the spectrum and avoids 
the possibility of the high variability in autistic traits within clinical and non-clinical 
populations masking potential group differences.  
1.7 Experimental evidence for mentalizing deficits in ASD and reasons for 
inconsistencies in the current literature 
Despite the strong association between ASD and mentalizing deficits, experimental 
evidence regarding the nature of these deficits is inconsistent; adults with ASD have 
been shown to display poorer performances on tasks involving inferring the 
intentions of characters in stories and comic strips (Happé, 1994; Kana et al., 2014; 
Moran et al., 2011), reduced abilities to infer the mental states of others’ from still 
images of their eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), from 
their actions (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009) and infer the mental states 
elicited from animated shapes (Castelli et al., 2002). Additionally, adults without an 
ASD diagnosis but high levels of autistic traits have shown reduced abilities to infer 
the mental states of others’ from still images of their eyes (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, 
Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016). However, 
a number of studies have found adults with ASD are not impaired at inferring others’ 
intentions or mental states (Hubert et al., 2007; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, 
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& Just, 2009; Murphy, Brady, Fitzgerald, & Troje, 2009; Saygin, Cook, & 
Blakemore, 2010; Schuwerk et al., 2014; Spek, Scholte, & Van Berckelaer-Onnes, 
2010) and abilities to infer others’ false beliefs are not related to the level of autistic 
traits displayed (Nijhof et al., 2016). Differences in the explicitness of the 
instructions provided, the particular aspects of mentalizing being assessed, the 
stimuli used and methods used to measure mentalizing abilities have all likely 
contributed to the inconsistency in the behavioural data. 
The majority of tasks that have been used to investigate the mentalizing 
abilities of adults with ASD have explicitly instructed the participants to do so 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2002; Happé, 1994; Kana, Libero, Hu, 
Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014). The instructions given in lab settings regarding which 
elements should be attended to and when to attend to these elements, may allow 
some high functioning adults with ASD to perform at a typical level. Only a small 
number of studies have examined the capabilities of adults with ASD to infer the 
internal states of others when not specifically told to do so; known as ‘implicit 
mentalizing’(Castelli et al., 2002; Rosenblau et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; 
Senju et al., 2009). These studies have consistently found that adults with ASD 
exhibit poorer performances. This has led to the suggestion that ASD is associated 
with implicit but not explicit mentalizing deficits (Frith, 2001b; Rosenblau, 
Kliemann, Heekeren, & Dziobek, 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014) 
The apparent difference between implicit and explicit mentalizing abilities 
may be, at least in part, due to differences in the stimuli and methods used to 
measure mentalizing abilities across explicit and implicit tasks. The tasks that have 
been most commonly used to assess explicit mentalizing abilities in adults with ASD 
have been Happé’s strange stories test which involves inferring the intentions of 
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characters in short passages of text (Happé, 1994), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
(RME) task in which participants are asked to infer the others’ mental states from 
still images of their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) and a task which requires 
participants to infer the intentions of characters in comic strips (Kana et al., 2014). 
The stimuli used in all of these tasks are simplistic and do not require complex 
factors such as body posture, action kinematics, face and eye movements to be 
processed which are vital in order to successfully interpret others’ internal states in 
real life social interactions. In contrast, the stimuli that have been used to measure 
implicit mentalizing capabilities have been videos or animations which were more 
complex and naturalistic than the stimuli used in the majority of explicit tasks 
(Rosenbalu et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). 
Two previous studies (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der 
Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001) investigated the abilities of 
adults with Pervasive Development Disorders (PDD; including ASD) to explicitly 
infer the mental states of others using both simplistic stimuli (images of people’s 
eyes and short passages of text) as well as naturalistic videos of social interactions 
(Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 
2001). The adults with PDD did not display impaired mentalizing abilities when 
simplistic stimuli were used but did show impairments on the tasks that used more 
complex, naturalistic stimuli. Additionally, the only study to date that measured both 
implicit and explicit mentalizing abilities using complex, naturalistic stimuli found 
that adults with ASD displayed equivalent impairments on both implicit and explicit 
tasks (Rosenblau et al., 2015). Therefore, differences in the stimuli used between 
studies that investigated explicit mentalizing abilities compared to implicit 
mentalizing abilities may have contributed to the consistent implicit mentalizing 
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deficits reported for adults with ASD but the inconsistent literature regarding the 
explicit mentalizing abilities of adults with ASD.  
In addition to stimuli differences across studies investigating explicit and 
implicit mentalizing abilities, there have also been differences in the way in which 
mentalizing abilities were assessed. Studies investigating implicit mentalizing 
abilities have tended to use eye-tracking data to measure implicit mentalizing 
(Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). In these studies, false belief tasks were 
used which involved a character who was unaware that another character had 
changed the location of an object, either because they were out of the room at the 
time or were looking elsewhere. The character therefore falsely believed that the 
object was still in the original location. When the character came back into the room 
or diverted their attention back to the social scene, adults with ASD tended to show 
reduced durations of fixation on the location in which the character falsely believed 
the object was located. Shorter durations of visual fixation on the locations of false 
belief in adults with ASD were interpreted as impaired implicit mentalizing 
(Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). However, shorter durations of fixation on 
the location of interest do not necessarily reflect a lack of processing; not only are 
unusual patterns of eye gaze widely reported for autistic individuals when processing 
social stimuli (Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Steimke, & Heekeren, 2010; Pelphrey et 
al., 2002) but unusual visual fixation patterns have been found in studies that have 
found no behavioural differences (Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Spezio, Adolphs, 
Hurley, & Piven, 2007). Therefore, eye-tracking data alone may not be an accurate 
measurement of mentalizing abilities. In comparison, explicit mentalizing abilities 
have always been assessed using measurable behavioural outcomes rather than eye-
tracking data alone.  
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Differences in the specific mentalizing abilities assessed across studies may 
have also contributed to inconsistencies in the literature. The term ‘mentalizing’ 
covers a range of internal state inferences which may involve different processes 
(Call & Tomasello, 2008; Pineda & Hecht, 2009). This is supported by 
neuroimaging studies which have shown that different brain areas are active during 
mentalizing tasks depending on the inferences being made (Pineda & Hecht, 2009; 
Schurz et al., 2014). Adults with ASD have shown more consistent impairments in 
inferring others’ intentions (Kana et al., 2014; Murdaugh, Nadendla, & Kana, 2014; 
Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 
2001) and emotions (Atkinson, 2009; Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, & Chapman, 2013; 
Peter G Enticott, Kennedy, Johnston, et al., 2013; Hubert et al., 2007; Nackaerts et 
al., 2012) but less consistent difficulties in inferring mental states (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997; Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 
2001; Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010) or false beliefs (Frith & Happé, 1994; 
Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). Studies which have assessed abilities to 
infer intentions have differed in the types of intentions participants were required to 
infer; consistent deficits have been found in inferring social (Chambon, Farrer, et al., 
2017; Happé, 1994; Moran et al., 2011) and prior intentions (Kana et al., 2014; 
Moran et al., 2011; Sivaratnam, Cornish, Gray, Howlin, & Rinehart, 2012) but not 
motor intentions (Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, & Bower, 2000; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1986; Broekhof et al., 2015; Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001). These 
data suggest that adults with ASD may be particularly impaired in inferring certain 
aspects of another’s internal state. Therefore, differences in the aspects of 
mentalizing assessed, explicitness of the instructions, stimuli used and the methods 
used to measure mentalizing abilities, may have all contributed to the heterogeneity 
41 
	
in the literature. Adults with ASD seem to display particular impairments when 
inferring more abstract intentions or emotions from realistic action stimuli. 
Difficulties inferring others’ social intentions is of particular importance as this 
deficit can result in individuals with ASD making inappropriate social decisions and 
consequently being vulnerable to mistreatment (Fisher, Moskowitz, & Hodapp, 
2013; The National Autistic Society, 2014). 
1.8 The broken mirror neuron hypothesis of ASD 
One of the neurobiological theories for the social impairments associated with ASD 
has been the ‘broken mirror’ theory. The broken mirror theory states that atypical 
functioning of the MNS underlies the social impairments associated with ASD 
(Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007). It is theorised that 
ineffective internal representations of others’ actions are formed as a result of 
dysfunctional MNS activation which causes impaired interpretation of others’ 
actions and ultimately leads to deficits in social communication. The broken mirror 
theory was formed as a result of the high incidence of comorbid motor deficits in 
individuals with ASD (Gowen & Hamilton, 2013; Larson & Mostofsky, 2006; Ming 
et al., 2007) and a number of neuroimaging studies showing that children with ASD 
display atypical MNS activity during tasks typically associated with MNS 
functioning such as imitation (Dapretto et al., 2005; Hobson & Hobson, 2008; 
Rogers et al., 2003; Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004), action planning (Cattaneo et 
al., 2007; Dowd et al., 2012; Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009) and 
gestural performance (Dewey et al., 2007). However, despite the empirical evidence 
for MNS dysfunction in children with ASD, neuroimaging data to support atypical 
MNS activity during tasks traditionally associated with MNS functioning in adults 
with ASD is limited. 
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A small number of studies have provided evidence to suggest that MNS 
activation is atypical during action observation in adults with ASD (Bernier, 
Dawson, Webb, & Murias, 2007; Enticott et al., 2012; Honaga et al., 2010; 
Martineau, Andersson, Barthélémy, Cottier, & Destrieux, 2010) and adults with high 
levels of autistic traits (Puzzo, Cooper, Vetter, Russo, & Fitzgerald, 2009). However, 
these results are limited: Martineau and colleagues found higher IFG activation in 
adults with ASD when observing hand actions (Martineau et al., 2010) but this result 
was due the absence of IFG activation in the control group which is very unusual 
(Buccino et al., 2001; Nelissen, Luppino, Vanduffel, Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2005; 
Plata Bello, Modroño, Marcano, & González-Mora, 2013). One transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) study by Enticott and colleagues found reduced MNS 
activity in adults with ASD when observing hand movements (Enticott et al., 2012) 
but a subsequent TMS study conducted by the same research group did not replicate 
this result (Enticott et al., 2013). In addition, a study by Honaga and colleagues 
found dysfunction in the MNS when memorising observed actions in order to imitate 
them at a later stage but mentalizing system dysfunction was also reported during 
this task (Honaga et al., 2010). It is possible that recruitment of the mentalizing 
system due to the demands of the task resulted in atypical MNS activity in adults 
with ASD. The majority of neuroimaging studies investigating MNS activity during 
tasks traditionally associated with MNS activation e.g. observing and performing 
actions, in adults with ASD have shown typical levels of MNS activity (Avikainen, 
Kulomäki, & Hari, 1999; Bastiaansen et al., 2011; Dinstein et al., 2010; Enticott et 
al., 2013). Despite the limited functional neuroimaging data to support the broken 
mirror theory, lower grey matter volumes and cortical thinning have been discovered 
in the IPL and IFG in adults with ASD (Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-
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Flusberg, 2006; Yamasaki et al., 2010) and these anatomical differences were shown 
to correlate with the degree of social impairment. Levels of grey matter volume in 
left IFG have also shown to correlate with autistic traits in individuals without an 
ASD diagnosis (Geurts, Ridderinkhof, & Scholte, 2013). However, adults with ASD 
generally display typical behavioural performances on tasks traditionally associated 
with MNS functioning (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; Sari Avikainen, 
Wohlschläger, Liuhanen, Hänninen, & Hari, 2003). Therefore, evidence to support 
general dysfunction of the MNS in adults with ASD is limited (Hamilton, 2013). 
Despite the limited evidence supporting general dysfunction of the MNS 
during action observation in adults with ASD, reduced MNS activation has been 
found in adults with ASD during mentalizing tasks. Lower MNS activity has been 
shown in adults with ASD when viewing emotional body movements depicted by 
point-light displays (Hadjikhani et al., 2009) and making emotional judgements 
about faces (Wicker et al., 2008). Mixed samples of adults and adolescents with 
ASD have shown atypical MNS activation when inferring motor intentions from 
hand actions (Libero et al., 2014), inferring prior intentions of characters in comic 
strips (Kana et al., 2014) and inferring the mental states of others from their facial 
expressions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Holt et al, 2014). Reduced MNS activity has 
also been shown to correlate with poorer performances on mentalizing tasks in adults 
and adolescents with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Holt et al., 
2014). Children with ASD and adults with high levels of autistic traits have been 
shown to display difficulties on VPT-2 tasks (Brunyé et al., 2012; Hamilton, 
Brindley, & Frith, 2009) which are mentalizing tasks that been shown to elicit MNS 
activation (Arora, Schurz, & Perner, 2017; Mazzarella, Ramsey, Conson, & 
Hamilton, 2013; Schurz et al., 2015). The degree of MNS activation during VPT-2 
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tasks has also been shown to be positively correlated with task performance 
(Mazzarella et al., 2013). These data provide evidence to suggest that reduced MNS 
during mentalizing tasks may underlie mentalizing difficulties experienced by adults 
with ASD. 
1.9 Mentalizing system activity in ASD 
An alternative hypothesis for the neural basis of mentalizing deficits associated with 
ASD is reduced mentalizing system activation (Frith, 2001; Hamilton, 2009). 
Reduced mentalizing system activation has been reported in individuals with ASD 
during a range of mentalizing tasks (Castelli et al., 2002; Happé et al., 1996; Holt et 
al., 2014a; Kana et al., 2009, 2014). Adults and adolescents with ASD have shown 
impaired performances on mentalizing tasks which only elicit mentalizing system 
activation not MNS activation due to the absence of human action (Castelli et al., 
2002; White et al., 2014) and atypical mentalizing system activation has been shown 
during these tasks (Castelli et al., 2002; White et al., 2014). This has led some 
researchers to conclude that reduced mentalizing system activation is the neural basis 
for mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD, regardless of whether mentalizing 
tasks involve interpreting human action (Frith, 2001; Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991; 
Hamilton, 2009). In support of this theory, reduced mentalizing system activation 
during mentalizing tasks has been shown to correlate with degree of social 
impairment (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; O’Nions et 
al., 2014; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). Autistic adults have been shown 
to exhibit reduced utilisation of prior expectations when inferring the social 
intentions of hand actions (Chambon, Farrer, et al., 2017) and increased mPFC 
activity has been found when reliance on prior expectations is higher when inferring 
social intentions (Chambon, Domenech, et al., 2017a). These data suggest reduced 
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mPFC activation in adults with ASD when inferring the social intentions of others 
from their actions. Additionally, reduced grey matter has also been found in areas of 
the mentalizing system in individuals with ASD (Duerden, Mak-Fan, Taylor, & 
Roberts, 2012; Greimel et al., 2013; McAlonan et al., 2008) further supporting 
atypical functioning of this system in ASD. 
In dispute of this theory, adults with ASD have shown typical performances 
on mentalizing tasks during which they have exhibited reduced mentalizing system 
activity (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015). A number of studies that have 
reported atypical mentalizing system activation during mentalizing tasks have shown 
higher mentalizing system activation in individuals with ASD rather than reduced 
activation (Libero et al., 2014; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; Mason, Williams, Kana, 
Minshew, & Just, 2008; White et al., 2014). Finally, individuals with ASD have 
shown more consistent deficits on mentalizing tasks which involve inferring internal 
states from actions and therefore elicit MNS activity as well as mentalizing system 
activation rather than tasks that do not involve human action (Kana et al., 2009; 
Kirkovski et al., 2015; Lombardo et al., 2011; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, 
& Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015).  
1.10 Connectivity between mirror neuron and mentalizing systems in ASD 
Rather than reduced activation in either the MNS or the mentalizing system 
individually, it is possible that the neural basis of mentalizing deficits associated 
with ASD is dysfunctional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system. Dysfunctional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system 
could explain the findings of typical MNS activation during tasks traditionally 
associated with MNS function but atypical MNS activity reported during 
mentalizing tasks in adults with ASD (Avikainen et al., 1999; Dinstein et al., 2010; 
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Enticott, Kennedy, Rinehart, et al., 2013; Kana et al., 2014; Libero et al., 2014; 
Wicker et al., 2008). Dysfunctional connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system could also explain the consistent impairments found for adults 
with ASD when mentalizing in the presence human action but not in the absence of 
action (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski, Enticott, Hughes, Rossell, & Fitzgerald, 2016; 
Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; 
Rosenblau et al., 2015; Spek et al., 2010). Mentalizing in the absence of action 
information is not thought to require kinematic information to be signalled from the 
MNS to the mentalizing system (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). A number of 
studies have provided evidence that mentalizing system activation alone is sufficient 
in order to infer internal states in the absence of human action (Castelli et al., 2000; 
Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; White et al., 2014). Therefore, if 
mentalizing system activation is typical but connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system is dysfunctional in adults with ASD then this could explain 
greater impairments on mentalizing tasks involving human action. Similarly, MNS 
activation without mentalizing system activation may be sufficient in order to infer 
motor intentions (Catmur, 2015; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005); motor intentions are 
directly related to observed actions, meaning that motor simulation in the MNS may 
be sufficient in order to infer these intentions and connectivity with the mentalizing 
system may not be required. Social, prior and communicative intentions are more 
abstract and further removed from observed actions and therefore inferring these 
more abstract intentions is thought to require integration of action kinematics with 
contextual information through connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system (Liew et al., 2011; Mainieri et al., 2013; Spunt & Leiberman, 2012c; de 
Lange et al., 2008). Dysfunctional connectivity between these two systems but 
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typical activation in the MNS could therefore explain the typical performances 
reported for adults with ASD when inferring motor intentions but consistent 
impairments in inferring more abstract intentions (Aldridge et al., 2000; Broekhof et 
al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2001; Kana et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2011; Sivaratnam et 
al., 2012). Collectively these data suggest that impairments in ASD are more 
pronounced when reliance on connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system is higher. 
Only a limited number of studies have investigated functional connectivity 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system in individuals with ASD when 
mentalizing (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015; Kana et al., 2014; Libero et al., 2014; Mason 
et al., 2008; Von Dem Hagen, Stoyanova, Rowe, Baron-Cohen, & Calder, 2014) and 
even fewer have investigated connectivity in adults exclusively (Mason et al., 2008; 
Von Dem Hagen et al., 2014). Developmental changes in brain activation and 
functional connectivity patterns in individuals with ASD (Long, Duan, Mantini, & 
Chen, 2016; Nomi & Uddin, 2015) mean that data from children with ASD cannot 
necessarily be generalised to adults. Some studies have investigated functional 
connectivity in adults with ASD when mentalizing but not included areas of the 
MNS in the connectivity analyses (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015; Libero et al., 2014; Von 
Dem Hagen et al., 2014; Wicker et al., 2008). The limited studies that have 
investigated functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system 
have reported atypical connectivity in adults with ASD when inferring prior 
intentions from passages of text (Mason et al., 2008), in adults and adolescents with 
ASD when inferring prior intentions from comic strips (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015; 
Kana et al., 2014) and in children with ASD when viewing emotional facial 
expressions (Rudie et al., 2012a). Atypical connectivity between the MNS and the 
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mentalizing system has also been reported during rest in adults (Kennedy & 
Courchesne, 2008), adolescents (Fishman, Keown, Lincoln, Pineda, & Müller, 2014) 
and mixed samples of adults and adolescents (Assaf et al., 2010; Shih et al., 2010) 
with ASD. These data support the existence of atypical functional connectivity 
between these two systems in ASD but the simplistic stimuli used as well as the 
inclusion of children and adolescents, mean it is unclear whether dysfunctional 
connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system underlies the mentalizing 
difficulties experienced by adults with ASD. No studies to date have investigated 
functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system when inferring 
others’ internal states from their actions which is important in terms of 
understanding the neural basis of the deficits associated with ASD. The behavioural 
data show adults with ASD exhibit consistent impairments in inferring internal states 
from naturalistic videos of others’ actions but not when simplistic stimuli, such as 
the stimuli used in the existing functional connectivity studies, are used (Ponnet, 
Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001).  
It is possible that connectivity is more dysfunctional between certain areas of 
the MNS and the mentalizing system in ASD than between other areas. More 
consistent impairments have been reported for adults with ASD in inferring 
intentions and emotions (Atkinson, 2009; Kana et al., 2014; Murdaugh et al., 2014; 
Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 
2001) compared to inferring mental states and beliefs (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski 
et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; Spek et al., 2010). Neuroimaging studies have 
shown that areas of brain activation and patterns of functional connectivity differ 
depending on the aspects of another’s internal state being inferred (Ciaramidaro et 
al., 2014; Pineda & Hecht, 2009; Rudie et al., 2012b; Schurz et al., 2014; Spunt & 
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Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b). Therefore, connections which are particularly important 
for inferring intentions and emotions of others may show higher levels of 
dysfunction. Currently, the literature is too limited to make any firm predictions 
regarding the specific areas that may display particularly dysfunctional connectivity 
in adults with ASD. Further characterisation of the patterns of activity and functional 
connectivity when making different internal state inferences is required. 
1.11 Mentalizing deficits as a result of more generalised deficit 
Theories of ASD exist which attempt to explain ASD characteristics more broadly 
and could account for the mentalizing deficits associated with ASD. The executive 
deficit hypothesis of ASD suggests that individuals with ASD exhibit a more 
generalised dysfunction in executive functioning (such as planning, inhibition, action 
monitoring and working memory) rather than mentalizing-specific deficits (Hill, 
2004; White 2013). A number of studies have provided evidence for executive 
functioning deficits in individuals with ASD (Chen et al., 2016; Robinson et al., 
2009; Zimmerman et al., 2016). Executive functioning is thought to rely on frontal 
cortical areas which largely overlap with areas associated with the mentalizing 
system (Ybarra & Winkielman, 2012). Therefore, it is possible that atypical 
functioning in areas of the mentalizing system and poorer performances on 
mentalizing tasks could result from a more generalised deficit in executive 
dysfunction. However, not all individuals with ASD display executive functioning 
deficits (Demetriou et al., 2017; Pellicano et al., 2006) and individuals with ASD 
who do not display executive functioning deficits have shown poorer performances 
on mentalizing tasks (Pellicano, 2007) suggesting mentalizing deficits associated 
with ASD can exist independently of executive functioning deficits. 
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The predictive coding theory of ASD implies that characteristics associated 
with ASD result from a generalised deficit in prediction (van Boxtel & Lu, 2013, van 
de Cruys et al., 2014). This theory states that individuals with ASD have reduced 
abilities to predict upcoming events and cannot appropriately update future 
predictions as a consequence of prediction errors made, resulting in striving for 
sameness (de Cruys et al., 2014). Empirical evidence has been provided to show 
adults with ASD display reduced abilities to predict the outcome of others’ actions 
(Zalla, Labruyère, Clément, & Georgieff, 2010) and do not display typical improved 
visual discrimination of a gesture when shown a complimentary responsive gesture 
(von der Lune et al., 2016) suggesting reduced ability to predict actions based on 
contextual information. Repetitive behaviours associated with ASD are hypothesised 
to reflect a desire for predictable sensory consequences (Chambon et al., 2017). 
Kilner and colleagues have hypothesised that MNS functioning can be explained 
within the predictive coding framework (Kilner et al., 2007). It is possible that MNS 
dysfunction, and perhaps difficulties inferring internal states from actions, may be 
the result of a wider predictive coding deficit. 
1.12 Summary 
In summary, both the MNS and the mentalizing system are thought to be involved in 
inferring others’ internal states from their actions but the precise roles of these 
systems and the nature of the interaction between them are unknown. Adults with 
ASD are widely regarded to exhibit difficulties inferring the internal states of others 
(known as ‘mentalizing’). However, despite the strong association between ASD and 
mentalizing difficulties, the existing literature is inconsistent regarding the nature of 
the mentalizing difficulties experienced by adults with ASD. Differences across 
studies in the explicitness of the instructions, stimuli used, particular internal state 
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inferences being made, as well as the methods used to measure mentalizing abilities, 
are all likely to have contributed to inconsistencies in the literature. Only a very 
limited number of neuroimaging studies have investigated patterns of brain 
activation and functional connectivity in adults with ASD when inferring the internal 
states of others from their actions. Therefore, it is uncertain as to the exact nature of 
mentalizing deficits experienced by adults with ASD and the neural basis of these 
difficulties.  
1.13 Aims of the current thesis 
The aims of this thesis were to examine the nature of mentalizing difficulties 
associated with ASD, delineate between existing models of MNS involvement in 
mentalizing, and identify the neural basis of mentalizing difficulties associated with 
ASD. The review of the current literature highlights that adults with ASD appear to 
show consistent implicit mentalizing deficits but inconsistent explicit mentalizing 
deficits. However, this comparison is confounded by differences in the methods used 
to measure mentalizing abilities, as well as the stimuli and particular internal states 
being inferred across studies. Chapter 2 aimed to address these issues by examining 
the implicit and explicit mentalizing abilities of adults with ASD using the same 
video stimuli. Abilities to both implicitly and explicitly infer the social intentions of 
others’ from their actions were assessed using measurable behavioural outcomes. 
Eye-tracking data was also collected to explore the relationship between possible 
atypical fixation patterns and behavioural performance. 
We then sort to investigate the neural basis of the mentalizing difficulties 
associated with ASD through brain stimulation and neuroimaging experiments. 
Firstly, the TMS experiment presented in Chapter 3 was designed in attempt to 
delineate between existing models of MNS involvement in mentalizing; the motor 
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simulation theory, the mirroring-first hypothesis, the dual-process hypothesis and the 
predictive coding theory. These models differ in the anticipated timing of MNS 
activation during mentalizing tasks as well as the predicted relationship between 
MNS activity and behavioural performance. Therefore, the TMS experiment in 
Chapter 3 investigated the timing of TMS activation as well as the relationship 
between MNS activation and performance in typically developing individuals whilst 
inferring the social intentions of others from their actions. The high temporal 
resolution of TMS and the well-established TMS index of MNS activity meant TMS 
was the ideal technique to examine the timing of MNS involvement in mentalizing. 
The timing of MNS involvement identified in Chapter 3 was then used to 
investigate mentalizing-specific MNS activity in adults with ASD. The broken 
mirror hypothesis proposes that MNS activity is reduced in individuals with ASD 
and this underlies some of the social deficits they experience. Evidence to support 
reduced MNS activation as the neural basis for mentalizing difficulties in adults with 
ASD is limited but only a small number of studies have investigated MNS activity 
during mentalizing tasks in exclusively adult samples and those that have, have used 
simplistic mentalizing tasks on which adults with ASD do not show consistent 
impairments. The study presented in Chapter 4 aimed to investigate whether reduced 
MNS activity may underlie the mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD by 
examining levels of MNS activity during a mentalizing task which used complex 
action stimuli. Both TMS and electroencephalography (EEG) techniques were used 
to measure MNS activity. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, presents an fMRI experiment which 
aimed to identify whether reduced functional connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system in adults with ASD may underlie the mentalizing difficulties 
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they experience. The existing neuroimaging literature suggest that connectivity 
between these two systems is important for inferring internal states of others from 
their actions. Behavioural data from adults with ASD imply that mentalizing deficits 
experienced by these individuals are more pronounced on tasks which are considered 
to involve increased reliance on connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system. However, no study to date has investigated connectivity between the MNS 
and the mentalizing system in adults with ASD when inferring internal states of 
others from their actions. 
Chapter 6 outlines the key findings from all the experiments presented in this 
thesis and discusses how the results contribute to our knowledge of MNS 
involvement in mentalizing, the nature of connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system, the mentalizing deficits experienced by adults with ASD and the 
neural basis of these deficits. 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 correspond to individual papers. The research 
presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have been submitted for publication, Chapter 5 
corresponds to a paper currently in preparation. Because the chapters are based upon 
research papers, there is a degree of overlap in the content of the introductions in 
these individual chapters and presented here in the introduction. I apologise for the 
repetitive nature of the introductions and I hope each introduction helps frame the 





Chapter 2: Abilities to Explicitly and Implicitly Infer 
Intentions from Actions in Adults with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder 
 
This chapter is adapted from: Cole, E.J., Slocombe K.E., Barraclough N. E. 
(accepted). Abilities to explicitly and implicitly infer intentions from actions in 




Previous research suggests that Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) might be 
associated with impairments on implicit but not explicit mentalizing tasks. However, 
such comparisons are made difficult by the heterogeneity of stimuli and the 
techniques used to measure mentalizing capabilities. We tested the abilities of 34 
individuals (17 with ASD) to derive intentions from others’ actions during both 
explicit and implicit tasks and tracked their eye-movements. Adults with ASD 
displayed explicit but not implicit mentalizing deficits. Adults with ASD displayed 
typical fixation patterns during both implicit and explicit tasks. These results 
																																								 																				
1  The author, Eleanor Cole, designed the experiment, collected the data, analysed 
the results and wrote the manuscript under the supervision of Dr Nick Barraclough. 





illustrate an explicit mentalizing deficit in adults with ASD, which cannot be 
attributed to differences in fixation patterns.  
2.2 Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is the term used in the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) to describe a range 
of neurodevelopmental disorders, classified according to core deficits in social 
communication and interaction as well as restricted and repetitive interests 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). One of the social communication 
difficulties associated with ASD is difficulty inferring the internal states of others 
including their intentions, mental states and beliefs (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2014; Frith, 2001; Holt et 
al., 2014; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999), collectively referred to as mentalizing 
deficits. Mentalizing deficits are so strongly associated with ASD that mentalizing 
abilities are even assessed in diagnostic and screening tools such as the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-2) and the Autism Quotient (AQ) scale (S 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Lord et al., 2000). Due to the 
spectral nature of ASD, individuals without a diagnosis also display varying degrees 
of autistic traits. Individuals with relatively high but not clinically significant levels 
of autistic traits have been shown to display subtler versions of the behavioural and 
neurological characteristics associated with ASD (Best, Arora, Porter, & Doherty, 
2015; Di Martino et al., 2009; Lindell, Notice, & Withers, 2009; Ridley, Homewood, 
& Walters, 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013) including mentalizing deficits (S Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Chung et al., 2014b; F. G. Happé, 1994; 
Kana et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2011)   
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Despite the strong association between ASD and mentalizing deficits, 
experimental evidence regarding the nature of these deficits is inconsistent, with 
some studies finding that adults with ASD are impaired at inferring intentions, 
emotions and mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 
2001; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Happé, 1994; Kana et al., 2014; Moran 
et al., 2011; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009) and others reporting adults with 
ASD (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, 
& Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010) and high levels of 
autistic traits (Nijhof et al., 2016) show typical performances on mentalizing tasks. A 
number of factors may have contributed to these inconsistent findings, including 
whether task instructions explicitly stated that participants should mentalize, the 
stimuli used, the type of mentalizing assessed and the method used to measure 
mentalizing abilities.   
The majority of previous studies have explicitly asked participants to make 
inferences about the internal states of others (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2000; Happé, 1994; Holt et al., 2014; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009; Kana et al., 2014; 
McAleer, Kay, Pollick, & Rutherford, 2011; Roeyers et al., 2001). Only a small 
number of studies have examined the capabilities of adults with ASD to infer the 
internal states of others when not specifically told to do so; this is known as ‘implicit 
mentalizing’. The existing adult literature shows consistent implicit mentalizing 
deficits associated with ASD (Castelli et al., 2002; Rosenblau et al., 2015; Schuwerk 
et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009) but the explicit mentalizing data are inconsistent 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Castelli et al., 2002; Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 
2015; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004). It may be 
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that the instructions given concerning which elements should be attended to during 
explicit tasks, allow some high functioning adults with ASD to perform at a typical 
level, which they would be unable to do without the explicit instructions. 
The apparent existence of a consistent implicit mentalizing deficit but lack of 
a consistent explicit mentalizing deficit in adults with ASD in the existing literature 
may, however, be attributable to other confounding factors, including stimuli 
differences. Most studies that have reported implicit mentalizing deficits in adults 
with ASD have used movie stimuli (e.g. Rosenbalu et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 
2014; Senju et al., 2009), which were more complex and naturalistic than stimuli 
used in the majority of explicit tasks. The stimuli used in the majority of explicit 
mentalizing tasks were passages of text, still images or cartoon strips which provide 
very simplistic representations of social interactions and a number of these studies 
found no mentalizing deficits  in adults with ASD (e.g. Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski 
et al., 2015; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; 
Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001; Spek, Scholte, & Van Berckelaer-Onnes, 
2010). In support of this argument, two previous studies (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, 
De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001) investigated the abilities 
of adults with Pervasive Development Disorders (PDD; including ASD) to explicitly 
infer the mental states of others using both simple stimuli (images of people’s eyes 
and short passages of text) and naturalistic videos of social interactions. The adults 
with PDD were not impaired on the explicit mentalizing tasks that used the simple 
stimuli but did show impairments with the more complex naturalistic stimuli 
(Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 
2001). Additionally, the only previous study that has investigated both implicit and 
explicit mentalizing abilities using complex, naturalistic stimuli found that adults 
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with ASD displayed equivalent impairments on both implicit and explicit tasks 
(Rosenblau et al., 2015).   
Differences in the way mentalizing performances have been measured may 
have also contributed to existence of consistent implicit mentalizing deficits but 
inconsistent data regarding explicit mentalizing abilities in the previous adult 
literature. Some studies have measured implicit mentalizing abilities using eye-
tracking data alone (Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). In these studies, 
participants watched animations in which a character wrongly believed an object was 
in a certain location. Adults with ASD spent shorter periods fixating on the place in 
which the character wrongly believed the object was located. This was interpreted as 
impaired implicit mentalizing. However, a number of studies have reported that 
adults with ASD have unusual patterns of eye gaze when processing social stimuli 
(Kliemann et al., 2010; Pelphrey et al., 2002) and unusual fixation patterns have 
been found during face processing tasks in the absence of behavioural differences 
(Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007). Therefore, 
adults with ASD may be able to deduce the internal states of others despite atypical 
eye movements. In contrast, explicit mentalizing studies have always used 
measurable behavioural outcomes to assess mentalizing abilities.  
The term ‘mentalizing’ covers a variety of internal state inferences which 
may involve different processes (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Pineda & Hecht, 2009); it 
is possible that the different internal state inferences required across studies may 
have also contributed to the heterogeneity in the literature. Previous studies have 
reliably found that adults with ASD are impaired at inferring others’ intentions 
(Kana et al., 2014; Murdaugh, Nadendla, & Kana, 2014; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, 
De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001) and others’ emotions 
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(Atkinson, 2009; Cassidy et al., 2013; Peter G Enticott, Kennedy, Johnston, et al., 
2013; Hubert et al., 2007; Nackaerts et al., 2012). However, the existing literature is 
more inconsistent regarding abilities to infer others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997; Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 
2001; Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010) or false beliefs (Frith & Happé, 1994; 
Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). The neuroimaging and developmental 
literature also support the argument that the different subcomponents of mentalizing 
reflect different processes; the results of a meta-analysis suggest that children 
develop the ability to infer others’ desires before they are able to infer others’ beliefs 
and can detect others’ emotions before they can deduce false beliefs (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). Additionally, neuroimaging studies have shown that different brain areas 
are active during mentalizing tasks depending on the inferences being made (Pineda 
& Hecht, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). Collectively, these data suggest that the 
subcomponents of mentalizing are distinct processes associated with different brain 
areas and developmental trajectories.  
In summary, although ASD is associated with mentalizing deficits, the nature 
of these deficits is unclear. The existing literature suggests that adults with ASD are 
more likely to show impaired performances on implicit mentalizing tasks using 
complex naturalistic stimuli that probe understanding of intentions or emotions. To 
our knowledge, only one study to date has assessed both implicit and explicit 
mentalizing abilities in adults with ASD using measurable behavioural outcomes 
(Rosenblau et al., 2015). In this study, a comparison between adults with and without 
ASD found that participants with ASD showed reduced abilities to both implicitly 
and explicitly infer the mental states of actors from short movies but there was no 
difference in the degree of impairment between tasks. However, this study did not 
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use a non-mentalizing control task so it is unclear whether the poorer performances 
observed in adults with ASD were specifically due to mentalizing deficits or whether 
poorer performances reflect reduced abilities to perform the experimental tasks in 
general. Thus the current study aimed to test the abilities of adults with ASD to both 
implicitly and explicitly mentalize, using complex stimuli, measurable behavioural 
outcomes and a non-mentalizing control task.   
This study specifically investigated the abilities of adults with ASD to both 
implicitly and explicitly infer the intentions of others from the kinematics of their 
hand actions using the same naturalistic stimuli. Previous studies have shown that 
hand actions with different intentions display subtle differences in action kinematics 
and adults without ASD are able to infer others’ intentions from these differences in 
action kinematics (Ansuini et al., 2015; Sartori, Becchio, Bara, & Castiello, 2009). In 
the first experiment, participants watched videos of actors playing a poker chip game 
and had to decide which actor, from a choice of two, they would prefer to play the 
poker chip game with. Participants were shown one video depicting an actor 
deliberately not passing a poker chip to another player (‘spiteful’ action) and a video 
of another actor accidentally not passing a poker chip to another player (‘clumsy’ 
action). In this task, participants were not explicitly asked to infer actors’ intentions; 
rather participants’ choice of actor was dependent upon ‘covert’ mentalizing 
(implicit mentalizing task). In contrast, during the second experiment, participants 
watched the same movies and were explicitly asked to infer the intentions of the 
actors. In addition to contrasting the performance of the ASD and typically 
developing groups, due to the spectral nature of ASD, we then examined the 
relationship between the level of autistic traits displayed and abilities to infer others’ 
intentions across all participants. We also tracked participants’ eye movements 
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during both experiments in order to test whether any potential behavioural 
differences associated with autistic traits could be explained by atypical fixation 
patterns (cf. Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al. 2009). It was predicted that adults 
with ASD would display reduced abilities to infer the intentions of others compared 
to matched control participants and across all participants higher levels of autistic 
traits would predict poorer performances. We also hypothesised that mentalizing 
deficits associated with ASD would be more evident in the implicit task compared to 
the explicit task. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-one adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; 14 male) were recruited 
for this study. The majority of the ASD sample were students from the University of 
York (n=13) and the remaining ASD participants were recruited from a local support 
group. Four participants were excluded for having scores that were not significantly 
higher than chance on the control task (see below).  This resulted in a final 
participant sample of 17 adults with ASD (10 male ages 18-56, mean age=23.71, 
SD=9.24) and 17 individually age, sex and IQ matched control participants (TD – 
Typically Developing; ages 18-55, mean age=23.71, SD=9.07). See Table 2.1 for 
participant demographics. 
All participants in the ASD group had a clinical diagnosis of Asperger’s 
(n=14) or Autism Spectrum Disorder. All diagnoses were issued by qualified 
clinicians external to this study. None of the ASD participants had a history of 
delayed language development or existing learning difficulties. All participants had 
IQ scores above 100. All neurotypical participants reported that they had no 
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neurological disorders and adults diagnosed with ASD reported no other 
neurological conditions. 
Experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the Department of 
Psychology, University of York, and were performed in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1990 Declaration of Helsinki. 
Table 2.1 
Participant demographic information; group mean (SD) values  
  ASD TD p 
AGE 23.71 (9.24) 23.71 (9.07) 0.97 
GENDER (male:female) 10:7 10:7 1.00 (X2) 
IQ (WASI)1 120.12 (9.32) 120.00 (10.09) 0.93 
WASI verbal score2 62.88 (6.66) 61.61 (7.52) 0.86 
    
1The IQ scores were obtained using the two-subtest version of Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI). 
2The verbal WASI scores given are standardised scores (T-scores). 
p values were derived from a one-way MANOVA unless otherwise stated 
 
2.3.2 Psychological tests 
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2000), Social 
Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003), The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald et al., 2006), Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2001) and Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 
1999) were administered to all participants. The ADOS-2 assessments were filmed 
63 
	
and then scored by both the experimenter and an independent rater who was blind as 
to whether participants had a diagnosis or not. Both the experimenter and 
independent rater were trained to the level of research reliability on the ADOS-2 
assessment. If the ADOS-2 scores differed between the experimenter and 
independent rater, the assessment movies were re-watched and a final score was 
agreed on. The independent ADOS-2 scores never differed by more than 2 points 
between the raters. The SRS and TASIT are designed to detect social impairment. 
The SRS is a self-report measure and TASIT measures abilities to detect sarcasm 
and lies from movies showing social interactions. The AQ is a self-report measure of 
autistic traits. The two subtest version of the WASI was used to measure the IQ of 
participants. All these psychological tests have been shown to have good 
psychometric properties (Allison, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Muncer, 
2011; Constantino et al., 2003b; Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray, 
2007; Skye McDonald et al., 2006; Oosterling et al., 2010). 
2.3.3 Stimuli 
The movie stimuli were designed to show different actors playing a poker chip 
exchange game. The poker chip game involved passing poker chips to another player 
through slots in a white wooden board (see Figure 2.1). Ten different types of hand 
actions were filmed (Panasonic TM900 HD-DV camera; 1920 x 1080 pixels at 50Hz 
progressive scan). Five of the hand actions involved pushing poker chips with the 
index finger of the right hand through a slot in the board which was level with the 
surface of the table. The other five hand actions involved grasping poker chips with 
the index finger and thumb of the right hand and passing them through a slot in the 
board at head height. Two different types of actions were used to generalise results 
across different action types. Both pushing and grasping actions were executed by 
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the actor in 5 different ways: 1. clumsily failing to pass one poker chip - here the 
actor had a positive intention to pass the chip to the other player, but the outcome of 
the action was unsuccessful (clumsy 1); 2. Clumsily failing to pass five pokers chips; 
positive intention to pass the chips, but the outcome of the action was unsuccessful 
(clumsy 5); 3. Spitefully (deliberately) failing to pass one poker chip; no intention to 
pass the chip to the other player and the outcome of the action was unsuccessful 
(spiteful 1); 4. Successfully passing one poker chip; the actor intended to pass the 
poker chip and the action was successful (successful 1); 5. Successfully passing five 
poker chips; the actor intended to pass the poker chips and the action was successful 
(successful 5).  
 
Figure 2.1 Example screenshots from the hand action movies depicting positive and 
negative intentions. A. The actor pushes five poker chips with a positive intention 
(clumsy 5 pushing action). B. The actor deliberately pushes a poker chip away from 
the slot (spiteful 1 pushing action). C. The actor accidentally drops a poker chip 
(clumsy 1 grasping action). D. The actor deliberately drops the poker chip (spiteful 1 
grasping action). The squares overlaid onto action A illustrate the regions of interest 
(ROIs) used for the eye-tracking analyses. 
65 
	
Twenty-eight different actors (14 female) were filmed performing all ten 
actions, from a three-quarters view from behind at an angle that allowed their right 
hand to be seen in front of them for the entire duration of the hand action but only 
showed a limited side profile of their face. This prevented participants from using 
facial information to infer the intentions of actors and required intentions to be 
inferred from the action kinematics alone (cf. Sartori et al 2009; Ansuini et al. 2015). 
This was done in order to investigate whether adults with ASD are impaired at 
inferring others’ intentions irrespective of reduced fixation on the eyes, which has 
been well reported (Bird, Press, & Richardson, 2011; Kliemann et al., 2010; 
Papagiannopoulou, Chitty, Hermens, Hickie, & Lagopoulos, 2014; Tottenham et al., 
2014).  
The actors sat in front of a white wooden board measuring 84 x 61cm with 
two slots (4 x 17cm) cut out of it (see Figure 2.1). Actions started with the actor’s 
right hand resting on a small marker for 3 seconds. In order to ensure all hand 
actions lasted approximately two seconds, a buzzer indicated to the actors when to 
move their hand towards the poker chips and signalled again to indicate when the 
actors should let go of the poker chips. Actors performed each of the 10 different 
actions at least 3 times; for each actor the action with the best timing and that best 
depicted the particular intention was selected for the final movie.  Movies were 
edited (Sony Vegas Pro 10) to finish 0.4 seconds after the poker chips left the actors’ 
hands; for grasping actions, this was always before the poker chips hit the table. In 
addition, the starts of all movies were trimmed such that they lasted exactly 4 
seconds. Editing the movies in this way meant that movement onset occurred at 
slightly different times in each movie (frames 32 - 146).  
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The chosen movies were rated by 30 independent observers who were 
students at the University of York. Observers classified each action as either 
‘clumsy’, ‘spiteful’ or ‘neither’ by pressing one of three keys on the computer 
keyboard.  Clumsy responses were coded as -1, spiteful responses were coded as 1 
and neither responses were coded as 0. For each action, scores were averaged across 
participants to generate an index of the degree of ‘spitefulness’ conveyed by each 
movie where -1 indicates a strong evaluation of the action as clumsy, +1 indicates a 
strong evaluation of the action as spiteful, and 0 indicates an evaluation of the action 
as neither clumsy or spiteful. Spiteful videos were required to have spitefulness 
indexes higher than .4 and clumsy videos were required to have indexes below -.4 to 
be included in the stimuli set. Three clumsy movies had spitefulness indexes that 
were higher than -.4 and therefore were deemed to not clearly portray the desired 
intention (.16, .03 and -.03 spitefulness indexes). These movies were replaced with 
new stimuli which were rated by another 30 independent observers and these stimuli 
all obtained ratings lower than -.4. The final stimuli used fell into three significantly 
(F(2,165)=1644.94, p<.001, ηp2=.95) distinct groups; clumsy (M=-.68, SD=.15), 
spiteful (M=.80, SD=.13) and successful (M=.01, SD=.03) actions.; 
2.3.4 Experiment 1 (Implicit mentalizing): Design and procedure 
Experiment 1 tested the participants’ abilities to implicitly infer the intentions of 
others from their hand actions. The task was adapted from one previously used with 
children (Behne & Carpenter, 2005) and  chimpanzees (Call, Hare, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2004). In these studies, experimenters either deliberately or 
‘accidentally’ did not give the chimpanzees or children rewards (in the form of food 
or a toy respectively). Both the chimpanzees and the children attempted to interact 
with the experimenters for longer when experimenters accidentally dropped the 
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reward rather than when they deliberately did not give the reward. This implied the 
experimenters’ intentions had been implicitly inferred and consequently the 
appropriate social decisions were made. 
In our experiment, each participant took part in a poker chip exchange game 
with the experimenter prior to the main experiment in order to familiarise them with 
the actions shown during the experiment, and to demonstrate the value of receiving 
poker chips from a partner. Participants were told that the experimenter would start 
with 8 poker chips that were each worth one pound. However, in order for the 
experimenter to receive money for their poker chips at the end of the game, they had 
to give at least one poker chip to the participant. If the experimenter had all the poker 
chips on their side of the board at the end of the game, neither the experimenter nor 
the participant would receive any money. The experimenter then had three chances 
to make a deal with the participant; they would pass some poker chips through the 
slots in the wooden board to the participant on the other side. The participant had to 
accept or reject the number of poker chips that were offered each turn. If the 
participant accepted then they would receive a pound coin for every chip on their 
side, if they rejected the number of poker chips offered, then the experimenter would 
have to offer a different number of chips. If no agreement was reached after three 
rounds then neither the participant nor the experimenter received any money. The 
aim of the game for the participant was to end up with as many chips as possible on 
their side of the board. Every participant played the poker chip game four times to 
gain a good understanding of the purpose of passing the chips and the value of the 
chips (three times as the participant and once in the experimenter role). Over the 
three games in the participant role, each participant experienced (i) a round in which 
the experimenter acted spitefully (experimenter offered no chips to the participant 
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and explained they were doing so in order to reduce the number of chances to make a 
deal and increase the chances of the participant accepting a lower offer); and (ii) a 
round in which the experimenter acted clumsily (experimenter accidentally dropped 
the poker chips and thus failed to make an offer) so that all participants had practical 
experience of both clumsy and spiteful actions. Participants also played one game in 
which they switched roles with the experimenter to ensure they understood the game 
fully.  
A PC running MATLAB R2015a controlled the experiment and recorded 
participant responses. Participants sat approximately 60cm from an Acer GD245HQ 
24” HD monitor on which all stimuli were presented. Participants’ eye movements 
were recorded during the experiment using an EyeTribe eye tracker (The EyeTribe 
Abs, Copenhagen). Participants rested their heads in a chin rest and fixation data 
from both eyes was recorded at 30Hz. A 9-point calibration procedure was carried 
out before conducting each experiment. Participants for which the eye-tracker could 
not reach a satisfactory level of accuracy on the calibration (3/5 star rating; 
indicating <1° accuracy) were excluded from subsequent eye-tracking analysis. Six 
participants (four from the ASD group, two from the TD group) were removed from 
the implicit experiment eye-tracking analysis. Eye tracker data recording was 
controlled using the EyeTribe MATLAB toolbox (Dalmaijer; available on GitHub: 
https://github.com/esdalmaijer/EyeTribe-Toolbox-for-Matlab).  
Participants were told that they would watch movies of individuals playing 
the poker chip game they had just played themselves. Each movie would show a 
player’s first attempt to offer poker chips to someone on the other side of the board. 
The participants watched pairs of movies and had to decide subsequently whether 
they would rather continue playing the poker chip game with the actor in the first or 
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the second movie. Each trial consisted of two actions of the same type (either both 
grasping or both pushing) presented sequentially with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
of 1000ms, during which the screen was black except for a white fixation cross. 
Following the second movie a response screen was displayed and participants had to 
indicate whether they would rather interact with the actor in the first or second movie 
by pressing either 1 or 2 on the keyboard (see Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Sequence of stages during a Mentalizing trial in the implicit task. Action 
1 shows a female actor deliberately dropping a poker chip (spiteful 1) and action 2 
shows a male actor accidentally dropping a poker chip (clumsy 1). In order to decide 
whether to interact with actor 1 or actor 2 the participant must infer the intentions of 
the actors from the kinematics of their actions because the outcomes of the two 
actions are identical. 
Different forms of decision making were required to make a choice between 
the first and second actors in three different conditions; we refer to them as 
‘Mentalizing’, ‘Action’ or ‘Either’ conditions. 1. Mentalizing condition: correct 
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decisions could be based upon inferences of intention only and consisted of movies 
of an action with a positive intention (clumsy 1) and an action with a negative 
intention (spiteful 1). Here, in order to decide between the actors, participants needed 
to infer the intentions of the actors from the kinematics of their actions. The 
outcomes of the actions were the same (both actors failed to pass a poker chip to 
another player) but the intentions of the actors were different. 2. Action condition: 
correct decisions could be based upon action recognition only, consisted of movies 
of actors successfully passing poker chips (successful 1 and successful 5). Here, in 
order to decide between the actors, participants needed to recognise whether the 
actor was passing 1 or 5 poker chips, and did not require participants to mentalize in 
order to complete the task. 3. Either condition: decisions were based upon 
recognition of the action, or possibly inferences of intention, and consisted of movies 
of actors attempting to pass poke chips (clumsy 1 and clumsy 5). Here, in order to 
decide between the actors, participants were expected to focus on the number of 
chips being offered and choose the actor trying to pass the higher number of poker 
chips, but participants may have automatically processed the actors’ intentions and 
recognized that both actors have the same positive intention. This condition was 
included in order to test for the differences in success of the actions between the 
Mentalizing and Action conditions, given that Mentalizing trials always showed 
unsuccessful actions and Action trials always showed successful actions; Either trials 
always showed unsuccessful  actions but did not require mentalizing.  
At the start of testing, participants completed six practice trials (two of each 
condition) in order to familiarise them with the experimental procedure. The stimuli 
used in the practice trials were not included in the main experiments and the actors 
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compared against each other in the implicit practice trials were not compared against 
each other in the main implicit experiment.  
Participants completed 72 trials in total, viewing 144 actions (12 repeats of 
each action except clumsy 1 which was shown 24 times); trials lasted approximately 
12 seconds depending on response times, and testing took approximately 15 minutes. 
The same actor never performed the same action (e.g. spiteful1 pushing action) 
twice, such that participants did not learn to associate certain behaviours with 
specific individuals. Every actor was seen the same number of times and each actor 
performed a preferable action 50% of the time; actor gender was also 
counterbalanced. Condition order was randomised and action order was 
counterbalanced so that the preferred action would occur first in 50% of the trials, 
e.g. on 50% of the Mentalizing trials the clumsy movies were shown before spiteful 
movies. 
2.3.5 Experiment 2 (Explicit mentalizing): Design and procedure 
In the second experiment, participants were asked explicitly to report the intentions 
of actors presented in movies. Participants returned approximately 3 months 
(average 112 days) after they completed Experiment 1 to complete Experiment 2. 
This helped minimalize the possibility of participants’ previous implicit judgements 
influencing their explicit judgements of the actions. Two of the ASD participants 
were unable to return to complete the explicit experiment, leaving a sample of thirty 
participants (15 matched pairs) in the explicit experiment. 
As with experiment 1, participants first completed six practice trials (two of 
each stimulus type), in order to familiarise them with the experimental procedure.  
Participants then viewed all 144 of the movies seen in the Experiment 1. After each 
movie, participants had to indicate whether they thought the movie showed a 
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‘spiteful’ (deliberate), clumsy (accidental) or successful action by pressing 1, 2 or 3 
respectively on the computer keyboard. The experiment consisted of two blocks of 
10 minutes (72 movies shown in each). Each block contained 36 clumsy actions, 12 
spiteful actions and 24 successful actions, the order of movies was randomised 
within each block and no movies were repeated. A response screen was shown after 
each movie until the participant responded. The PC, display and eye-tracker were all 
identical to Experiment 1. Two participants from the ASD group were removed from 
the explicit experiment eye-tracking analysis for not reaching a satisfactory level of 
accuracy on the calibration (3/5 star rating; indicating <1° accuracy). 
2.3.6 Behavioural performance analysis 
For Experiment 1, the numbers of correct responses each participant gave in each 
condition (Mentalizing, Either, Action) were calculated. All 34 participants included 
in the analyses had scores significantly higher than chance in the Action condition 
(Binomial test (0.5), p<.05, scores >17/24), indicating that all individuals understood 
the task. We then subtracted the number of correct responses on the Action condition 
from the number of correct responses on both the Mentalizing and Either condition 
for each participant. This allowed us to identify any task specific deficits rather than 
generalised poorer performances on experimental tasks.  
For Experiment 2, we calculated the proportion of correct responses for the 
mentalizing conditions (clumsy and spiteful actions) and non-mentalizing condition 
(successful actions) for each participant. Similar to Experiment 1, differences 
between mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions were calculated to provide a 
specific measure of the ability of participants to explicitly infer the intentions of 
others, whilst controlling for ability to do a simple action discrimination task. 
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Task-specific scores were not normally distributed even after log 
transformations had been applied. Therefore, non-parametric analyses (Mann-
Whitney U tests) were used to investigate group differences in mentalizing abilities. 
Further, due to the spectral nature of ASD, linear regressions were used to examine 
the influence of autistic traits (continuous independent variable) on task-specific 
performances (continuous dependent variables). These linear regressions were 
conducted in order to identify whether any significant group differences that were 
found also showed a significant relationship with the continuum of autistic traits 
across all participants. In order to obtain a single score for each participant that 
reflected the level of autistic traits that they displayed, we performed a principal 
components analysis (PCA) on all the psychological test scores (ADOS-2, AQ, SRS 
and TASIT). The only factor with an eigenvalue higher than Kaiser’s criteria of 1 
was extracted and used as a measure of autistic traits. Data analysis was carried out 
using R i386 3.2.3 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria, 
http:// www.r-project.org). 
2.3.7 Eye-tracking analysis 
Eye tracking data was analysed using the EyeMMV MATLAB toolbox 
(Krassanakis, Filippakopoulou, & Nakos, 2014). Data from the implicit and explicit 
experiments were analysed in the same way. First, heatmaps were created using the 
data from all participants in order to identify regions of interest (ROIs); these were: 
the head of the actor, the initial start position of the hand with the poker chips, and 
the grasp release point. Three rectangular ROIs were drawn for each movie outlining 
these areas of interest. Due to the similarity in the spatial extent of the actions on the 
screen it was then possible to combine the co-ordinates of the ROIs from all 144 
movies to make a single set of ROIs that encompassed the ROIs from all movies (see 
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Figure 2.1A). We then calculated the number and duration of fixations within each 
ROI during each condition for each participant. We defined the minimum duration 
for fixation detection as 150ms.  
The duration of fixations in each ROI as a percentage of the total number of 
fixations were calculated for each participant in each condition. As for the 
behavioural data, for Experiment 1 the duration each participant fixated in each ROI 
during the Action condition was subtracted from the time spent fixating in each ROI 
during the Mentalizing and Either conditions. For Experiment 2, the durations of 
fixation in each ROI during the non-mentalizing condition were subtracted from the 
durations of the fixation in each ROI during the Mentalizing condition. For 
Experiment 1, group differences in fixation patterns were tested using separate 
mixed-model ANOVAs for each ROI (with condition [Mentalizing-Action, Either-
Action] as the within subjects variable and diagnosis (ASD/TD) as the between 
subjects variable). For Experiment 2, the eye-tracking data were found to violate the 
assumption of normality even after a log transformation had been applied so non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to examine potential group 
differences in mentalizing-specific fixation patterns. For both experiments, linear 
regressions were used to examine the influence of autistic traits on changes in the 
duration of fixations in each ROI across conditions. The data from different ROIs 
were treated separately because the data were not independent (participants could 
only fixate in one ROI at a time).  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Psychological Tests  
All psychological assessment scores were highly correlated with each other except 
for IQ which did not correlate with the scores on any other psychological tests 
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(Bivariate Pearson correlations; see Table 2.2). Three female participants with an 
ASD diagnosis obtained ADOS scores below the clinical cut-off. However, all of 
these participants had AQ scores above the clinical cut-off as well as SRS scores that 
indicated either moderate or severe social impairments (see Table 2.3 for group 
means scores on all psychological assessments). 
Table 2.2 
Correlations between psychological test scores 
  1 2 3 4 
1. ADOS 
    2. AQ .74*** 
   3. SRS .77*** .90*** 
  4. TASIT .54*** .73*** .76*** 





Participants' psychological test scores; group mean (SD) values 
       ASD TD p ηp2 
ADOS 8.47 (2.58) 2.76 (1.86) <.001 .63 
AQ 35.71 (6.47) 16.47 (6.57) <.001 .70 
TASIT 49.24 (8.61) 57.76 (3.72) .001 .31 
SRS 114.12 (24.26) 42.76 (18.87) <.001 .74 
Autistic traits .84 (.63) - .84 (.42) <.001 .73 
     p values were obtained from one-way MANOVA 
   
Given that the psychological test scores assessing autistic traits were highly 
correlated with each other (all rs>.54) they were suitable for principal component 
analysis, the Kasier-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling accuracy was .81 (above .6) 
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and Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant c2(6)=108.82 p<.001. Additionally, 
the communalities were all above .7 supporting the inclusion of all the psychological 
tests in the principle components analysis (PCA). PCA with varimax rotation was 
used. The initial eigenvalues from the PCA analysis showed that one factor (with an 
eigenvalue of 3.23) explained 80.81% of the variance in psychological test scores. 
No other factors had eigenvalues higher than Kaiser’s criteria of 1 and therefore only 
one factor was extracted. This factor was labelled ‘autistic traits’ (see Table 2.3 for 
group mean values). 
2.4.2 Experiment 1 
ASD participants displayed poorer performances on the implicit task than matched 
controls (see Table 2.4) but group differences were not significant (Mentalizing-
Action scores: U=112.50, p=.27, r=.19; Either-Action scores: U=90.00, p=.06, 
r=.33). Linear regression analyses also showed that higher levels of autistic traits 
were associated with poorer performances on the implicit task but this trend was not 
significant (see Figure 2.3; Mentalizing-Action scores: F(1,32)=3.11, p=.09, 
R2=0.09, 95% CI [-5.91 -2.33]; Either-Action scores: F(1,32)=3.54, p=.07, R2=0.10, 





Figure 2.3 The relationship between the levels of autistic traits displayed and 
performances on the implicit task in the Mentalizing condition (A) and Either 
condition (B). Although there was a trend of poorer performances with high levels of 
autistic traits, linear regression analysis found that the level of autistic traits 
displayed was not a significant predictor of performance in the Mentalizing 
(F(1,32)=3.11, p=.09, R2=0.09) or the Either condition (F(1,32)=3.54, p=.07, 
R2=0.10). The curved lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 2.4 
Group performances; mean (SD) of proportion correct 
 
  ASD TD 
Implicit 'Mentalizing'  .74 (.25) .84(.14) 
Implicit 'Either'  .71 (.24) .88 (.14) 
Implicit 'Action'  .96 (.04) .96 (.07) 
Explicit mentalizing  0.83 (.15) 0.93 (.08) 
Explicit non-mentalizing  1.00 (.01) 1.00 (.01) 
 
In addition, adults with ASD did not show atypical changes in fixation 
patterns between conditions in the implicit experiment and changes in fixation 
patterns were not significantly different across Mentalizing and Either conditions for 
any of the ROIs [head ROI: task [F(1,26)=.45, p=.51, ηp2=.02], diagnosis 
[F(1,26)=.77, p=.39, ηp2=.03], task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26)=.23, p=.63, 
ηp2=.01; Poker chip ROI: task [F(1,26)=2.41, p=.13, ηp2=.09], diagnosis 
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[F(1,26)=.32, p=.57, ηp2=.01], task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26)=.70, p=.41, 
ηp2=.03]; Release point ROI: task [F(1,26)=3.27, p=.08, ηp2=.11], diagnosis 
[F(1,26)=2.99, p=.10, ηp2=.10], task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26)=.55, p=.47, 
ηp2=.02]. Group average values for the percentage of time spent fixating in each ROI 
can be seen in Table 2.5. The level of autistic traits that participants displayed also 
did not significantly predict changes in the duration of fixation within any ROI 
between conditions (see Table 2.6 and Figure 2.4).  
Table 2.5 
Percentage duration of fixation in each ROI; Mean (SD) values 
 
     ASD TD 
Head ROI 
  Implicit Mentalizing-Action 4.64 (9.68) 2.32 (12.01) 
Implicit Either-Action  4.32 (8.00) .37 (11.08) 
Explicit mentalizing-non-mentalizing* .06 (18.05) 1.91 (13.13) 
Poker chip ROI 
  Implicit Mentalizing-Action 1.16 (6.15) -1.83 (8.76) 
Implicit Either-Action  2.36 (5.58) 2.12 (11.96) 
Explicit mentalizing-non-mentalizing* 4.12 (15.89) .75 (6.21) 
Release point ROI 
  Implicit Mentalizing-Action -5.34 (3.98) -1.99 (5.52) 
Implicit Either-Action  -6.04 (4.24) -3.67 (4.76) 
Explicit mentalizing-non-mentalizing* -3.53 (6.81)  -3.82 (2.70) 







Figure 2.4 Heatmaps showing fixation patterns for both TD and ASD groups across 
all three tasks in Experiment 1. Warmer colours indicate longer durations of fixation. 
There were no significant group differences in fixation patterns.  
Table 2.6 
Results of the linear regression analyses investigating relationships between the eye-
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Head ROI -.72 2.05 -.07 -.35 .73 
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2.4.3 Experiment 2 
Participants in the ASD group displayed significant explicit mentalizing deficits 
(Median difference= -1.88; IQR = 3.50) compared to matched controls (Median 
difference = -.74; IQR = 1.13; U=61.50, p=.03, r=.39). The participant in the ASD 
group with the highest level of autistic traits was identified as an outlier in the linear 
regression analysis for the explicit task (Cook’s distance>1 and leverage value >n/4), 
therefore this participant was removed from the linear regression analysis.  
Participants with higher levels of autistic traits displayed poorer 
performances on the explicit mentalizing condition but this was a non-significant 
trend (mentalizing-non-mentalizing scores; F(1,27)=3.42, p=.08, R2=.11, 95% CI [-
1.15, .06] see Figure 2.5).  
 
 
Figure 2.5 The relationship between the levels of autistic traits displayed and 
performances on the explicit mentalizing task. Although there was a trend of poorer 
explicit mentalizing performances with high levels of autistic traits, linear regression 
analysis found that the level of autistic traits displayed was not a significant predictor 




Participants with ASD displayed typical changes in the duration of fixation 
between mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions for all ROIs (Head ROI: 
U=75.00, p=.32, r=.19: Poker chip ROI: U=77.00, p=.36, r=.17: Release point ROI: 
U=74.00, p=.29, r=.20). See Figure 2.6. The level of autistic traits that participants 
displayed did not significantly predict changes in the duration of fixation between 
mentalizing and and non-mentalizing conditions within any ROI (Head ROI: 
F(1,26)=2.23, p=.15, R2=0.08, 95% CI [-10.77, 1.71]; poker chips ROI: 
F(1,26)=1.63, p=.21, R2=0.06, 95% CI [-2.04, 8.76]; release point ROI: 
F(1,26)=1.63, p=.90, R2<0.001, 95% CI [-1.65, 1.47]).  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Heatmaps showing fixation patterns for both TD and ASD groups during 
both mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks in Experiment 2. Warmer colours 
indicate longer durations of fixation. There were no significant group differences in 
fixation patterns. 
2.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the abilities of adults with ASD to both implicitly 
and explicitly infer the intentions of others. In the first experiment, participants 
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completed a task where mentalizing was implicit. Here participants were asked to 
make decisions about who they wanted to interact with between pairs of actors and 
in some cases these social decisions required the intentions of the actors to be 
inferred in order to make the appropriate choice. In contrast, during the second 
experiment, participants were explicitly asked to report the intentions of actors.  Our 
results showed that adults with ASD displayed explicit mentalizing deficits 
compared to matched controls. Adults with ASD did not display significant implicit 
mentalizing abilities.  Furthermore, ASD participants did not display atypical 
fixation patterns during both the explicit and implicit experiments. Therefore, the 
explicit mentalizing deficits exhibited by adults with ASD cannot be explained by 
differences in fixation.  
The explicit mentalizing deficit found with adults with ASD in this study  
supports a number of previous studies which found  adults with ASD were impaired 
at explicitly inferring others’ intentions (Happé, 1994; Kana et al., 2014; Moran et 
al., 2011). Our data are also consistent with reported difficulties for adults with ASD 
in everyday life (O’Neal, 2013; The National Autistic Society, 2014). However, 
some previous studies have not found a connection between ASD and impairments 
in explicitly inferring the intentions of others (McAleer et al., 2011; Ponnet, 
Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; 
Schuwerk et al., 2014). This may be due to the simplicity of the stimuli used in these 
studies, e.g. passages of text and still images (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, 
& Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Schuwerk et al., 2014). In contrast, 
our study used a task with complex, naturalistic stimuli more akin to social 
environments in which individuals are required to make judgements. The use of 
more simplistic stimuli in previous studies may have allowed some adults with ASD 
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to explicitly infer the intentions of others, perhaps with the help of learned strategies, 
which are of less help in more complex and natural settings. In support of this 
argument, two previous studies have investigated the ability of adults with Pervasive 
Development Disorders (PDDs; including ASD) to infer mental states both using 
simple stimuli and complex, naturalistic stimuli (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De 
Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001). Their results showed that 
adults with PDDs were only impaired when complex stimuli were used. 
In addition to the group analysis, we also investigated the relationship 
between autistic traits and performance across all participants. This additional 
analysis was conducted as ASD is a spectrum disorder rather than a dichotomous 
classification and our results clearly show that participants displayed a range of 
autistic traits (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). The linear regression analysis showed that 
across all participants the wide range of autistic traits shown was negatively 
associated with performance on both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks, but 
these remained non-significant trends. A previous study found no relationship 
between autistic traits and both explicit and implicit mentalizing abilities (Nijhof et 
al., 2016). However, this study did not recruit adults with an ASD diagnosis and 
therefore may have not had the range of autistic traits required to find a relationship 
between autistic traits and mentalizing performance. 
Although a trend was found in our study for poorer implicit mentalizing 
abilities associated with higher levels of autistic traits, there was not a significant 
group difference in performance between those with ASD and their matched 
controls. This lack of clear evidence for a significant implicit mentalizing deficit in 
adults with ASD was unexpected. We had more participants in this study than in the 
explicit study, which revealed clear significant results, so it is unlikely the null result 
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is simply due to insufficient statistical power. Additionally, the effect size was much 
larger for the explicit experiment (r=.39) compared to the implicit experiment 
(r=.11), further supporting the presence of a significant explicit deficit but no clear 
implicit mentalizing deficit in these adults with ASD. The existing literature shows 
consistent implicit mentalizing deficits in adults with ASD (Castelli et al., 2002; 
Rosenblau et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014, Senju et al., 2009). The methods we 
used to measure mentalizing abilities may have contributed to the discrepancy 
between our findings and the previous literature. Our study measured implicit 
mentalizing abilities using a measurable behavioural outcome and performances 
were assessed relative to a control task. Previous implicit mentalizing studies in 
adults with ASD that used complex stimuli have either used eye-tracking data alone 
as a measure of mentalizing abilities (Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009) or 
not included a control task (Rosenblau et al., 2015). Without the inclusion of a 
control task, it cannot be determined whether poorer performances linked to ASD are 
mentalizing-specific or more generalised deficits. Additionally, this study was the 
first to investigate abilities to implicitly infer intentions in adults with ASD; in 
contrast previous implicit mentalizing studies in adults have assessed abilities to 
infer others’ mental states and false beliefs (Castelli et al., 2002; Rosenblau et al., 
2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). Neuroimaging studies have shown 
that different brain areas are active during different types of mentalizing tasks 
(Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Pineda & Hecht, 2009; 
Saxe & Powell, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014), suggesting that the systems used depend 
on the specific mentalizing task being performed. Therefore, it is possible that ASD 




The lack of clear evidence for a significant implicit mentalizing deficit in 
adults with ASD in the current study may also be due to the use of action stimuli; 
implicitly inferring others’ intentions from their actions may involve different 
processes than implicit mentalizing in the absence of action information. Actions 
with different intentions have been shown to display different kinematic profiles 
(Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 
2011). The dual-process model suggests that when intentions are inferred from 
others’ actions, these differences in action kinematics allow automatic, subconscious 
processing of intentional information in the observer’s own motor system before 
intentions are actively interpreted in a higher-level cortical system (de Lange et al., 
2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012c; Uddin et al., 2007). 
Neuroimaging data suggest that in the absence of action information, others’ 
intentions aren’t subconsciously processed in the motor system (see a review and 
meta-analysis; Gallagher et al., 2000; Schurz et al., 2014). Therefore, because 
intentional information in our study was provided by differences in action 
kinematics, it is possible that subconscious processing of intentional information in 
the motor system allowed adults with ASD to select preferable kinematic profiles 
(required in our implicit task). Whereas, if intentional information was provided by 
other cues, not solely by differences in action kinematics, then a significant implicit 
mentalizing deficit may have been found. A larger number of implicit mentalizing 
studies have been carried out in young children than adults and a number of studies 
have shown that children with ASD can implicitly infer others’ intentions when 
intention is portrayed using action (Aldridge et al., 2000; Berger & Ingersoll, 2014; 
Carpenter et al., 2001; Colombi et al., 2009; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008; Schietecatte, Roeyers, & Warreyn, 2012) but not when intentions 
86 
	
are portrayed by social-emotional cues such as eye gaze or facial expression (Berger 
& Ingersoll, 2014; Vivanti, Hocking, Fanning, & Dissanayake, 2016). These data 
support the theory that inferring intentions from action kinematics involves different 
processes than inferring intentions using different cues and that implicitly inferring 
intentions from action kinematics is not significantly impaired in ASD. 
Individuals with ASD and high levels of autistic traits also showed relatively poor 
performance on Either trials. It seems likely that mentalizing may have influenced 
the social judgments participants made during the Either condition even though, in 
principal, mentalizing was not required. The Either condition was included in this 
study in attempt to control for differences in the success of actions across 
mentalizing and non-mentalizing (Action) conditions. In the Mentalizing condition, 
unsuccessful actions were always seen and in the Action condition only successful 
actions were seen. The Either condition showed unsuccessful actions but did not 
require mentalizing in order to complete the task, if participants made their decisions 
based purely on the number of poker chips involved in the hand actions then they 
would make correct choices. However, previous evidence suggests that the 
intentionality of observed hand actions is automatically processed (Liepelt, Cramon, 
et al., 2008), and given participants were blind to the condition, from the 
participant’s perspective, the relevant feature of the action (number of chips / 
intention of the actor) only became clear after the second movie had been viewed. 
Thus, it may have been an effective strategy to pay attention to the intention of the 
actor in all trials. This may have affected performance in several ways. First, 
participants with higher levels of autistic traits may have wrongly attributed negative 
intent to the preferable actions (the actor attempting to pass more poker chips) in the 
Either condition resulting in incorrect choices. Second, reading actor intentions may 
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have distracted participants from focussing on the number of chips being passed and 
thus the inclusion of both actor intentions and differential number of chips, may have 
placed a higher cognitive load on participants, compared to other conditions and this 
may have contributed to the relatively poor performances in this condition. 
Despite the poorer explicit mentalizing abilities found in adults with ASD 
compared to matched controls in our study, fixation patterns were not different in the 
ASD group. The typical fixation patterns exhibited by adults with ASD in this study 
may also be due to the use of action stimuli. The majority of the literature reporting 
atypical fixation patterns in adults with ASD have found atypical fixation patterns 
during face processing, in particular, showing reduced fixation on the eyes (Dalton et 
al., 2005; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; 
Sterling et al., 2008). In the current study, the actors’ faces were not shown and 
intentional information was portrayed by the kinematics of the actions alone. Adults 
with ASD may alter their eye movements appropriately according to differences in 
the mentalizing demand of the task when intentional information is portrayed by 
action kinematics but not when internal state inferences require face processing. This 
theory is supported by data from a previous study that showed that when adults with 
ASD naturalistically viewed videos and pictures of social scenes they displayed 
reduced fixation on people’s faces but showed equivalent fixation on bodies to 
control participants (Rigby, Stoesz, & Jakobson, 2016). The typical eye-tracking data 
in conjunction with the explicit mentalizing deficit in the current study suggest that 
despite receiving the visual cues they needed, adults with ASD could not accurately 
interpret the social cues embedded within the action kinematics in order to explicitly 
infer the actors’ intentions. This dissociation between the behavioural data and the 
eye-tracking data has implications for future research assessing mentalizing abilities. 
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Some previous studies have investigated mentalizing abilities using eye-tracking 
data alone (Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al. 2009). However, our results 
demonstrate that poorer mentalizing abilities associated with high levels of autistic 
traits are not always accompanied by atypical visual fixation patterns. This is 
supported by previous research which showed that although adults with ASD spent 
less time fixating on the eyes of others, these atypical fixation patterns did not 
correlate with poorer mentalizing performances (Cassidy et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, we found that adults with ASD were significantly impaired at 
explicitly but not implicitly inferring the intentions of others from their hand actions. 
Although there was a trend for adults with high levels of autistic traits to display 
poorer implicit mentalizing performances, this relationship did not reach 
significance. The lack of a significant implicit mentalizing deficit may be due to 
subconscious processing of intentional information when intentions are portrayed by 
action kinematics. Adults with ASD displayed typical fixation patterns when both 
implicitly and explicitly inferring the intentions of others. The inconsistency we 
observed between impaired explicit mentalizing but typical fixation patterns suggests 
that reduced abilities to explicitly infer intentions from hand actions cannot be 
attributed to dissimilarities in fixation patterns. Our findings suggest that future 
research should consider the stimuli used and assess mentalizing abilities with both 




Chapter 3: Timing of Mirror Neuron System Activation 
when Inferring the Intentions of Others 
 
This chapter is adapted from: Cole, E.J., Barraclough N. E. (in review). Timing of 
Mirror Neuron System activation when inferring the intentions of others. European 
Journal of Neuroscience.2 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Neuroimaging studies have shown mirror neuron system (MNS) activation when 
participants infer internal states e.g. emotions, intentions or beliefs (known as 
‘mentalizing’) from others’ actions. However, the exact role of the MNS in 
mentalizing tasks is unknown. The role of the MNS in mentalizing tasks is important 
for understanding the neurobiological basis of autism spectrum disorders because 
autistic individuals display mentalizing deficits and MNS dysfunction may underlie 
these difficulties. This study investigated the timing of MNS activity when 
participants inferred others’ intentions from their actions in order to delineate 
between existing models of MNS involvement. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic 
stimulation was applied to the primary motor cortex at different time points during 
the observation of hand actions whilst participants performed mentalizing and non-
mentalizing tasks. Electromyographic activity in the contralateral hand was used as 
an indirect measure of MNS activity. Greater corticospinal activity was found during 
																																								 																				
2 The author, Eleanor Cole, designed the experiment, collected the data, 





the mentalizing task but only at the end of observed actions. These results suggest 
that the MNS is involved in inferring others’ intentions but only after prior 
involvement of another cortical system, which potentially provides feedback to the 
MNS. The degree to which corticospinal activity was increased when mentalizing 
was not related to levels of autistic traits participants’ displayed or behavioural 
performance suggesting the MNS has a more automatic role in processing others’ 
intentions, irrespective of mentalizing ability. Our results extend current knowledge 
of MNS activation when mentalizing, allowing initial delineation between different 
models of MNS involvement in mentalizing. 
3.2 Introduction 
Inferring others’ internal states (e.g. emotions, beliefs or intentions) is referred to as 
‘mentalizing’. There are a number of theories to explain human mentalizing abilities; 
‘theory theory’ suggests that others’ internal states are inferred using lawlike 
generalisations (Goldman, 2012), rationality theory implies that surrounding context 
and prior experience are used to rationalise what other individual’s internal state 
‘should’ be (Goldman, 2006; Goldman 2012) and simulation theory suggests that 
another’s internal state is inferred by internal simulation (Goldman 2006). There are 
two subcategories of simulation theory; motor simulation and mental simulation. 
Motor simulation suggests that others’ actions are internally simulated and their 
internal states are deduced as a result whereas mental simulation theory suggests that 
another’s mental state is simulated based on prior knowledge and contextual 
information (Hegarty, 2004; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). It is possible that the 
method used to determine others’ internal states depends on the information 
available; motor simulation may be particularly important when inferring others’ 
internal states from their actions. 
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The neural system associated with motor simulation is known as the mirror neuron 
system (MNS). The MNS is a network of brain areas that contain neurons that are 
active both when an individual performs an action and when they observe others 
performing similar actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The 
main components of the human MNS are considered to be the inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). It has been proposed that the MNS is required to mentalize when 
action information is available. Indeed, mentalizing tasks that have used stimuli 
which either include movies of human actions or portray human actions (through sets 
of still images or point-light displays), have tended to elicit MNS activity (Brunet, 
Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, & Decety, 2000; Bucchioni, Cavallo, Ippolito, Marton, & 
Castiello, 2013; Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011; 
Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Enticott et al., 2013; Iacoboni et 
al., 2004). Although there is evidence that the MNS is active when inferring others’ 
internal states from their actions, the exact role of the MNS in this task is debated. 
There are a number of different theories regarding the involvement of the 
MNS in inferring other’s internal states from their actions: 1. strict motor simulation 
theory states that MNS activity alone, reflecting simulation of observed actions on 
the observer’s own motor system, is sufficient to encode others’ internal states 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007); 2. a dual-process hypothesis has been proposed 
which suggests that internal state information embedded in action kinematics is 
automatically and subconsciously processed in the MNS and this information is then 
passed on to a separate cortical system known as the ‘mentalizing system’ in order 
for active inferences about the person’s internal state to be made (de Lange, Spronk, 
Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Spunt & Lieberman, 
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2012c; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007); 3. the ‘mirroring-first’ model 
implies that internally simulating others’ actions in the MNS is a vital prerequisite 
for inferring others’ internal states but the MNS is not involved in processing others’ 
internal states itself (Hamilton & Marsh, 2013; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011).  
A strict ‘mirroring-first’ model cannot account for the evidence which shows 
that MNS activity is modulated by mentalizing (Brunet et al., 2000; Bucchioni et al., 
2013; Centelles et al., 2011; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; Enticott et al., 2013; Iacoboni 
et al., 2004). One possible source of this MNS modulation could be feedback from 
the mentalizing system. The predictive coding theory suggests that when inferring 
aspects of someone’s internal state from their actions, contextual information is 
processed prior to kinematic processing (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Kilner, Friston, & 
Frith, 2007). This contextual information is used to infer the internal state of the 
individual and therefore predict the outcome of upcoming actions. These predictions 
are then signalled to the MNS and incoming sensory information is compared to 
predictions made. Discrepancies between predictions made and actual action 
outcomes are signalled in the form of ‘prediction errors’ and these are used to inform 
future predictions (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). The predicted 
response outcome model by Alexander and Brown suggests that the mPFC, a core 
area of the mentalizing system, makes predictions about the outcomes of upcoming 
actions based on action context and prior experience (Alexander & Brown, 2011). 
Therefore, the predictive coding model, in combination with the predicted response 
outcome model, suggests a potential fourth model of MNS involvement: information 
regarding others’ internal states is processed by the mentalizing system (mPFC) first 
based on contextual information before internal states are processed in the MNS. 
Data from neuroimaging studies have provided evidence to support this model: 
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action context and prior expectations about an upcoming action modulate activity in 
the mPFC (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Becchio et al., 2012; Chambon et al., 2017b; 
Cooper, Kreps, Wiebe, Pirkl, & Knutson, 2010; Ferdinand & Opitz, 2014; Fogelson, 
Shah, Scabini, & Knight, 2009; Forster & Brown, 2011; Jahn, Nee, Alexander, & 
Brown, 2014; Leue, Cano Rodilla, & Beauducel, 2015; Schiffer, Krause, & 
Schubotz, 2014), increased functional connectivity between the mPFC and the MNS 
has been reported when inferring internal states from actions (Ciaramidaro et al., 
2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b). Additionally, action context has been 
shown to modulate MNS activity (Amoruso, Finisguerra, & Urgesi, 2016; Amoruso 
& Urgesi, 2016; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005), 
implying possible top-down connectivity from the mentalizing system to the MNS.  
Understanding when MNS activity is modulated by mentalizing may help 
delineate the possible roles of the MNS in the mentalizing process. Previous studies 
have shown that the early kinematics of actions vary depending on the actor’s 
underlying intentions and intentions can be predicted from this information before 
the outcomes of the actions have been revealed (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, 
& Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). Therefore, both the motor 
simulation theory and dual-process hypothesis suggest that when inferring intentions 
from actions, MNS activity should be modulated early during action observation 
whilst kinematic differences reflecting the actor’s intention are processed. In 
contrast, the predictive coding framework suggests that intentions are first processed 
in the mentalizing system and therefore, mentalizing-induced modulation of MNS 
activity would be observed later. Finally, the ‘mirroring-first’ model would suggest 
that MNS activity was not modulated by mentalizing at all. 
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Previous studies have used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
investigate the timing of MNS modulation due to the high temporal resolution of this 
technique (Amoruso, Finisguerra, & Urgesi, 2016b; Barchiesi & Cattaneo, 2013; 
Bardi, Schiff, Basso, & Mapelli, 2015; Candidi, Sacheli, Mega, & Aglioti, 2014). 
Single TMS pulses can be applied at different time points during action observation 
in order to provide an indirect measure of MNS activity at different stages of an 
action. For example, Alaerts and colleagues found that the weight of objects being 
acted upon influenced MNS activity during early stages of action observation even 
before the objects had been grasped (Alaerts, de Beukelaar, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 
2012). These results suggest that the MNS is involved in forming predictions about 
upcoming actions based on properties of the objects being acted upon. In contrast, 
Amoruso and colleagues found that when participants were inferring the goals of 
observed actions, action context only modulated MNS activity during later stages of 
the actions (Amoruso et al., 2016). These data show that the MNS is not involved in 
early processing of action context in order when making predictions about the goals 
of observed actions. Collectively, these data suggest that MNS activity is modulated 
at different time points, by different factors during action observation. In the current 
study, we used single-pulse TMS in order to determine the timing at which 
mentalizing modulates MNS activity in order to delineate the role of the MNS when 
inferring the intentions of others’ from their actions.  
Determining the role of the MNS in inferring others’ intentions from actions 
is of importance in understanding autism spectrum disorder (ASD) which is 
associated with difficulties inferring the intentions of others (Happé, 1994; Kana, 
Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014; Moran et al., 2011). The ‘broken mirror’ 
theory proposes that these individuals exhibit atypical MNS activity (Iacoboni & 
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Dapretto, 2006; Lindsay M Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Ramachandran & 
Oberman, 2006), and this underlies difficulties these individuals experience in 
inferring the internal states of others, and consequently contribute to the social 
interaction deficits associated with ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
ASD is a spectrum disorder, meaning that individuals within the non-clinical 
population exhibit differing degrees of autistic traits (Robinson et al., 2011). 
Individuals with relatively high levels of autistic traits without a diagnosis, have 
been shown to display reduced abilities to infer the internal states of others (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, 
Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016) and 
atypical MNS activity (Cooper, Simpson, Till, Simmons, & Puzzo, 2013; Lepage, 
Tremblay, & Théoret, 2010; Puzzo, Cooper, Vetter, Russo, & Fitzgerald, 2009). 
Collectively, these data suggest that the level of autistic traits displayed may 
correlate with MNS functioning and abilities to infer intentions.  In this study we, 
therefore, evaluated the degree of autistic traits displayed by participants in order to 
examine whether this factor influenced the level of MNS activity displayed when 
inferring others’ intentions. 
The present study aimed to investigate MNS activity at different time points 
during three different tasks in order to delineate between previously proposed 
models of the role of the MNS in inferring intentions from actions. Single-pulse 
TMS was applied at different time points during action observation whilst 
participants inferred others’ intentions (Mentalizing task), whilst participants 
observed actions that did not depict their intentions and were not required to 
mentalize (Action task), and whilst participants observed actions that reflected the 
actors’ intentions but were not required to mentalize (Either task). If the motor 
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simulation theory explains the role of the MNS in mentalizing, early MNS 
modulation would be observed during the Mentalizing task, and MNS activity during 
this task should correlate with ability to infer intentions. If the dual-process 
hypothesis explains the role of the MNS in mentalizing, early MNS modulation 
would be observed during both the Mentalizing and the Either task, but MNS 
activation should not correlate with behavioural performance. If intentional 
information is processed by an alternative cortical system first (e.g. the mentalizing 
system) then MNS modulation should only occur at later stages of observed actions 
during the mentalizing task. Finally, the mirroring-first model would predict 
equivalent levels of MNS activity across all tasks throughout action observation. 
Autism quotient (AQ) scores were also measured for all participants in order to 
examine whether any mentalizing-induced MNS modulation was associated with the 
level of autistic traits displayed. Individuals with higher levels of autistic traits were 
expected to exhibit lower levels of MNS modulation. 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited based on their Autism Quotient (AQ) scores (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001) in order to ensure there was a wide range of AQ scores among 
participants. An email was sent to students at the University of York containing a 
link to an online version of the 50-item AQ questionnaire. Six hundred and four 
students responded and completed the AQ assessment. Fifteen participants were 
recruited (9 female) aged 18-29 (mean=22.13) with AQ scores ranging from 4-40 
(mean=18). All participants reported no neurological or psychiatric illnesses, no 
contradictions for TMS and provided written informed consent. None of the 
participants had a diagnosis of ASD. Ethical approval was granted by the York 
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Neuroimaging Centre Ethics Committee. All research was performed in accordance 
with the ethical standards laid down in the 1990 Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.3.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli used were a subsample of the movies used in a previous behavioural 
study (Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017), and are described in detail there. 
Briefly, movies were filmed at full HD (1080 x 1920 pixels) and at 50 frames per 
second using a Panasonic TM900 camera. Actors were filmed sitting in front of a 
white wooden board and passing or attempting to pass poker chips to another player 
(out of view) through slots cut out of the board (see Figure 3.1). Actors each 
performed ten different actions; five hand actions involved pushing poker chips with 
their right index finger towards a slot level with the surface of the table in front of 
them. The other five hand actions involved grasping the poker chips with their right 
index finger and thumb and lifting the chips towards a slot at head height. Both 
pushing and grasping actions were executed by the actor in one of 5 different ways: 
1. clumsily failing to pass one poker chip; positive intention to pass the chip, but the 
outcome of the action was unsuccessful (clumsy 1), 2. Clumsily failing to pass five 
pokers chips (clumsy 5), 3. Spitefully failing to pass one poker chip; no intention to 
pass the chip and the outcome of the action was unsuccessful (spiteful 1), 4. 
Successfully passing one poker chip (successful 1) and 5.Successfully passing five 
poker chips (successful 5). Sets of movies of 12 different actors (6 female and 6 




Figure 3.1 Screenshots depicting the final frame of the video stimuli for one actor. 
The videos depict an actor: A. Accidently dropping a poker chip (clumsy grasp). B. 
Deliberately dropping a poker chip (spiteful grasp). C. Passing a poker chip through 
the higher slot in the board (successful grasp) D. Accidentally not passing a poker 
chip through the bottom slot (clumsy push) E. Deliberately not passing a poker chip 
through the bottom slot (spiteful push) F. Passing a poker chip through the bottom 
slot (successful push). 
3.3.3 Electromyography and TMS 
Electromyogram (EMG) was recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and 
opponens pollicis (OP) muscles of the left hand using standard surface Ag-AgCl 
electrodes. Participants’ left arms were rested on the table in front of them. EMG 
signals were band-pass filtered and amplified using a BIOPAC MP150 amplifier 
(BIOPAC Systems Inc., USA). The top centre point of the head (Cz) was found by 
measuring half way between the inion and the nasion as well as the half way point 
between the ears. The position of the hand area of right primary motor cortex (M1) 
was identified in participants by measuring 5cm lateral and 1cm anterior to Cz. A 3-
by-3 grid was created around the estimated position of right M1. Single TMS pulses 
were delivered using a Magstim Rapid2 and a 70mm figure of eight coil to every 
point in this grid (Magstim Company Ltd, UK). The point in the grid that produced 
the largest motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in the left FDI & OP muscles when 
stimulated was concluded to be the optimal stimulation site in M1. The resting motor 
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threshold was determined for each participant as the minimum stimulation intensity 
that produced MEPs greater than 50µV amplitude in the FDI and OP muscles in 5/10 
cases after single pulse stimulation. The TMS pulses delivered during the experiment 
were at 120% resting motor threshold. 
3.3.4 Procedure 
Before starting the experiment, each participant played a poker chip game with the 
experimenter. This was done in order to familiarise participants with the board and 
poker chips they would see in the movies and so they understood the aim of the 
game was to have the highest number of poker chips on your side of the board as 
possible. For a full description of this poker chip game, see the previous behavioural 
experiment (Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017). 
During the experiment, MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., Massachusetts, USA) 
was used to run the experiment, record participants’ responses and send TTL pulses 
to the parallel port in order to trigger the delivery of TMS pulses. Movies were 
displayed on a 22” flat-screen CRT monitor (Philips 202P40, 1600 x 1200 pixels 
100Hz refresh rate) positioned approximately 60cm in front of participants. Each 
trial consisted of two action movies of the same type (either grasping or pushing) 
presented sequentially with an inter-stimulus interval of 1000ms. During the inter-
stimulus interval, the screen was black except for a white fixation cross. Following 
the presentation of the second stimulus a response screen was subsequently 
displayed and participants had to indicate whether they would rather play the poker 
chip game with the actor in the first or second movie by pressing either ‘1’ or ‘2’ on 
the keyboard with their right hand. Movies were presented in blocks of 
‘Mentalizing’, ‘Either’ or ‘Action’ tasks and all movies were shown in greyscale. 
During the Mentalizing task, actions with different intentions but the same outcome 
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were shown (clumsy 1 and spiteful 1). Here, in order to make the appropriate 
decision between the actors, participants were required to infer the intentions of the 
actors. There were two types of control tasks: Either and Action tasks. During the 
Action task, pairs of successful actions were presented in which one actor passed one 
poker chip (successful 1) and another actor passed five poker chips (successful 5). In 
order to make the appropriate decision during this task, participants simply had to 
identify which action involved the highest number of poker chips. During the Either 
task participants were shown two actions with positive intentions but involving 
different numbers of poker chips (clumsy 1 and clumsy 5). Again, in order to make 
the appropriate decision, participants simply had to identify which action involved 
the greatest number of poker chips. However, the movies shown during this task did 
portray positive intentions of the actors so participants may have automatically 
inferred the intentions of the actors. This task is referred to as the Either task as it 
may involve mentalizing or simply action processing. The Either task was included 
in the experiment in order to control for the fact that the Mentalizing task only 
showed unsuccessful actions and the Action task showed only successful actions. 
The Either task showed unsuccessful actions but mentalizing was not required in 
order to complete the task. Participants completed 12 practice trials, 4 of each task 
type (Mentalizing, Either and Action), before they took part in the main experiment. 
Within each block, every trial showed one action performed by a male actor 
and one action performed by a female actor. The stimuli were counterbalanced so 
that gender and identity of the actors were not predictors of the action outcome. 
There were four blocks of each task, each containing 30 trials (60 movies). Each 
block contained 15 grasping trials and 15 pushing trials which were randomly 
presented. Every participant completed all 12 blocks across two sessions. In each 
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session participants completed 6 blocks (2 of each task type). The order in which 
blocks (n=12) were completed was different for every participant. Additionally, the 
order in which different tasks (Mentalizing, Either, Action) were completed was 
counterbalanced across participants and the order in which each participant 
completed the different task types in the first session was reversed in the second 
session. This was done to reduce the possibility of order effects. Each block lasted 
approximately 8 minutes and participants had short breaks in between each block.  
Single TMS pulses were delivered at one of six different time points during 
each movie. The movies were made in a controlled way so that TMS pulses could be 
applied during specific stages of every action. In all movies, the poker chips were 
released 20 frames before the end of the movie, the actors were stationary for at least 
the first 25 frames of every movie and the frame in which the poker chip was first 
grasped/pushed was recorded for each movie. Therefore, the pulse timings were 
defined in the following way: Pulse time 1 was at the start of the movie before 
movement occurred (frame 20), pulse time 2 was after movement onset but before 
contact had been made with the poker chip(s) (20 frames before the frame in which 
the poker chip(s) were first grasped/pushed), pulse time 3 was when the poker 
chip(s) were first grasped/pushed (between frames 73-161), pulse time 4 was during 
the action before the poker chip(/s) left the actor’s hand (15 frames after the frame in 
which poker chip(s) were first grasped/pushed), pulse time 5 was at the moment at 
which poker chip(/s) left the actor’s hand (frame 180) and pulse timing 6 was at the 
end of the action after the poker chip(/s) had been released (frame 200; see Figure 
3.2).  There were 20 repeats of each of the 36 conditions [pulse time (1-6), task 
(Mentalizing, Either, Action) and action type (grasping or pushing)].The time at 





Figure 3.2 Screenshots from one example video showing the frames that were 
displayed when the TMS pulses were applied at the 6 different time points. 1. When 
the hand was stationary, 2. After movement onset but before contact was made with 
the poker chip, 3. Initial movement of the poker chip, 4. During the movement of the 
chip before it was released, 5. Moment at which the chip was released, 6. End of the 
action, 20 frames after the chip was released. 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Behavioural data 
The mean proportion of correct responses were calculated for each task for every 
participant. Data screening identified that these data were not normally distributed 
and consequently, a log transformation was applied. Following the log 
transformation, the data still violated the assumption of normality so non-parametric 
analyses were conducted. A Friedman’s ANOVA was used to examine potential 
differences in behavioural performance across tasks. The relationships between task 
performances and both levels of autistic traits and MNS activity were investigated 
using linear regression analyses. 
3.4.2 MEP data 
For each participant, the mean and standard deviation of the root mean squared 
scores of the EMG background activity in the 50ms period prior to stimulus onset 
were calculated. As EMG background activity can modulate MEP magnitude (Hess, 
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Mills, & Murray, 1987), MEPs were excluded from the analyses if EMG background 
activity exceeded more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from the mean EMG 
activity for that particular participant and muscle. MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes 
were measured, and in order to exclude outliers, those MEPs that differed more than 
1.5 SD from the mean MEP size for that condition and muscle, were also excluded 
from subsequent analyses. From the remaining MEPs, median values were then 
calculated for each muscle and condition. Median MEP values were calculated rather 
than mean MEP values as Schmidt and colleagues showed that MEP values can be 
inflated on initial trials (Enticott et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2009) and this would 
have greater influence on mean rather than median values. In total, 12.07% of all 
MEPs were excluded from the analyses. 
The median MEP values were averaged across both muscles (FDI and OP) 
and action type (pushing and grasping) as neither were factors of interest; the goal of 
the experiment being to investigate the effect of the interaction between TMS pulse 
timing and task on MEP sizes. This resulted in 18 median MEP values for each 
participant: for the 6 different TMS pulse timings, and for all three tasks 
(Mentalizing, Either, Action). Median MEP values violated the assumption of 
normality and therefore a log transformation was applied. Shapiro-Wilk tests 
established that median MEP sizes did not significantly differ from a normal 
distribution after the log transformation was applied. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
was conducted to identify the influence of task (Mentalizing, Either, Action) and 
pulse timing (1-6) on MEP sizes. Finally, linear regression analyses were conducted 
in order to investigate possible relationships between mentalizing-specific MEP sizes 
and autistic traits (as measured by AQ). 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated alongside all linear 
regressions and were additionally tested using Bayesian analyses (Dienes, 2008, 
2011) to quantify the evidence in favor for or against each correlation. The resulting 
Bayes factor (B) quantifies how much more (or less) likely the data are under the 
alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. For example, B=3.0 would 
indicate that the data are 3 times as likely to be correlated compared to the null 
hypothesis, whereas B=1/3 would indicate that the data are 3 times as likely to 
indicate the hull hypothesis over the alternative that the data are correlated. The 
suggested convention (Jeffreys, 1961) is that Bayes factors above 3 indicate 
substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis (data are correlated), Bayes 
factors below 1/3 indicate substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (data are 
uncorrelated), whilst values in between 3 and 1/3 indicate neither support for the 
alternative nor the null hypothesis. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Behavioural data 
Participants’ abilities to make judgments of the actors’ behaviours were not 
significantly different across tasks [Mentalizing (proportion correct M=.94, SD=.10), 
Either (M=.93, SD=.08), Action (M=.93, SD=.06); χ2(2)=5.72, p=.06]. In addition, 
linear regression analyses showed that the level of autistic traits that participants 
displayed did not significantly predict performance on the Mentalizing task 
[F(1,13)=.69, p=.42, R2=.05, r=-.22, B=.69], the Either task [F(1,13)<.01, p=.93, 
R2=<.01, r=-.03 B=.56] nor the Action task [F(1,13)=1.7, p=.22, R2=.12, r=.34, 
B=1.02]. See Figure 3.3. The Bayes factors indicated that there was neither evidence 
for, nor against, correlations between the level of autistic traits and performance on 




Figure 3.3 The relationships between AQ score and behavioural performance 
(proportion correct) on each of the tasks. There were no significant relationships 
between AQ score and behavioural performance. Curved lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
3.5.2 TMS data 
Median MEPs were larger during the Mentalizing task than other tasks when TMS 
was applied towards the end of the action (see Figure 3.4A). This was reflected in a 
significant interaction between task and the timing of the TMS pulse 
[F(4.71,65.87)=5.11, p=.001, ηp2=.27; Greehouse-Geisser correction applied]. There 
were no main effects of task [F(2,28)=2.01, p=.15, ηp2=.13] nor TMS pulse timing 
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on MEP sizes [F(2.51,35.20)=1.34, p=.28, ηp2=.09; Greehouse-Geisser correction 
applied]. 
The significant interaction between experimental task and TMS pulse timing 
was explored further by performing six separate one-way ANOVAs examining the 
effect of task on MEP sizes for each TMS pulse timing separately. There was only a 
significant effect of task at pulse timing 6 [F(2,28)=8.90, p=.001, ηp2=.39, 
Bonferroni correction applied; see Figure 3.4B]. Subsequent paired samples t-tests 
showed that at time point 6, MEPs were significantly larger during the Mentalizing 
task (t(14)=-5.17, p<.001, d=1.34) and the Either task (t(14)=-2.62, p=.02, d=.68) 
compared to the Action task. However, once the significance level had been adjusted 
to correct for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni correction, only the 
difference between the Mentalizing task and the Action task was significant. MEP 
sizes at time point 6 were not significantly different during the Mentalizing task 
compared to the Either task (t(14)=1.23, p=.24, d=.32. 
 
Figure 3.4 The effect of behavioural task on levels of corticospinal excitability at 
different time points. The task that participants were engaged in, significantly 
influenced corticospinal excitability if TMS was applied at the end of the observed 
actions [pulse timing 6; F(2,28)=8.90, p=.001*, ηp2=.39]. * Bonferroni-corrected 
threshold value for significance: .05/6= p<.008. Levels of corticospinal excitability 
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were larger during the Mentalizing task than the Action task when TMS was applied 
at the end of the actions (t(14)=-5.17, p<.001**).  **Bonferroni-corrected threshold 
value for significance: .05/3=p<.02. 
Finally, we examined the relationship between mentalizing-specific increases 
in MEP sizes at time-point 6 and the degree of autistic traits participants displayed. 
Linear regression analysis showed that participants’ AQ scores did not significantly 
predict MEP sizes during the Mentalizing task at time point 6 [F(1,13)=.13, p=.72, 
R2=.01, r=-.10, B=.34]. In addition, the degree of mentalizing-specific MNS activity 
didn’t predict mentalizing behavioural performance [F(1,13)=.93, p=.35, R2=.07, r=-
.26, B=.38]. The Bayes factors indicated that there was neither evidence for, nor 
against, correlations between the level of autistic traits and MEP sizes, and between 
the degree of mentalizing-specific MNS activity and performance on the mentalizing 
task. 
3.6 Discussion 
This study measured corticospinal activity (as an indirect measure of mirror neuron 
system (MNS) activity) at different time points when inferring the intentions of 
others, and investigated the relationship between the degree of mentalizing-induced 
modulation of corticospinal activity and autistic traits. Our results show that, 
corticospinal excitability was higher when participants inferred actors’ intentions 
compared to when they made judgments about actions that did not depict the actor’s 
intention. Importantly, this mentalizing-induced modulation of corticospinal 
excitability was observed only at the end of the actions, when the actors’ intentions 
had been revealed. No relationships were found between the degree to which 
corticospinal excitability was modulated and either the level of autistic traits that 
participants displayed or behavioural performance. These data helps us delineate 
between models of MNS involvement in mentalizing. 
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The larger MEP sizes (reflecting higher levels of MNS activity) found during 
the Mentalizing task compared to the Action task at the end of observed actions, 
suggest that the MNS plays a role in processing intentional information from hand 
actions (Giovanni Buccino et al., 2007; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; de Lange et al., 
2008; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Vingerhoets et al., 2010). These data oppose the 
mirroring-first hypothesis which argues that processing action kinematics in the 
MNS is a prerequisite for inferring others’ intentions but the MNS does not process 
information about others’ intentions directly (Hamilton & Marsh, 2013; Spunt, 
Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). The mirroring-first model predicts that MNS 
activation at all time points would be equivalent irrespective of the task, and this was 
not observed here. 
Second, the timing at which mentalizing was found to modulate MEP sizes 
provides evidence against the motor simulation theory which argues that MNS 
activity alone is sufficient to infer the intentions of others’ from their actions 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007). This theory predicts early mentalizing induced 
modulation of MNS activity given previous studies have shown others’ intentions 
can be inferred during the early phases of movements of their actions (e.g. Manera, 
Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). In 
contrast, we did not observe any early mentalizing induced modulation of MNS 
activity, rather the late mentalizing-induced modulation of MNS activation identified 
in our study suggests that early information about an individual’s intentions is 
processed in an alternative system prior to MNS involvement. In addition, we did not 
see evidence for a relationship between the degree of mentalizing-induced 
modulation of MNS activity and ability to infer the intentions of others in our study, 
a Bayes factor of .38 indicated that there was more evidence for the null hypothesis: 
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that the mentalizing induced signal we observed in the MNS did not determine 
behavioural performance. A motor-simulation account would predict that MNS 
activity determines behavioural performance, and thus our data provide evidence 
against this theory of the role of the MNS in inferring intentions from observed 
actions.  
The lack of a relationship between mentalizing performance and MNS 
activity supports the dual-process hypothesis which states that subconscious 
processing of intentional information available from action kinematics occurs in the 
MNS first before intentions are actively inferred in the mentalizing system (de Lange 
et al., 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). This theory would not predict a direct 
relationship between MNS activity and mentalizing performance as it argues that the 
MNS is not involved in actively inferring others’ intentions. However, similar to the 
motor simulation theory, the dual-process hypothesis would also predict early 
mentalizing-induced modulation of MNS activity, in contrary to our observed 
results. Instead, the timing of mentalizing-induced modulation of corticospinal 
activity identified in our study suggests that intentional information is initially 
processed by another cortical system before MNS involvement. It is possible that 
predictions about the intentions of unfolding actions, based on prior expectations and 
action context, are formed in the mentalizing system  prior to intentional inferences 
made based on kinematic information in the MNS (Alexander & Brown, 2011a; 
Kilner et al., 2007).  
The late timing of MNS involvement observed in our study implies that the 
interaction between the mentalizing system and the MNS, when inferring intentions 
from actions, might be best conceptualized within a predictive coding framework. 
The predictive coding theory in combination with the predicted outcome response 
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model of mPFC functioning would suggest that intentions are initially inferred based 
on contextual information in the mPFC before MNS involvement in processing 
intentions information. This compliments data from neuroimaging studies which 
have shown that action context and prior expectations about an upcoming action 
modulate activity in the mPFC (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Becchio et al., 2012; 
Chambon et al., 2017b; Cooper, Kreps, Wiebe, Pirkl, & Knutson, 2010; Ferdinand & 
Opitz, 2014; Fogelson, Shah, Scabini, & Knight, 2009; Forster & Brown, 2011; 
Jahn, Nee, Alexander, & Brown, 2014; Leue, Cano Rodilla, & Beauducel, 2015; 
Schiffer, Krause, & Schubotz, 2014) and functional connectivity between the mPFC 
and the MNS increases when inferring intentions from actions (Ciaramidaro et al., 
2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b). Action context has also been shown to 
modulate MNS activity (Amoruso, Finisguerra, & Urgesi, 2016; Amoruso & Urgesi, 
2016; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005), in the later 
stages of action processing, implying possible top-down connectivity from the 
mentalizing system to the MNS. If the interaction between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system is best conceptualised within a predictive coding framework, the 
higher activation we found in the MNS at the end of observed actions may reflect the 
signalling of a ‘prediction error’ once the actual intention of an action has been 
revealed by the kinematics at the end of observed actions. The predictive coding 
model suggests that prediction errors are formed in the MNS and used to inform 
future predictions about others’ intentions (cf. Brown & Brüne, 2012; Kilner, 
Friston, & Frith, 2007; Kilner & Frith, 2008).  
Although our data suggest late modulation of the MNS when mentalizing, it 
is possible that MNS activation was maximal throughout the mentalizing task and a 
task-related difference was only found at the end of observed actions because this is 
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when MNS activity decreased during the control tasks. This interpretation would 
mean that the MNS is involved in mentalizing throughout the task. MNS 
involvement in mentalizing throughout the task without a relationship between MNS 
activation and mentalizing performance would support the dual-process hypothesis 
of mentalizing. However, we have no evidence that MNS activation was maximal 
during the early stages of action processing in our control tasks and previous studies 
have shown that MNS activation during the early stages of action processing can be 
enhanced by other factors such as the weight of an object about to be lifted (Alaerts 
et al., 2012) or expertise (Candidi, Sacheli, Mega, & Aglioti, 2014). These data 
suggest that in fact, MNS activation was likely not maximal during the early stages 
of action processing and imply mentalizing only modulates MNS activation at the 
end of observed actions.   
Although corticospinal activity was higher (MEP sizes were larger) during 
the Mentalizing task than the Action task, MEP sizes were not significantly larger 
during the Mentalizing task compared to the Either task. These data suggest that 
higher levels of MNS activation are, to a certain extent, automatically elicited when 
observing actions that reflect an individual’s intention, regardless of the task 
participants are engaged in. Both the Mentalizing and the Either tasks involved 
watching actions that portrayed the actor’s intentions but only the Mentalizing task 
required the intentions of the actors to be inferred in order to complete the task. The 
lack of a significant increase in MNS activity during the Mentalizing task compared 
to the Either task compliments previous studies which found higher levels of MNS 
activity during the observation of actions with social intent compared to non-social 
actions even in the absence of a mentalizing task (Bucchioni et al., 2013; 
Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; Enticott et al., 2013; Iacoboni et al., 2004). Additionally, a 
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previous study found higher MNS activity when viewing actions with unusual 
intentions regardless of the task participants were performing and no differences in 
MNS activity associated changes in the mentalizing demand of the task (de Lange et 
al., 2008). However, MEP sizes in our study were also not significantly different 
between the Either task and the Action task. This implies that although higher MNS 
activity was elicited when viewing actions which portrayed the actors’ intentions 
compared to viewing actions which did not portray intent, MNS activity was only 
significantly higher if participants were engaged in a mentalizing task. In summary, 
our data suggest that the MNS is involved in inferring others’ intentions from their 
actions. However, MNS activation does not appear to be sufficient in order to do so; 
our data imply that intentional information is initially processed in another cortical 
system (possibly the mentalizing system) before the MNS signals the performer’s 
intention once it has been revealed at the end of the observed action. 
Although mentalizing-specific MNS activity and performance on the 
Mentalizing task were not correlated in our study, we should be cautious as 
performances were extremely high (mean proportion of correct responses: M=.94, 
SD=.10) across all participants. Potentially, behavioural performances were near 
ceiling, preventing a relationship between mentalizing performance and the degree 
of mentalizing-specific MNS activation to be found. If we had also recruited 
participants with a diagnosis of ASD, it is possible that these individuals would have 
displayed poorer performances and a wider range of behavioural performances may 
have allowed a relationship between mentalizing-induced modulation of MNS 
activity and behavioural performance to be identified. In addition, recruitment of 
adults with ASD may have allowed a relationship to be identified between autistic 
traits and mentalizing-induced modulation of corticospinal activity. MNS 
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functioning may be atypical in adults with ASD when inferring others’ intentions but 
reduced levels of MNS activity may only be seen in individuals with clinical levels 
of autistic traits. This suggestion is supported by a previous study by Holt and 
colleagues that found reduced activation in IFG in individuals with ASD when 
inferring others’ mental states but this reduction in MNS activity was not found in 
siblings of those with ASD (Holt et al., 2014). However, the lack of evidence for a 
relationship between autistic traits and modulation of corticospinal activity in our 
study supports some previous studies that found adults with ASD exhibited typical 
levels of MNS activation during mentalizing tasks (e.g. Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, 
Minshew, & Just, 2009; Kirkovski, Enticott, Hughes, Rossell, & Fitzgerald, 2015). 
Therefore, it is possible that dysfunction in other brain systems (e.g. the mentalizing 
system) or dysfunctional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system 
rather than atypical MNS activity may underlie the mentalizing deficits that 
individuals with ASD experience (Frith, 2001; Gallagher et al., 2000; Schurz, Radua, 
Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b; Spunt et al., 2011).  
Although the hand actions shown in the Mentalizing and Action tasks had 
very similar kinematics at the time in which the task-related difference in 
corticospinal excitability was found, they were not identical (see Figure 3.1). These 
small kinematic differences between the actions shown in different tasks in principal 
may have contributed to the task-related difference in MEP sizes. However, in both 
tasks the poker chip had been released at this time point, and the FDI and OP 
muscles in the actors’ hands were no longer contracted. Previous studies have shown 
that increased MEP sizes during action observation are specific to the muscles 
involved in the observed actions (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; 
Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Urgesi, Candidi, Fabbro, Romani, & Aglioti, 
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2006). Therefore, if MEP sizes were solely dependent upon the kinematics of the 
observed actions, MEPs would be expected to be small in both tasks at the end of the 
observed actions (Fadiga et al., 2005; Fadiga et al., 1995; Urgesi et al., 2006). This 
was observed during the Action task, MEPs were maximal leading up to, and during 
interaction with the object and were smallest once the object had been released (see 
Figure 3.4A). However, during the Mentalizing task, MEP sizes were significantly 
larger at the end of the actions, even when there was no obvious muscle contraction 
indicating increased corticospinal excitability was instead a result of processing 
others’ intentions.  
The actions shown in both the Mentalizing and Either tasks were always 
unsuccessful and the actions shown in the Action task were always successful. 
Possibly action success could explain the differences in MNS activity between the 
Mentalizing and Action tasks. However, previous studies have shown greater levels 
of MNS activity during the observation of actions with higher likely reward in both 
monkeys (Caggiano et al., 2012; Roesch & Olson, 2003, 2004) and humans (Brown, 
Wiersema, Pourtois, & Brüne, 2013; Trilla Gros, Panasiti, & Chakrabarti, 2015). 
Given that the actions during our Mentalizing (and Either) tasks were unsuccessful, 
and thus reflected a lower likelihood of reward than the actions during the Action 
task, if MNS activity was commensurate with success/reward, we would have 
observed opposite effects to those that we show here. 
In the current study, participants observed right-handed actions and MEPs 
were recorded from the muscles in their left hands. It has been previously shown that 
MEPs are smaller when they are measured from the hand which is contralateral to 
the observed hand executing the action compared to when recordings are made from 
the observer’s hand which is ipsilateral to that of the acting hand (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 
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2002). In principal, we may have measured larger MEPs if we had applied TMS to 
the left hemisphere in our study.  However, MNS activation is bilateral during the 
observation and imitation of right-handed actions (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & 
Eickhoff, 2010). In addition, a previous fMRI study showed bilateral MNS 
activation during the observation of right-handed actions but a greater degree of 
activation in right MNS (Aziz-Zadeh, Iacoboni, Zaidel, Wilson, & Mazziotta, 2004). 
Higher levels of activity have also been shown in the right MNS when actions are 
shown in a context that reflect the goals of the actions compared to actions shown 
without context (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Higher levels of right IFG activity have 
also been found when inferring the goals of actions compared to processing action 
kinematics (Spunt & Lieberman, 2011). Finally, reduced activation in right IFG and 
bilateral IPL in adults with ASD has also previously been associated with poorer 
abilities to infer the intentions of others (Kana et al., 2014). Collectively, these data 
suggest that MNS activation is often bilateral when observing others’ actions and 
suggest possible right-hemisphere dominance for MNS activity when inferring 
others’ intentions. 
In conclusion, our data add to the current knowledge of MNS involvement in 
mentalizing by identifying the timing in which MNS activity is modulated by 
mentalizing. These data allow us to start to delineate between the different models of 
MNS involvement in inferring others’ intentions. The late timing in which MNS 
activity was found to be modulated by mentalizing suggests that the MNS plays a 
role in processing others’ intentions but only once they have been clearly revealed. It 
appears that another cortical system is involved in making early inferences about the 
intentions of observed actions. MNS activity was also found to be independent of 
behavioural performance and the level of autistic traits displayed by the participants, 
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suggesting that the MNS play a more automatic role in processing the intentions of 
others’ actions, irrespective of mentalizing ability.
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Chapter 4: Investigating Mirror Neuron System (MNS) 
Activity in Adults with ASD when Inferring Others’ 
Intentions Using Both TMS and EEG. 
 
This chapter is adapted from: Cole, E.J., Barraclough N. E., Enticott. P.G. (in 
review). Investigating mirror neuron system (MNS) activity in adults with ASD 




Atypical MNS activation may underlie mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD. 
We investigated MNS activity in adults with ASD when inferring others’ intentions 
using both TMS and EEG. Eye-tracking data were collected to ensure MNS 
differences were not due to atypical fixation. Autistic traits were measured for all 
participants. Our EEG data show reduced right MNS activity in adults with high 
autistic traits when mentalizing and higher left MNS activity associated with 
superior mentalizing performances. The eye-tracking and TMS data show no 
differences associated with autistic traits. Our data suggest ASD is associated with 
reduced right MNS activity when mentalizing, TMS and EEG measure different 
aspects of MNS functioning and the MNS is directly involved in inferring others’ 
intentions. 
																																								 																				
3The author, Eleanor Cole, designed the experiment, collected the data, 
analysed the results and wrote the manuscript under the joint supervision of A/Prof 





Experimental evidence and anecdotal reports suggest that individuals with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnoses display difficulties inferring the thoughts, 
feeling and beliefs of others, collectively known as ‘mentalizing’ (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014; 
Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). ASD is a term used by the most recent 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) to 
describe a number of neurodevelopmental disorders characterised by difficulties in 
social communication as well as restricted and repetitive behaviours (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Due to the spectral nature of ASD, individuals with 
and without ASD diagnoses display varying degrees of autistic traits. Individuals 
without an ASD diagnosis but who display relatively high levels of autistic traits 
have also been shown to exhibit mentalizing deficits (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, 
Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016). 
The ‘broken mirror’ theory of ASD suggests that dysfunction in brain areas 
known collectively as the mirror neuron system (MNS) underlie some of the social 
communication difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD (Iacoboni & 
Dapretto, 2006; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007). The main components of the 
human MNS are considered to be the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior 
parietal lobe ( IPL; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
Areas of the MNS are active during the performance of an action as well as the 
observation of similar actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). It is 
thought that by displaying similar activation patterns during the observation of 
actions as when performing actions, the MNS simulates observed actions in the 
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observer’s own motor system to facilitate action understanding (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). This is known as the motor resonance theory (Agnew, Bhakoo, & 
Puri, 2007; Landmann et al., 2011; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004; 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002). According to the broken mirror theory, 
atypical MNS activation in individuals with ASD results in reduced understanding of 
the actions of others, which in turn underlies some of the social communication 
difficulties these individuals experience (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Oberman & 
Ramachandran, 2007). 
Although the broken mirror hypothesis is an attractive theory, the literature 
supporting the possibility of atypical MNS activation in individuals with ASD is 
limited, particularly in adults. A number of studies have shown that children with 
ASD display behavioural impairments and atypical MNS activity during tasks 
typically associated with MNS functioning such as imitation (Dapretto et al., 2005; 
Hobson & Hobson, 2008; Rogers et al., 2003; Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004), 
action planning (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Dowd et al., 2012; Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, 
Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009) and gestural performance (Dewey et al., 2007). In 
contrast, some studies have shown that children with ASD display typical 
behavioural performances (Dapretto et al., 2006; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007; 
Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2016; Stoit, Van Schie, Slaats-
Willemse, & Buitelaar, 2013) and MNS activation levels (Pascolo & Cattarinussi, 
2012; Raymaekers, Wiersema, & Roeyers, 2009; Ruysschaert, Warreyn, Wiersema, 
Oostra, & Roeyers, 2014) when performing these tasks. Adults with ASD generally 
display typical behavioural performances on tasks traditionally associated with MNS 
functioning (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; Sari Avikainen, Wohlschläger, 
Liuhanen, Hänninen, & Hari, 2003) and the majority of neuroimaging studies have 
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shown that adults with ASD display typical levels of MNS activity (Avikainen, 
Kulomäki, & Hari, 1999; Dinstein et al., 2010; Enticott et al., 2013, Marsh & 
Hamilton, 2011). Only a limited number of studies have provided evidence to 
suggest MNS activation is atypical during these tasks in adults with ASD (Bernier, 
Dawson, Webb, & Murias, 2007; Enticott et al., 2012; Honaga et al., 2010; 
Martineau, Andersson, Barthélémy, Cottier, & Destrieux, 2010) and adults with high 
levels of autistic traits (Cooper, Simpson, Till, Simmons, & Puzzo, 2013; Lepage, 
Tremblay, & Théoret, 2010; Puzzo, Cooper, Vetter, Russo, & Fitzgerald, 2009). 
Therefore, evidence to support general dysfunction of the MNS in ASD, particularly 
in adults, is limited (Hamilton, 2013). 
Despite the limited evidence suggesting atypical MNS activity in adults with 
ASD during tasks traditionally associated with MNS functioning (e.g. imitation and 
action planning), adults with ASD have shown reduced MNS activation during 
mentalizing tasks compared to control participants (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Holt et 
al., 2014; Kana et al., 2014). A wide body of literature has provided evidence for 
MNS involvement in mentalizing in typically developing adults: higher levels of 
MNS activity have been shown during mentalizing tasks than non-mentalizing tasks 
(Adams et al., 2010; Brunet et al., 2000; Centelles et al., 2011; de Lange et al., 2008; 
Schurz et al., 2014) and higher MNS activation has also been elicited during the 
observation of actions with social context compared to non-social actions even in the 
absence of mentalizing tasks (Bucchioni, Cavallo, Ippolito, Marton, & Castiello, 
2013; Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Enticott et al., 2013; 
Iacoboni et al., 2004). Additionally, lesions to IFG, both in brain damaged patients 
(Besharati et al., 2016; Dal Monte et al., 2014) and when temporary functional 
lesions are induced via direct current stimulation in patients undergoing surgery to 
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treat epilepsy (Herbet, Lafargue, Moritz-Gasser, Bonnetblanc, & Duffau, 2014), 
have been shown to impair mentalizing performances. Collectively, these data show 
that MNS has a role in mentalizing and that MNS functioning is atypical in adults 
with ASD when the mentalizing system is engaged. Therefore, it is possible that, 
reduced MNS activity during mentalizing tasks may contribute to the mentalizing 
difficulties these adults experience. 
Despite numerous studies providing evidence for a role of the MNS in 
mentalizing, some mentalizing tasks have not elicited higher levels of MNS activity 
compared to non-mentalizing tasks in typically developing participants (Castelli, 
Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; Spunt, 
Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011; White, Frith, Rellecke, Al-Noor, & Gilbert, 2014). 
Differences in the stimuli used are likely to have contributed to inconsistencies in the 
existing literature. Neuroimaging studies have shown that different brain areas are 
active during mentalizing tasks depending on the stimuli used (Gobbini et al., 2007; 
Schurz et al., 2014). Mentalizing tasks have been shown to elicit more MNS 
activation when dynamic stimuli are used rather than static stimuli and when stimuli 
depict bodies rather than faces (Schlochtermeier, Pehrs, Kappelhoff & Jacobs, 2015). 
The majority of mentalizing tasks that have not elicited MNS activation have used 
simplistic cartoons, still images or passages of text as stimuli (Castelli et al., 2000; 
Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; White et al., 2014). If MNS functioning 
is atypical in adults with ASD during mentalizing tasks then these individuals may 
display more prominent differences in brain activation and greater behavioural 
impairments on mentalizing tasks that typically elicit greater levels of MNS activity. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electroencephalography (EEG) 
are two techniques that have often been used to non-invasively measure MNS 
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activity, but it is unknown precisely how these two indices of MNS activity relate to 
each other. TMS involves administering brief magnetic pulses through a magnetic 
coil placed on the scalp in order to induce transient changes in activity in the 
underlying region of the cortex (Hallett, 2000). When single TMS pulses are applied 
to the primary motor cortex (M1), the resulting increases in corticospinal activity can 
be measured by recording increased activity in contralateral hand muscles via 
electromyography ( EMG; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; 
Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005). These increases in muscle activity induced by 
TMS (known as motor evoked potentials; MEPs) are larger when individuals view 
hand actions compared to when TMS is applied at rest and therefore these increases 
in MEP sizes during action observation are regarded as an index of MNS activity 
(Luciano Fadiga et al., 2005a; Patuzzo et al., 2003; Strafella & Paus, 2000). In 
contrast, mu rhythm; large amplitude oscillations in the alpha frequency band (8-
12Hz) over sensorimotor cortex detected by EEG, is suppressed during action 
observation as well as the performance of actions and thereby provides another index 
of MNS activity (Fox et al., 2016; Frenkel-Toledo, Bentin, Perry, Liebermann, & 
Soroker, 2014; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007). Two previous studies 
that have combined EEG and single-pulse TMS have shown that although 
measurements from both these techniques are sensitive to motor resonance 
mechanisms, they are not correlated with each other (Andrews, Enticott, Hoy, 
Thomson, & Fitzgerald, 2015; Lepage, Saint-Amour, & Théoret, 2008). Therefore, it 
is possible that these measurements reflect different aspects of MNS functioning. It 
is important to note that these indices of MNS activity also differ in their spatial and 
temporal properties; EEG measures the sum of post-synaptic neuronal activity over a 
large area, and an index of mu suppression is typically taken over a relatively long 
 123 
	
time period (i.e., >1s). By contrast, TMS measures brief induced increases in 
corticospinal activity from peripheral muscles (Andrews et al., 2015; Pineda, 2005; 
Rossini et al., 1994). Using both of these non-invasive measures of MNS activity 
simultaneously allows a more complete picture of MNS functioning to be collected. 
This study aimed to investigate whether adults with diagnoses of ASD 
display atypical MNS activity when mentalizing and whether levels of MNS 
activation correspond to mentalizing performance. In this study, participants watched 
hand action videos, and after each video they had to either make decisions about the 
intention of the actor (mentalizing task) or the success of the action (non-mentalizing 
task). The video stimuli used showed different actors performing naturalistic hand 
actions to ensure the stimuli were sufficiently complex and optimally activated the 
MNS. TMS-induced MEPs and mu suppression were both used as indices of MNS 
activity. A preliminary TMS study, using the same stimuli, identified higher MNS 
activation during a mentalizing task compared to a non-mentalizing task once the 
actors’ intentions had been revealed (Cole & Barraclough, in review). Therefore, in 
our study, single-pulse TMS was applied to the primary motor cortex (M1) at the end 
of each hand action when the outcome of the action or the intention of the actor had 
been revealed. Simultaneous EEG recordings were made throughout the experiment. 
It was predicted that larger TMS-induced MEP sizes and greater levels of mu 
suppression would be found during the mentalizing task compared to the non-
mentalizing task in adults without ASD diagnoses, indicating higher levels of MNS 
activity. It was also predicted that ASD would be associated with reduced task-
related changes in MNS activity and that lower levels of MNS activity would be 





Forty-three adults were recruited for this study, of which 13 had a formal diagnosis 
of either Asperger’s disorder (11) or Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). All of the 
participants with a diagnosis met the DSM-5 criteria for ASD and none of the 
participants had any existing learning difficulties or experienced delayed language 
development. Participants without an ASD diagnosis were recruited based on the 
level of autistic traits they displayed as measured by the Autistic Quotient (AQ; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). The average AQ 
score in the general population is 16.94 (Ruzich et al., 2015). Individuals were 
excluded from the study if they had AQ scores between 16-19. Participants with 
scores between 0-15 were assigned to the ‘low AQ’ group and participants with AQ 
scores higher than 20 were assigned to the ‘high AQ’ group. This resulted in three 
participant groups: low AQ (n=15), high AQ (n=15) and ASD (n=13). The 
participant groups did not significantly differ in age, verbal IQ, gender or years of 
formal education and all participants had verbal IQ scores within the normal range 
(>70; see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 
Demographic information; group mean (SD) values 
   
      
  Low AQ High AQ ASD p ηp2 
N 15 15 13 
  Age 23.40 (6.82) 24.13(4.68) 28.30 (9.40) 0.16 0.09 
Gender (m:f) 8:7 7:8 9:4 0.47 (X2) / 
Years of formal Education 15.60 (1.64) 16.20 (1.66) 15.38 (1.45) 0.37 0.05 
Verbal IQ1 109.67 (14.09) 113.00 (9.22) 11.62 (14.98) 0.78 0.01 
      1The verbal IQ scores were measured using the test of pre-morbid 
functioning. 





All participants were screened for symptoms of psychiatric disorders using 
the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Individuals were not eligible to take part in this study if they were diagnosed with 
any psychiatric disorders or were identified by the MINI as displaying symptoms of 
any psychiatric disorders. An exception was made for mood disorders, anxiety and 
ADHD in the participants with ASD due to the high prevalence of these 
comorbidities (Matson, Rieske, & Williams, 2013; Matson & Williams, 2014). In the 
ASD group, six participants were taking psychotropic medication to treat ADHD, 
depression or anxiety (see Table 4.2). None of the participants without an ASD 
diagnosis were taking psychotropic medication. 
Table 4.2 
Medication information for participants in the ASD group 
  Participant Medication (daily dosage) 
1 Dexamphetamine (20mg), Zoloft (150mg)  
2 Dexamphetamine (20mg) 
3 Ritalin (30 mg) 
4 Valium (5 mg when needed) 
5 Zoloft (50mg) 
6 Zoloft (50mg) 
 
Participants were also screened for contraindications for TMS; history of 
seizures, serious head injuries, brain related conditions, severe headaches, implanted 
metal or medical devices, family history of epilepsy and current pregnancy (Rossi, 
Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009). 
This research project was approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at Deakin University and was performed in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1990 Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided 
signed informed consent. 
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4.3.2 Psychological Assessments 
All participants completed the Autism Quotient (AQ), Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS-2), The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT), 
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS-2) and Empathy Quotient (EQ). The AQ and 
ADOS-2 are designed to measure the level of autistic traits displayed, the SRS-2 and 
TASIT measure social functioning and the EQ provides a measure of empathy. The 
three groups significantly differed from each other on all these measures (see Table 
4.1). These psychological tests have been shown to display good psychometric 
properties (Allison et al., 2011; Hurst et al., 2007; S McDonald et al., 2006; 
Oosterling et al., 2010). The AQ was administered in the form of an online 
questionnaire before the participants took part in the experiment. The other 
assessments were administered at the Cognitive Neuroscience Unit at Deakin 
University as a two-hour session prior to the TMS testing session. Psychological 
assessment sessions always took place on a separate date to the TMS session and 
both sessions were completed within a 2 week time frame. 
4.3.3 Experimental set-up 
Participants sat 600mm away from an Eyelink 1000 plus eye-tracker (SR Research, 
Ontario) placed in front of a 24” LED computer monitor. Single EEG electrodes 
were placed at locations FCz, F3 and F4 according to the international 10-20 system 
of electrode placement. Typically, EEG recordings are taken from central electrodes 
(C3, C4, Cz) when investigating MNS activity. However, due to the placement of the 
TMS coil over the primary motor cortex (M1) EEG recordings were taken from 
frontal electrodes (F3, F4, FCz) to reduce TMS-induced artefacts, and to allow 
sufficient contact between the TMS coil and the scalp. It has previously been shown 
that mu suppression can be measured across the entire scalp when observing and 
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imitating hand actions and ASD participants have been shown to display differences 
in mu power over frontal regions (Dumas, Soussignan, Hugueville, Martinerie, & 
Nadel, 2014). Reference electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoid bones 
and the ground electrode was placed on the forehead. Electrooculogram (EOG) 
electrodes were placed above and below the left eye to in order to identify EEG 
artefacts caused by blinking. EEG signals were recorded using Curry Neuroimaging 
Suite 7 (Compumetics Ltd, Australia). EEG signals were amplified using NeuroScan 
SynAmps RT (NeuroScan SynAmps, Compumedics Ltd.) and digitised at 1kHz. All 
electrode impedances were below 5KΩ. EEG analyses and bandpass filtering were 
conducted offline. 
TMS was administered using a Magstim BiStim2 stimulator (Magstim 
Company Ltd., Carmarthenshire, Wales, UK). Firstly, the location of the primary 
motor cortex (M1) was identified in each participant by measuring the position on 
the scalp five centimetres lateral and one centimetre anterior to Cz (according to the 
international 10-20 system of electrode placement). TMS pulses were then applied to 
this position on the scalp using a standard figure of eight 70mm coil held 
tangentially over the scalp at a 45 degree angle to the midline. An initial intensity of 
40% stimulator output was used and then the intensity of TMS stimulation was 
increased in 5% increments until MEPs were produced. Stimulation was also applied 
around the estimated location of M1 in order to confirm that this was the optimal 
scalp location to produce motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in muscles of the right 
hand. MEPs were measured from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and abductor 
digiti minimi (ADM) muscles using Ag/AgCl surface electrodes. EMG signals were 
amplified using PowerLab 4/35 (with dual BioAmp; AD Instruments, Colorado 
Springs, CO). Once the optimal location for stimulation had been identified, the 
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intensity of the TMS stimulation was adjusted in order to find the participants’ 
resting motor threshold (RMT). Participants’ RMT was defined as the minimum 
stimulation intensity needed to induce MEPs with an average peak-to-peak 
magnitude of 1mV over 5 consecutive trials. Twenty MEPs induced by stimulation 
at RMT were used as a measure of baseline corticospinal excitability (CSE). 
4.3.4 Experimental Task 
The experiment comprised of two tasks; a mentalizing task and a non-mentalizing 
task. In both tasks, participants watched short videos (4 seconds) of actors passing or 
attempting to pass a poker chip through slots in a wooden board to another person on 
the other side of the board (who was out of view; see Figure 4.1). Grasping and 
pushing actions were shown; grasping actions involved actors grasping a poker chip 
and placing it through a slot at head height, pushing actions involved pushing the 
poker chip with the index finger through a slot that was level with the table in front 
of them (see Figure 4.1). After each video, participants were asked to make a 
decision about the action and indicated their response by pressing buttons on the 
computer keyboard with their left hand. Videos were presented in mentalizing and 
non-mentalizing blocks. In the mentalizing block, participants watched videos that 
either showed an actor accidentally dropping a poker chip and therefore failing to 
pass the poker chip to the other player (‘clumsy’ action) or an actor deliberately not 
passing the poker chip (‘spiteful’ action). After each video, participants indicated 
whether they thought the action was ‘clumsy’ or ‘spiteful’. In the non-mentalizing 
block, participants watched videos in which actors either successfully passed the 
poker chip to the other player (successful action) or accidentally dropped the poker 
chip (unsuccessful action). After each video, participants had to indicate whether the 
action was ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’. The unsuccessful actions shown in the 
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non-mentalizing block were the same as the ‘clumsy’ actions shown in the 
mentalizing block. The videos shown in this experiment are a subset of the videos 
used in a previous study (Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017). Twenty actors (10 
male) were shown performing each action (clumsy grasp, clumsy push, spiteful 
grasp, spiteful push, successful grasp, successful push) resulting in 80 action videos 
per block (clumsy actions were seen in both blocks). Two types of actions (grasping 
and pushing) were used in order to make the stimuli more varied and these particular 
actions were chosen as they both utilise the FDI muscle. 
 
 Figure 4.1 Screenshots depicting the final frame of the video stimuli for one actor. 
The videos depict an actor: A. Accidently dropping a poker chip (clumsy grasp). B. 
Deliberately dropping a poker chip (spiteful grasp). C. Passing a poker chip through 
the higher slot in the board (successful grasp) D. Accidentally not passing a poker 
chip through the bottom slot (clumsy push) E. Deliberately not passing a poker chip 
through the bottom slot (spiteful push) F. Passing a poker chip through the bottom 
slot (successful push). 
A single TMS pulse at 1mV RMT was delivered at the end of each video. A 
light sensor was used in order to time lock the TMS pulses to the timing of the 
videos. A black square was added to the top left corner of the videos and this black 
square was replaced with a white square for the last three frames in each video. The 
light sensor detected this change and sent a 5V TTL pulse to the TMS stimulator via 
a BNC cable which triggered a single TMS pulse to be fired. The TMS machine 
 130 
	
subsequently sent a trigger to a PowerLab 4/35 (ADInstruments Pty Ltd) to trigger 
EMG recording. EEG was continuously recorded throughout both the mentalizing 
and non-mentalizing tasks but triggers were sent to the EEG machine at the start of 
each trial to record the type of action being shown. The order in which mentalizing 
and non-mentalizing blocks were completed was counterbalanced across all 
participants and within each participant group. Once participants had completed both 
the mentalizing and the non-mentalizing task, twenty single TMS pulses were 
administered at RMT in order to compare baseline corticospinal excitability before 
and after the experiment. 
4.3.5 Behavioural Analysis 
First, the ADOS-2, AQ, EQ, SRS-2 and TASIT scores were calculated and a one-
way MANOVA was used to identify group differences in these scores. Then, the 
numbers of correct responses on the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks were 
calculated for each participant. Data screening identified that the behavioural data 
were not normally distributed and therefore a log transformation was applied. The 
log transformed data still violated the assumption of normality so non-parametric 
analyses were conducted. Potential group differences in behavioural performances 
were explored using a Kruskal-Wallis test and a possible task-related difference in 
performances across all participants was examined using a Wilcoxon signed rank 
test. 
4.3.6 EMG analysis 
TMS was not performed on two participants in the high AQ group and four 
participants in the ASD group; two participants in the ASD group and one 
participant in the high AQ group found TMS too uncomfortable and the remaining 
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three participants had motor thresholds deemed too high to continue (>75% 
stimulator output). Trials in which muscle activity was identified within a 200ms 
time window before the TMS pulse or trials in which FDI peak to peak MEP 
amplitudes were smaller than .2mV were removed from the analysis (4.02% of all 
MEPs were excluded). Two participants in the high AQ group were removed from 
the analyses for having only 50% or fewer valid FDI MEPs for either task. This 
resulted in 35 participants (15 low AQ, 11 high AQ and 9 ASD) being included in 
the EMG analysis.  
Preliminary analyses were carried out on the EMG data in order to clarify 
that RMTs were not significantly different between groups, that the experiment did 
not alter participants’ resting corticospinal activity and that the number of excluded 
MEPs did not significantly differ across tasks or participant groups. Group 
differences in RMTs were investigated using a one-way ANOVA. Changes in 
corticospinal activity as a result of the experiment were investigated by first 
calculating median MEP sizes (peak-to-peak amplitude [mV]) for both the 20 single 
TMS pulses given before the experiment and after the experiment for both muscles. 
Then, separate mixed-model ANOVAs were performed for each muscle 
investigating the influences of group (low AQ, high AQ, ASD) and time point 
(before or after the experiment) on MEP sizes. The data regarding the number of 
excluded MEPs violated the assumption of normality even after a log transformation 
was applied so non-parametric tests were used. An independent-samples Kruskal-
Wallis test was used to investigate group differences and a related-samples Wilcoxon 




For the main TMS data analyses, median MEP values were calculated for 
both the FDI and the ADM muscles for each participant and each task 
(mentalizing/non-mentalizing). Median baseline MEP values were also calculated 
for both muscles for each participant by combining MEPs from both pre- and post-
experiment baseline measures. The raw median MEP values for each task were then 
converted into motor resonance values by computing the relative MEP sizes in 
comparison to MEP sizes at baseline: 
 
MR =  [(median MEP during task-median MEP at baseline)/median MEP at 
baseline]*100 
 
Data screening found that the motor resonance data for both FDI and ADM 
muscles violated the assumption of normality so a log transformation was used. This 
transformation cannot be performed on negative values so a constant of 100 was 
added to each motor resonance value prior to transformation to ensure that all values 
were positive. After the log transformation, the distribution of the FDI data did not 
significantly differ from a normal distribution but the ADM data still violated the 
assumption of normality. Therefore, parametric analyses were used for the log 
transformed FDI data, but non-parametric analyses were conducted on the log 
transformed ADM muscle data. 
The FDI motor resonance data were analysed using a mixed-model ANOVA 
to investigate the influences of group (low AQ, high AQ, ASD) and task 
(mentalizing/non-mentalizing) on MEP sizes. Potential group differences in the 
ADM motor resonance data were investigated using a Kruskal-Wallis test and 
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potential differences in motor resonances across experimental tasks were explored 
using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
4.3.7 EEG Analysis 
Offline analyses of the EEG data were performed using Curry 7 Neuroimaging Suite 
software (Compumetics Ltd, Australia). Epochs of EEG data were created for videos 
shown in each task (mentalizing and non-mentalizing). Although, the action videos 
were 4000ms long, the last 350ms of each video was removed in order to eliminate 
the artefact created by the TMS pulse. Therefore, each video epoch was 3650ms long 
and 80 epochs of each type were created for every participant. EEG data collected 
when participants were viewing a fixation cross were used as a baseline measure. 
There were 160 fixation cross epochs (80 for each task), each 1500ms long. The first 
500ms of each fixation cross epoch were removed from the analysis because the 
fixation cross was shown directly after participants were required to make a response 
and therefore removing the first 500ms reduced the possibility of increased mu 
power during fixation as a result of participants moving their left hand back to a 
resting position after they had made their responses. This resulted in 160 fixation 
epochs for each participant that were each 1000ms long.  
EEG data were baseline corrected and band-pass filtered (1-30Hz). Data from the 
EOG electrodes were used to identify blink artefacts and these were removed using a 
threshold reduction method. Any epochs that still contained non-cerebral artefacts 
(>75 µV) were identified and removed from the analysis. Two participants were 
removed from the analysis (one participant from the high AQ group and one 
participant from the ASD group) because 62.5% or less of the epochs were valid for 
one or more of the individual conditions (mentalizing videos, non-mentalizing 
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videos, mentalizing fixation crosses, non-mentalizing fixation crosses). Excluding 
these participants, only 5.6% of epochs were invalid across all participants. 
Preliminary analyses were carried out on the EEG data in order to clarify that the 
number of epochs that were excluded did not significantly differ between participant 
groups or experimental conditions. The numbers of excluded epochs were not 
normally distributed even after a log transformation was applied so non-parametric 
analyses were conducted. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to investigate group 
differences in the number of epochs excluded and a Friedman’s ANOVA was used 
to identify differences in the number of excluded epochs across experimental 
conditions. 
A Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) was used to calculate mu power in both the 
low alpha frequency range (8-10Hz) and high alpha frequency range (10-12Hz) 
during all epochs. The majority of previous studies investigating MNS activity using 
EEG have used activity in the entire alpha frequency band (8-12/13Hz) as a measure 
of mu power (Andrews et al., 2015; Oberman et al., 2005; Oberman, Ramachandran, 
& Pineda, 2008; Perry, Stein, & Bentin, 2011; Ulloa & Pineda, 2007). However, 
there is accumulating evidence to suggest that lower (8-10Hz) and higher (10-12Hz) 
alpha bands reflect different processes and should therefore be analysed separately 
(Dumas et al., 2014; Frenkel-Toledo et al., 2014; Neuper, Scherer, Wriessnegger, & 
Pfurtscheller, 2009; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, & Krausz, 2000). Additionally, a previous 
study found reduced mu suppression in the 10-12Hz range over frontal regions in 
adults with ASD but not the 8-10Hz range when observing hand movements (Dumas 
et al., 2014). Consequently, lower and higher mu frequency bands were analysed 
separately in this study. 
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Average mu power in both frequency bands was then calculated for each 
epoch type (four epoch types: mentalizing videos, non-mentalizing videos, 
mentalizing fixation and non-mentalizing fixation) for every participant. The degree 
of mu suppression during each experimental condition was calculated by comparing 
average mu power during the video epochs compared to the fixation epochs in the 
same condition:[(fixation-video)/fixation]*100. Larger values indicated greater 
degrees of mu suppression. The mu suppression data for both frequency bands 
violated the assumption of normality so the data were log transformed. Log 
transformations cannot be carried out on negative values so a constant of 1300 was 
added to each data point to ensure that all values were positive before the log 
transformation. After the log transformation was applied, the data still violated the 
assumption of normality and therefore non-parametric analyses were conducted. 
Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to investigate group differences in mu suppression 
and related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests were carried out to investigate task-
related changes in mu suppression. Analyses were carried out separately for both 
frequency bands. 
4.3.8 Eye-tracking Analysis 
The eye-tracking data were analysed using EyeLink DataViewer software (SR 
Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Three dynamic rectangular regions of interest 
(ROIs) were created for each action video individually. These ROIs corresponded to 
the head of the actor, the actor’s hand and the poker chip (see Figure 4.2). These 
three interest areas were chosen based on eye-tracking data from a previous 
behavioural study using the same stimuli (Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017). 
The total number and total duration of fixations in each ROI during each task 
(mentalizing/non-mentalizing) were calculated for each participant. ROIs were 
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analysed separately as these data are not independent (participants cannot fixate in 
more than one ROI at once). The eye-tracking data were not normally distributed 
even after a log transformation was applied and therefore non-parametric analyses 
were conducted. Independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to investigate 
group differences and related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests examined 
differences between tasks for each ROI. 
 
Figure 4.2 The dynamic regions of interest (ROIs) used in the eye-tracking data 
analysis for one of the action videos are shown overlaid onto screenshots from (A) 
the start and (B) the end of that particular video. Three dynamic ROIs corresponding 
to 1. The poker chip,  2. The actor’s head and 3. The actor’s hand, were created for 
each of the 120 videos individually.  
4.3.9 Additional analyses  
For all analyses (behavioural, EMG, EEG and eye-tracking), any significant task-
related differences that were identified were investigated further by analysing the 
data collected during the presentation of clumsy actions across the two tasks. 
Identical clumsy actions were shown during both the mentalizing and non-
mentalizing tasks. Analysing the data in this way eliminates the possibility that 
apparent effects of the task are due to differences in observed action kinematics. 
Due to the spectral nature of ASD, any significant group differences that 
were found were also examined across the continuum of autistic traits. A principal 
components analysis (PCA) was performed on all the psychological test scores in 
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order to obtain a single score for each participant that reflected the level of autistic 
traits that they displayed. Linear regression analyses were then used to examine 
whether the levels of autistic traits significantly predicted the outcome variable e.g. 
levels of mu suppression. These additional analyses were conducted to further 
support the relationships between the outcome variables and ASD. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Psychological tests  
A one-way MANOVA identified that scores on all psychological tests (ADOS-2, 
AQ, EQ, TASIT and SRS-2) were significantly different between groups (see Table 
4.3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons identified that all groups were significantly 
different from each other on the ADOS-2, AQ and SRS-2 measures (Bonferroni 
correction applied; see Table 4.4). The high AQ group and the ASD group did not 
display significantly different TASIT scores and EQ scores did not significantly 
differ between low and high AQ groups. All other group comparisons were 
significant (see Table 4.4). In all cases, where significant group differences were 
found, the ASD group had scores that reflected the highest level of autistic traits and 
the low AQ group had scores reflected the lowest level of autistic traits. 
Table 4.3 
Participants' psychological test scores; group mean (SD) values 
        Low AQ High AQ ASD p ηp2 
AQ 8.80 (4.38) 24.07 (4.27) 32.00 (6.67) <.001 0.79 
EQ 53.07 (11.82) 42.60 (13.61) 27.23 (12.09) <.001 0.43 
TASIT1 58.73 (3.10) 54.07 (4.13) 52.38 (5.49) 0.001 0.30 
ADOS-2 1.40 (.99) 4.67 (1.40) 8.54 (3.28) <.001 0.78 
SRS-22 27.87 (15.70) 58.60 (19.10) 101.46 (26.00) <.001 0.69 
      
 
1The TASIT scores were obtained from part 3 (social inference test). 
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2The reported SRS-2 scores are the unstandardized, raw scores, where scores above 60 
indicate some social impairment and scores above 75 reflect severe social impairment. 
 
Table 4.4 
Bonferroni post-hoc pairwise comparisons for psychological test scores 
 
  Low AQ-High AQ Low AQ-ASD High AQ-ASD 
AQ p<.001 p<.001 p=.001 
EQ p=.08 p=.001 p<.01 
TASIT p=.02 p=.001 p=.92 
ADOS p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
SRS p=.001 p<.001 p<.001 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted using the psychological 
test scores in order to obtain a single value for each participant that represented the 
level of autistic traits that they displayed. The psychological test scores correlated 
with each other (all rs>.35) meaning that they were suitable for PCA. The Kasier-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling accuracy was .84 (above .6), Barlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant χ2(10)=146.07, p<.001 and the communalities were all 
above .7 which collectively supported the inclusion of all the psychological tests in 
the PCA. PCA with varimax rotation was used. The initial eigenvalues from the PCA 
analysis showed that one factor (with an eigenvalue of 3.57) explained 71.36% of the 
variance in psychological test scores. No other factors had eigenvalues higher than 
Kaiser’s criteria of 1 and therefore only one factor was extracted. This factor was 
labelled ‘autistic traits’. 
4.4.2 EEG data 
4.4.2.1 8-10Hz 
4.4.2.1.1 Group differences 
There were significant differences in the levels of mu suppression in the 8-10 
frequency band between groups during the mentalizing task at F4 (H(2)=6.21, p<.05; 
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see Table 4.5). Additionally, linear regression analysis demonstrated that the level of 
autistic traits that participants displayed significantly predicted the amount of mu 
suppression in 8-10Hz band at F4 during the mentalizing task [F(1,38)=.47, p=.04, 
R2=.11; see Figure 4.3]. Pairwise-comparisons with adjusted p values demonstrated a 
borderline significant difference between the high AQ group and the ASD group 
(p=.05, r=.47; with lower levels of mu suppression in the ASD group). After 
applying a Bonferroni correction, the new significance threshold was p=.02 (.05/ 3) 
meaning that this borderline significant difference between the high AQ group and 
ASD group did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. There were also no 
significant differences between ASD and low AQ groups (p=.18, r=.37) or the 
between the low and high AQ groups (p=1.00, r=-.10).  
 
Table 4.5 
Mu Suppression (8-10Hz): Median (IQR) values 
    Low AQ High AQ ASD 
8-10Hz F3 Mentalizing 66.40 (73.62) 76.14 (159.40) 64.07 (26.80) 
 
F3 Non-mentalizing 80.25 (20.02) 63.85 (34.49) 80.94 (15.34) 
 
FCz Mentalizing 74.42 (25.32) 75.70 (80.67) 58.88 (64.91) 
 
FCz Non-mentalizing 74.61 (28.31) 62.09 (38.42) 78.19 (14.02) 
 
F4 Mentalizing 74.59 (66.71) 79.23 (40.92) 46.19 (116.16) 
 





Figure 4.3 The relationship between the level of autistic traits that participants 
displayed and the level of mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency range at F4. 
Levels of autistic traits significantly predicted the degree of mu suppression at F4; 
participants that exhibited higher levels of autistic traits showed lower levels of mu 
suppression (8-10Hz) at F4 [F(1,38)=.47, p=.04, R2=.11]. The curved lines represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
Mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band was significantly different 
between groups during the non-mentalizing task at F3 (H(2)=10.10, p=.006) and 
FCZ (H(2)=7.32, p=.03). Pairwise comparisons showed that the high AQ group 
displayed significantly lower levels of mu suppression than the low AQ group at F3 
(p=.01, r=.54). No other group differences were significant once threshold 
significance values had been adjusted using the Bonferroni correction (p=.02; see 
supplementary material). Linear regression analysis demonstrated that the level of 
autistic traits that participants displayed was not a significant predictor of the amount 
of mu suppression in 8-10Hz band during the non-mentalizing task at F3 
[F(1,38)=.02, p=.90, R2<.001] or FCZ [F(1,38)=.03, p=.86, R2<.01]. 
There were no other significant group differences in mu suppression in the 8-10Hz 
frequency band (see supplementary material). 
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4.4.2.1.2 Task-related differences 
Initial analyses identified that mu suppression in the 8-10Hz band was significantly 
lower during the mentalizing task than the non-mentalizing task at F3 across all 
participants (T=581, p=.02, r=.38).  However, when this apparent significant task-
related difference in mu suppression was investigated using data from the clumsy 
actions alone (in order to control for differences in action kinematics), there was no 
significant difference in mu suppression in the 8-10Hz range  between clumsy 
actions shown in the mentalizing task compared to the non-mentalizing task (T=518, 
p=.15, r=.23). There were also no task-related differences in mu suppression in the 8-
10Hz band at FCZ (T=501, p=.21, r=.20) or F4 (T=495, p=.25, r=.18).  
4.4.2.2 10-12Hz 
There were no significant differences in mu suppression in the 10-12Hz frequency 
band between groups or across tasks at any of the cortical sites (see Table 4.6 and 
supplementary material). 
Table 4.6 
Mu Suppression (10-12Hz): Median (IQR) values 
    Low AQ High AQ ASD 
10-12Hz F3 Mentalizing 82.10 (64.85) 71.27 (51.51) 62.40 (63.67) 
 
F3 Non-mentalizing 73.34 (40.03) 72.09 (43.26) 70.91 (36.56) 
 
FCz Mentalizing 73.52 (48.86) 66.79 (36.94) 71.03 (96.40) 
 
FCz Non-mentalizing 72.58 (42.96) 72.60 (48.57) 78.43 (29.70) 
 
F4 Mentalizing 83.38 (37.30) 73.15 (27.42) 69.86 (.40) 
 
F4 Non-mentalizing 71.80 (23.32) 68.72 (26.15) 78.20 (23.88) 
 
4.4.3 TMS data 
Across all participants, there was no significant difference in motor resonance values 
in the FDI muscle between the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks (F(1,32)=.30, 
p=.59, ηp2<.01), there was no significant interaction between participant group and 
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the task (F(2,32)=.73, p=.49, ηp2=.04) and there were no significant group 
differences in motor resonance values (F(2, 32)=.73, p=.49, ηp2=.04; see Table 4.7 
for motor resonance values). 
There were also no significant results for the ADM muscle (see Table 4.8 and 
supplementary material). 
Table 4.7 
Motor resonance log values FDI muscle: Mean (SD) values 
  Mentalizing task  Non-mentalizing task 
Low AQ 2.15 (.24) 2.17 (.23) 
High AQ 2.16 (.23) 2.14 (.24) 
ASD 2.07 (.22) 2.03 (.32) 
 
Table 4.8 
Motor resonance log values ADM muscle: Median (IQR) values 
  Mentalizing task  Non-mentalizing task 
Low AQ 2.02 (.56) 2.14 (.59) 
High AQ 2.00 (.28) 2.00 (.25) 
ASD 1.94 (.41) 1.96 (.52) 
 
4.4.4 Eye-tracking 
Across all participants, significantly more and longer fixations were made in the 
hand and head ROIs during the mentalizing task compared to the non-mentalizing 
task [hand ROI: number: (T=169, p<.001, r=-.52), duration: (T=288, p= .03, r=-.33); 
head ROI: number: (T=271, p=.02, r=-.34), duration: (T=344, p= .02, r=-.35)]. See 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 for descriptive statistics. There was borderline significantly more 
fixations in the poker chip ROI during the mentalizing than the non-mentalizing task 
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(T=297, p=.05, r=.29). However, there was no significant task-related difference in 
the total duration of fixations within the poker chip ROI (T=431, p=.61, r=-.08). 
Table 4.8 
Number of fixations: Median (IQR) values 
    Low AQ High AQ ASD 
Mentalizing Hand ROI 132.00 (89.00) 154.00 (129.00) 206.00 (157.20) 
 
Head ROI 183.00 (90.00) 203.00 (126.00) 161.00 (126.50) 
 
Poker chip ROI 90.00 (80.00) 93.00 (62.00) 92.00 (78.50) 
     Non-mentalizing Hand ROI 103.00 (37.00) 115.00 (69.00) 139.00 (73.00) 
 
Head ROI 158.00 (102.00) 201.00 (1.03) 169.00 (109.00) 
 
Poker chip ROI 93.00 (65.00) 56.00 (57.00) 84.00 (63.00) 
 
Table 4.9 
Duration of fixations (ms): Median (IQR) values 
    Low AQ High AQ ASD 
Mentalizing Hand ROI 29366 (32683) 45431 (27323) 53280 (56637) 
 
Head ROI 54584 (59841) 60864 (42150) 44154 (58472) 
 
Poker chip ROI 23850 (25791) 27003 (25843) 21126 (37765) 
     Non-mentalizing Hand ROI 29624 (25911) 27452 (21443) 48775 (33693) 
 
Head ROI 42858 (41739) 68264 (40723) 44889 (51148) 
 
Poker chip ROI 28313 (39537) 14469 (13128) 20584 (34201) 
 
When the eye-tracking data from the clumsy actions were analysed alone, all 
previously significant results (including the borderline significant difference) were 
still significant except for the duration of fixations within the head ROI (T=344, 
p=.12, r=-.24; see supplementary material for all results).There were no significant 
group differences in the eye-tracking data (see supplementary material). 
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4.4.5 Relationships between data from different techniques 
4.4.5.1 EEG and behavioural performance 
Linear regression analysis found that mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band 
at F3 during the mentalizing task significantly predicted performance on this task 
across all participants [F(1,38)=5.64, p=.02, R2=.13; see Figure 4.4].  There were no 
other significant relationships between the EEG data and behavioural performance 
(see supplementary material). Although one ASD participant was identified as an 
outlier (Cook’s distance>1) this point had a relatively low leverage value (.06, <n/4) 
and when this outlier was removed, the linear regression was still significant 
[F(1,38)=17.90, p<.001, R2=.33]. 
 
Figure 4.4 The relationship between performance on the mentalizing task and the 
level of mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band at F3. Mentalizing 
performance significantly predicted the degree of mu suppression at F3; participants 
with superior mentalizing performances also showed greater levels of mu 
suppression at F3 in the 8-10Hz frequency band [F(1,38)=5.64, p=.02, R2=.13]. The 
curved lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
4.4.5.2 Eye-tracking and behavioural performance 
The total duration of fixations within the poker chip ROI during the non-mentalizing 
task significantly predicted performance on the non-mentalizing task [F(1,41)=5.14, 
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p=.03, R2=.11]. There were no other significant relationships between eye-tracking 
data and behavioural performance (see supplementary material). 
4.4.5.3 Eye-tracking and EEG 
Linear regression analyses found that the degree of mu suppression did not 
significantly predict fixation patterns for any of the cortical sites (see supplementary 
material). 
4.4.5.4 TMS and other measures 
Linear regression analyses found that motor resonance values did not significantly 
predict behavioural performances or levels of mu suppression in either task (see 
supplementary material). 
4.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the possible association between ASD and atypical 
MNS activity when mentalizing, as well as the relationship between MNS activity 
and mentalizing performance. Both TMS-induced MEPs and mu suppression 
(measured by EEG) were used as indices of MNS activity. The EEG data show that 
higher levels of autistic traits (across clinical and non-clinical populations) were 
associated with lower levels of MNS activation in the right hemisphere when 
mentalizing. However, these lower levels of MNS activity in the right hemisphere 
were not associated with poorer mentalizing performances. In contrast, lower levels 
of MNS activity in the left hemisphere were associated with poorer mentalizing 
performance but not associated with the levels of autistic traits that participants 
displayed. The TMS data did not show differences in MNS activity between groups 
or a relationship between MNS activity and mentalizing performances. 
Consequently, the EEG data provide evidence for MNS involvement in mentalizing 
and reduced MNS activity in adults with high levels of autistic traits. However, as 
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there were lateralisation differences between MNS activity associated with task 
performance and reduced MNS activity associated with high levels of autistic traits, 
our data do not provide evidence that atypical MNS functioning underlies 
mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD.  
Across all participants, the level of autistic traits displayed significantly 
predicted levels of mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band at F4 during the 
mentalizing task (see Figure 4.3). These data imply that high levels of autistic traits 
are associated with reduced MNS activity in the right hemisphere when mentalizing. 
Our results support previous studies which have found atypical MNS activation in 
adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Kana et al., 2014; Martineau et al., 
2010; Oberman et al., 2005) and adults without a diagnosis but high levels of autistic 
traits (Cooper et al., 2013; Puzzo et al., 2009). The right lateralisation of the reduced 
MNS activity associated with high levels of autistic traits in this study compliments 
findings from a previous study which found reduced right IFG activity in adults with 
ASD when inferring the intentions of characters in a comic strip task (Kana et al., 
2014). In contrast, reduced left IFG activity has been found in adults with ASD 
during the ‘reading the mind in the eyes’ (RME) task which involves viewing still 
images of people’s eyes and selecting the appropriate mental state from four written 
options (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Holt et al., 2014). Differences in the laterality of 
reduced MNS activity associated with ASD between studies may reflect differences 
in task demands; activity in the right IFG has been linked to inhibiting self-
perspective (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005; Samson, 
Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015) and processing action context (Villarreal, Fridman, 
& Leiguarda, 2012) whereas left IFG has been associated with face (Feurra, 
Fuggetta, Rossi, & Walsh, 2010; Kesler-West et al., 2001) and language processing 
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(Cornelissen et al., 2009; Liakakis, Nickel, & Seitz, 2011; Purcell, Napoliello, & 
Eden, 2011; Tyler et al., 2011; Wright, Randall, Marslen-Wilson, & Tyler, 2010). 
Therefore, mentalizing tasks which rely more heavily on face or language processing 
are likely to recruit the left IFG to a greater degree than right IFG in neurotypical 
participants, meaning that larger group differences will be found in left IFG if the 
MNS is disengaged in adults with ASD. In our study, individuals with low levels of 
autistic traits may have used methods which preferentially recruited the right MNS in 
order to infer the intentions of others from their actions. This is supported by 
previous studies which have found right lateralised MNS activity when identifying 
deceitful actions (Grezes, 2004), when implicitly processing the intentions of actions 
(Iacoboni et al., 2005) and when viewing intended compared to non-intended hand 
actions (Liepelt, Cramon, et al., 2008).  
Although our EEG data suggest that MNS activation in the right hemisphere 
is reduced in adults with high levels of autistic traits when mentalizing, no 
significant relationship was found between right-lateralised MNS activity and 
mentalizing performance. Consequently, our data do not provide evidence that 
atypical MNS activation in the right hemisphere underlies mentalizing difficulties 
associated with ASD. These data contradict the broken mirror theory, which states 
that atypical MNS activity underlies the social communication deficits that 
individuals with ASD experience (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Lindsay M Oberman 
& Ramachandran, 2007; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). The typical 
performances of adults with high levels of autistic traits on the mentalizing task 
despite the reduced levels of right MNS activity in the current study may reflect 
compensatory strategies that these individuals have adopted in order to successfully 
infer the intentions of others from action kinematics, despite atypical disengagement 
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of the right MNS. All participants in this study were high-functioning adults with IQ 
scores within the typical range (>70). It is possible that if younger participants were 
recruited they may not have yet developed compensatory mechanisms to allow 
intentions to be successfully inferred from others’ actions and a relationship between 
right IFG activation and mentalizing performance may have been found. 
The lower levels of mu suppression in the right hemisphere associated with 
high levels of autistic traits in the mentalizing task were not observed in the non-
mentalizing task. This suggests mentalizing induces atypical suppression of the right 
MNS in these adults. Both the mentalizing task and the non-mentalizing task 
involved watching hand action videos but the tasks differed in the inferences that the 
participants were required to make. Making judgements about others’ internal states, 
such as their intentions, reliably induces activation in brain areas known as the 
‘mentalizing system’ (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; de Lange et al., 2008; Lombardo et 
al., 2010; Spunt et al., 2011; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). The core areas of the 
mentalizing system are thought to be the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the temporal poles (Frith & Frith, 2006). As 
lower levels of MNS activation were only observed in adults with high levels of 
autistic traits during the task in which the mentalizing system was engaged, this 
suggests that activation of the mentalizing system causes atypical suppression of 
MNS functioning in adults with high levels of autistic traits. Atypical connectivity 
between the mentalizing system and the MNS has previously been reported in ASD 
(Damarla et al., 2010; Fishman et al., 2014; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & 
Minshew, 2007; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004; Kennedy & 
Courchesne, 2008; Noonan, Haist, & Müller, 2009; Shih et al., 2010). Additionally, 
neuroimaging studies have provided evidence to suggest that MNS activation is 
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influenced by top-down processing; MNS activity is higher when actions are shown 
in context compared to actions shown without context (Iacoboni et al., 2005) and 
MNS activation is higher during socially relevant movements compared to non-
social movements (Becchio et al., 2012; Centelles et al., 2011). Therefore, our data 
in conjunction with the previous literature suggest that top-down connectivity from 
the mentalizing system to the MNS may be atypical in adults with high levels of 
autistic traits, which results in reduced levels of right MNS activity in these 
individuals compared to adults with low levels of autistic traits when inferring the 
intentions of others. 
In contrast to the right-lateralised MNS data, left-lateralised MNS activity 
was not related to levels of autistic traits,  but a significant positive relationship was 
found between left MNS activity and mentalizing performance. Participants who 
exhibited superior performances on the mentalizing task also displayed higher levels 
of mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band at F3 during this task. These data 
support the motor resonance (or motor simulation) theory (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; 
Landmann et al., 2011; Uithol et al., 2011). This theory states that observed actions 
are internally simulated in the observer’s own MNS in order to infer the internal 
states of the individuals performing the actions. In our study, right-handed actions 
were viewed and therefore internal simulation of these actions would be predicted to 
result in particularly increased activation in left hemisphere motor areas (Aziz-Zadeh 
et al., 2002). The relationship found between MNS activity and mentalizing 
performance implies that individuals who formed stronger internal simulations of the 
observed actions displayed superior abilities to infer the internal states of the actors. 
Our data therefore support the notion that internal simulation of observed hand 
actions by the contralateral MNS is an important process in order to successfully 
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infer others intentions. This compliments previous studies that have shown bilateral 
but stronger left MNS activity when inferring the intentions of right-handed actions 
(de Lange et al., 2008), higher left MNS activation when viewing social right-handed 
actions compared to those without social context (Becchio et al., 2012; Bucchioni et 
al., 2013; Enticott et al., 2013) and poorer mentalizing performances in patients with 
MNS lesions (Besharati et al., 2016; Dal Monte et al., 2014).  
Initial analyses of task-related differences in mu suppression suggested that 
left-lateralised MNS activity was lower during the mentalizing task than the non-
mentalizing task. However, this task-related difference in MNS activity was 
eliminated when only identical (‘clumsy’) actions were analysed across tasks. This 
implies that the apparent task-related difference in MNS activity in the left 
hemisphere was likely to be the product of differences in action kinematics between 
the videos shown across the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks. During the non-
mentalizing task, successful actions were shown which involved an actor passing a 
poker chip to another player through a slot in a board and returning to their hand to 
their side of the board at the end of the action. In comparison, during the mentalizing 
task, spiteful actions were shown which involved an actor deliberately releasing a 
poker chip before it could be passed through the slot (see Figure 4.1). Determining 
the success of the successful actions required participants to process that the actors’ 
hands had returned to their side of the board without the poker chip. Therefore, it is 
likely that the successful actions were internally simulated for slightly longer periods 
of time, resulting in overall greater levels of MNS activation during the non-
mentalizing task. This could explain the apparent significantly higher levels of MNS 
activity during the non-mentalizing task compared to the mentalizing task and the 
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elimination of this apparent difference in MNS activity when only activity during the 
presentation of identical action videos (‘clumsy’ actions) was compared across tasks. 
Our EEG data show differences in mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency 
band rather than the 10-12Hz frequency band were associated with autistic traits and 
mentalizing performance. No significant relationships were found between mu 
suppression in the 10-12Hz frequency band and any other measures. These data 
support previous studies which have found mu suppression only in the lower alpha 
frequency band (8-10Hz) and not the higher alpha frequency band during action 
observation (Cochin, 1999; Simon & Mukamel, 2016). These EEG data also support 
the functional segregation of mu rhythm into two discrete sub-bands, complimenting 
previous work that found distinct mu responses in low and high alpha bands (Dumas 
et al., 2014; Frenkel-Toledo et al., 2014; Neuper et al., 2009; Pfurtscheller et al., 
2000). The majority of previous studies investigating mu rhythm in individuals with 
ASD have not split mu rhythm into sub-bands (Bernier, Aaronson, & McPartland, 
2013; Dumas et al., 2014; Fan, Decety, Yang, Liu, & Cheng, 2010; Oberman et al., 
2005, 2008; Raymaekers et al., 2009). A previous study that did investigate mu 
suppression in two discrete sub-bands in adults with ASD found reduced mu 
suppression in the 11-13Hz frequency band when observing hand actions and no 
atypicalities in the 8-10Hz frequency band (Dumas et al., 2014). This previous study 
investigated mu suppression during passive action observation, not during a 
mentalizing task. Similar to this previous study, our data show no atypicalities in mu 
suppression in the 8-10Hz range in adults with ASD during the non-mentalizing task. 
The reduced mu suppression in the upper sub-band during passive action observation 
in this previous study may be the result of the slightly higher frequency band used. 
This frequency band encroaches into the beta frequency range 12(/13)-30(/35)Hz 
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(Haenschel, Baldeweg, Croft, Whittington, & Gruzelier, 2000; Kilavik, Zaepffel, 
Brovelli, MacKay, & Riehle, 2013; Miller, 2007). Similar to mu suppression, 
oscillatory activity in the beta frequency range is suppressed when observing 
biological motion (Babiloni et al., 2002; Milston, Vanman, & Cunnington, 2013; 
Perry et al., 2010) and atypical oscillatory activity in the beta frequency range has 
previously been reported in adults with ASD (Cooper et al., 2013; Honaga et al., 
2010). In summary, mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency sub-band (and not 10-
12Hz) appears to reflect MNS activity in the left hemisphere that is related to 
mentalizing performance, and MNS activity in the right hemisphere is reduced in 
adults with high levels of autistic traits when mentalizing.  
The TMS data show no relationship between motor resonance values and 
either mentalizing performance or autistic traits and no differences in motor 
resonance values across tasks. These data were unexpected as we predicted that a 
positive relationship would be found between motor resonance values and 
mentalizing performances. We predicted that motor resonance values would be 
larger during the mentalizing task (Enticott et al., 2013), and that task-related 
differences in motor resonance values would be reduced in adults with high levels of 
autistic traits (Enticott et al., 2012; Puzzo et al., 2009; Théoret et al., 2005). In this 
study, TMS stimulation was applied to the left hemisphere meaning that the TMS 
data reflects MNS activity in the left hemisphere. The lack of a task-related 
difference in MNS activity in the TMS data compliments our EEG data, which also 
suggest no task-related difference in MNS activity when differences in action 
kinematics are controlled for. Additionally, the lack of a relationship between MNS 
activity and autistic traits in the TMS data supports our EEG data, which also found 
no relationship between left MNS activity and autistic traits. However, the 
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relationship between left MNS activation and mentalizing performance shown in the 
EEG data were not replicated in the TMS data.  
A possible reason for the inconsistency between the TMS data and the EEG 
data is that these methods measure different aspects of MNS functioning. We found 
that, across all participants, motor resonance values did not significantly predict the 
degree of mu suppression (see supplementary material). These data support previous 
studies that found TMS-induced MEP sizes did not correspond with levels of mu 
suppression when observing actions (Andrews, Enticott, Hoy, Thomson, & 
Fitzgerald, 2015; Lepage, Saint-Amour, & T Théoret, 2008).  Results from both 
MEG studies (Cheyne et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2009) and a combined MRI-EEG 
study (Arnstein, Cui, Keysers, Maurits, & Gazzola, 2011) suggest that mu rhythms 
correspond to activation in S1. Although S1 is not considered to be a 'core region' of 
the MNS, S1 has been reliably shown to display mirror properties (Confalonieri et 
al., 2012; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012; 
Porro et al., 1996). TMS on the other hand, is very unlikely to cause MEPs in 
muscles of the hand through means other than the stimulation of M1 (Lepage et al., 
2008). TMS-induced MEPs measured during action observation are thought to 
measure increased excitability in M1 as the result of excitatory cortico-cortical 
connections from prefrontal MNS areas (IFG/vPMC; Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 
2005; Loporto, McAllister, Williams, Hardwick, & Holmes, 2011). Therefore, if mu 
suppression measured by EEG reflects MNS activity in S1 and TMS-induced MEPs 
provide an index of prefrontal MNS activity then this could explain the differences 
between the results from these two measures. 
An alternative reason for the inconsistency between the EEG and TMS data 
could be due to the differences in the spatial and temporal properties of these two 
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measurements of MNS activity. The EEG measurements in this study reflect the sum 
of post-synaptic neuronal activity over a large cortical area and a relatively long time 
period (throughout video or fixation cross display) whereas TMS measures brief 
induced increases in corticospinal activity from peripheral muscles, induced by 
stimulating a relatively small population of neurons at a discrete time point 
(Andrews et al., 2015; Pineda, 2005; Rossini et al., 1994). Therefore, even if EEG 
and TMS methods were measuring the same aspects of MNS functioning, the results 
may differ simply due to differences in the spatial and temporal properties of the 
measurements. Consequently, it is unsurprising that these two indices of MNS 
activity do not correlate with each other. Measuring MNS activity using both these 
measures allowed us to obtain a more complete measure of MNS activity. 
The total duration of fixations in the poker chip ROI predicted non-
mentalizing task performance but there were no significant relationships between 
any of the eye-tracking measures and mentalizing performance. This implies that the 
visual information within the poker chip ROI was vital for performance on the non-
mentalizing task; this is to be expected as performances relied upon identifying 
whether the poker chip was successfully passed to another player or was dropped 
before being passed to another player. Therefore, visual information from the other 
ROIs was not needed, only the final position of the poker chip was important for task 
performance. In contrast, during the mentalizing task, the final location of the poker 
chip was always the same (all actions were unsuccessful) but participants were 
required to infer the intentions of the actors from the kinematics of their actions in 
order to complete the task. The lack of any significant relationships between the eye-
tracking data and mentalizing performances suggests that participants did not have a 
rigid method in which they did this. This is supported by the fact that overall, 
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participants displayed a greater number of fixations during the mentalizing task than 
the non-mentalizing task suggesting a greater degree of re-diverting attention during 
this task perhaps reflecting an increased level of uncertainty regarding where to 
direct their visual attention.  
There were no significant differences in the eye-tracking data associated with 
high levels of autistic traits during the mentalizing task. This means that the lower 
levels of MNS activity during the mentalizing task exhibited by adults with high 
levels of autistic traits were not due to reduced fixation on the observed action 
kinematics in these individuals. 
There are a number of limitations associated with this study including the 
small sample size, particularly for the TMS data, which may have resulted in limited 
power to detect differences in MNS functioning associated with ASD. The 
particularly small sample size for the TMS data was due to a number of participants 
(n=6) not being able to complete the TMS element of this study either due to not 
tolerating stimulation or having particularly high motor thresholds. This particularly 
small sample size may have contributed to the lack of differences in motor resonance 
values found both across tasks and between groups. The lack of significant 
mentalizing deficits in adults with high levels of autistic traits in our study may have 
also limited our ability to detect a relationship between motor resonance values and 
autistic traits; it is possible that if ASD participants with higher levels of autistic 
traits and significant mentalizing deficits were recruited then a significant 
relationship may have been observed. However, adults with higher levels of autistic 
traits did show lower levels of mu suppression which suggests that MNS 
atypicalities were detectable in these high-functioning adults despite typical 
behavioural performances. Additionally, our TMS data support other studies that 
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have previously reported typical motor resonance in adults with ASD (Enticott et al., 
2013; Kirkovski et al., 2016). It is possible that the interesting laterality difference in 
the relationship between mu suppression (8-10Hz) and behavioural performance 
compared to the relationship between mu suppression (8-10Hz) and autistic traits 
may have been the result of TMS stimulation to the left hemisphere in our study. 
Therefore, replication of the study with stimulation applied to the right hemisphere is 
required in order to confirm this laterality difference. The inclusion of medicated 
participants in this study may have also influenced the TMS data; six participants in 
the ASD group were taking psychotropic medications which have been shown to 
increase corticospinal excitability (Gilbert et al., 2006; Minelli et al., 2010). Due to 
the high comorbidity of ADHD, depression and anxiety in ASD, the inclusion of 
adults taking psychotropic medication is common in TMS studies with ASD 
participants (Enticott, Rinehart, Tonge, Bradshaw, & Fitzgerald, 2010; Enticott et al., 
2013; Oberman, Pascual-Leone, & Rotenberg, 2014). Despite the possible influence 
of psychotropic medication on corticospinal excitability, our data show no group 
differences in resting motor thresholds and there was no significant difference in 
resting motor threshold values between medicated and non-medicated participants 
(see supplementary material).  
Despite these limitations, our EEG data add to the existing literature by 
identifying lower levels of right MNS activity in adults with high levels of autistic 
traits when inferring the intentions of others from their actions and higher levels of 
left MNS activity associated with superior mentalizing performances. These EEG 
data suggest that the MNS has a role in inferring the intentions of others from their 
actions, providing support for the motor resonance theory of social cognition 
(Agnew et al., 2007; Landmann et al., 2011; Leslie et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 
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2002). Additionally, adults with high levels of autistic traits appear to display 
atypical suppression of the MNS in the right hemisphere when inferring the 
intentions of others. Therefore, this study provides evidence for reduced MNS 
activity in adults with high levels of autistic traits when mentalizing and a potential 




Chapter 5: Reduced Connectivity between Mentalizing and 
Mirror Neuron Systems May Underlie Difficulties Inferring 
Social Intentions in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
This chapter is adapted from: Cole, E.J., Barraclough N. E., Andrews T.J. (in 
preparation). Reduced connectivity between mentalizing and mirror neuron systems 
may underlie difficulties inferring social intentions in autism spectrum disorder.4 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is associated with difficulties inferring the social 
intentions of others. Two neural systems known as the mentalizing system and the 
mirror neuron system (MNS) are thought to play an important role in making 
inferences about the actions of others.  The aim of this fMRI study was to determine 
whether differences in the connectivity between these networks can explain 
behavioural difficulties associated with ASD.  We recruited 40 adult participants (20 
with ASD and 20 typically-developing). Brain activity was monitored while 
participants watched videos in which actors performed hand actions.  The videos 
were divided into mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.  During mentalizing 
blocks, participants were asked to indicate whether hand actions were clumsy or 
spiteful. During non-mentalizing blocks, participants indicated whether the actions 
were successful or unsuccessful.  Behavioural performance on the mentalizing task 
was negatively correlated with levels of autistic traits.  To explore the neural 
																																								 																				
4 The author, Eleanor Cole, designed the experiment, collected the data, analysed the 
results and wrote the manuscript under the joint supervision of Prof Timothy 
Andrews and Dr Nick Barraclough. 
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correlates of this behavioural deficit in adults with high levels of autistic traits, the 
neural response was compared during the mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.  
Higher activity was elicited during the mentalizing blocks in regions associated with 
the mentalizing system, such as the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), as well as in regions associated with the MNS, such 
as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL). Next, 
connectivity between regions was measured as a function of task.  Increased 
functional connectivity between the dmPFC and both the IFG and supplementary 
motor area (SMA) was evident during mentalizing compared to non-mentalizing 
blocks. Interestingly, connectivity between the dmPFC and IFG was negatively 
correlated with autistic traits. Together, these data emphasise the importance of 
functional connectivity between the MS and MNS in inferring social intentions and 
show that reduced connectivity between these systems could explain some of the 
social difficulties experienced by adults with ASD. 
5.2 Introduction 
Inferring the internal states of others from their movements is important for 
successful social interactions.  Two neural systems; the mirror neuron system (MNS) 
and the mentalizing system, have been shown to be active when making inferences 
about the internal state of others based on their actions (Becchio et al., 2012; 
Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; de Lange, Spronk, Willems, 
Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2010; 
Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a). Inferring aspects of someone’s internal state such as 
their emotions, intentions or beliefs is known as ‘mentalizing’ (Chung, Barch, & 
Strube, 2014; Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Frith & Frith, 2006; Kampe, 
Frith, & Frith, 2003). 
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The main components of the mentalizing system are considered to be the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Frith & 
Frith, 2006; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). The mPFC can be 
subdivided into distinct subregions and meta-analyses have identified different roles 
for each subregion (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Bzdok et al., 2013; Jérôme Sallet et al., 
2013). The most dorsal region of the mPFC (dmPFC) appears to be the subregion 
that is particularly involved in inferring internal states of others from their actions 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Sallet et al., 2013).  
Regions in the MNS show similar activation patterns during both the 
performance and observation of actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 
1996). It is thought that this pattern of activation reflects the internal simulation of 
observed actions on the observer’s own motor system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). Some researchers propose that internally simulating the actions of others aids 
the understanding of the internal states motivating their actions (de Lange et al., 
2008; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Lindsay M Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; 
Trilla Gros et al., 2015; Uddin et al., 2007). The core components of the MNS are 
considered to be the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Despite the activation 
of both the MNS and the mentalizing system during mentalizing tasks, it is not clear 
how these two systems interact and the role of the MNS is debated (Catmur, 2015; 
de Lange et al., 2008; Hamilton & Marsh, 2013). 
Identifying the brain activation and functional connectivity patterns elicited 
when mentalizing may be important for understanding the difficulties experienced by 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A number of studies have shown 
that individuals with ASD have difficulties mentalizing (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
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Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014; Senju, 
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). Difficulty inferring others’ social intentions (i.e. 
their intended impact on others such as the intent to help or to harm) is of particular 
importance as this deficit can result in individuals with ASD making inappropriate 
social decisions and consequently being vulnerable to mistreatment (Fisher, 
Moskowitz, & Hodapp, 2013; The National Autistic Society, 2014). To date, brain 
activation and functional connectivity patterns when inferring social intentions have 
not been investigated in adults with ASD.  
The aim of this fMRI study was (1) to determine whether connectivity 
between areas associated with the MNS and mentalizing system is important when 
inferring social intentions and (2) to explore whether differences in connectivity 
between these systems can explain the difficulties experienced by individuals with 
ASD in inferring social intentions of others. To address this issue, we recruited 
adults with and without a diagnosis of ASD.  Participants viewed videos in which 
actors performed actions.  During the mentalizing videos, participants had to report 
whether the actor was being clumsy or spiteful and during the non-mentalizing 
videos, participants had to report whether the action was successful or unsuccessful.  
To localize regions involved in mentalizing, the response during mentalizing blocks 
was compared to non-mentalizing blocks.  The prediction was that this contrast 
should define regions associated with the MNS and mentalizing system.  Next, we 
examined whether connectivity between these regions differed between the 
mentalizing blocks compared to non-mentalizing blocks.  The prediction was that 
functional connectivity between these systems would be higher during mentalizing 
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blocks.  Finally, we explored whether differences in connectivity across individuals 
could be explained by the level of autistic traits displayed. 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants 
Twenty adults with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD; 8 female) and 
twenty typically developing (TD) adults were recruited for this study. Each 
participant with ASD was individually matched on both gender and age to a TD 
participant and the groups did not significantly differ in years of formal education 
(demographic information is shown in Table 5.1). One participant pair were left-
handed. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This research 
project was approved by the Ethics Committee at York Neuroimaging Centre and 
was performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1990 
Declaration of Helsinki. Six participants in the ASD group were taking psychotropic 
medication to treat depression or anxiety and one of these participants was 
additionally taking a very low dose of an antipsychotic (see Table 5.2). None of the 
participants in the control group were taking psychotropic medication for any 
psychiatric disorders. 
Table 5.1 
Participant demographic information; group mean (SD) values  
  ASD TD p ηp2 
N 20 20 
  Age 29.8(12.87) 29.6 (13.50) 0.96 0.00 
Gender (m:f) 12:8 12:8 1.00 (X²) / 
Years of formal Education 16.20 (1.42) 17.20 (1.88) 0.07 0.09 
     




Medication information for participants in the ASD group 
Participant Medication (daily dosage) 
1 Fluoxetine (20mg) 
2 Mirtazapine (30mg) 
3 Sertraline (200mg) 
4 Sertraline (200mg) 
5 Sertraline (200mg) 
6 Aripiprazole (2.5mg), Citalopram (30mg) 
 
5.3.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were action videos used in a previous behavioural study (Cole, 
Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017). Videos were filmed at a resolution of 1080 x 1920 
pixels and 50 frames per second. The videos showed actors either successfully or 
unsuccessfully passing a poker chip through slots in a white wooden board to 
another player on the other side that was out of view (see Figure 5.1). The actors in 
the unsuccessful videos either did not pass the poker chip to the other player 
deliberately (‘spiteful’ action) or accidentally (‘clumsy’ action). All action types 
(successful, spiteful and clumsy) were carried out by both pushing the poker chip 
(with the index finger) through a lower slot or by grasping the poker chip (with the 
index finger and thumb) and passing it through a higher slot (see Figure 5.1). 
Eighteen different actors (9 female) were shown performing these actions and each 




Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of the mentalizing task. At the beginning of 
each block, an instruction screen was shown for 9 seconds to indicate whether 
participants would be completing a mentalizing or non-mentalizing task. 
Subsequently, six videos were shown sequentially. After each video a response 
screen was shown and participants indicated whether the action shown was ‘clumsy’ 
(accidental) or’ spiteful’ (deliberate). In this example, video 1 portrays a spiteful 
action and video 2 depicts a clumsy action. 
5.3.3 Experimental design 
Participants completed a behavioural task whilst inside the scanner which had a 
block-design with two conditions: mentalizing and non-mentalizing. In mentalizing 
blocks, participants were shown unsuccessful (clumsy or spiteful) actions and after 
each video a response screen was shown, prompting participants to indicate whether 
the action was clumsy or spiteful. In the non-mentalizing blocks, participants were 
shown successful or unsuccessful (clumsy) actions and were asked to indicate 
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whether the action was successful or unsuccessful. In both tasks, participants 
indicated their answers by pressing buttons on a response box placed in their right 
hand. Each block contained six videos (three of each type). Videos were 
counterbalanced, so that gender and identity of the actors were not predictive of the 
actions they were performing. 
At the beginning of each block, an instruction screen was shown for nine 
seconds to make participants aware of the task they would be completing during the 
upcoming block. After each video the response screen was shown for five seconds 
and afterwards a central fixation cross was shown for one second before the next 
video in the block was shown. Participants completed twelve blocks (six mentalizing 
and six non-mentalizing) lasting a total of 12 minutes 36 seconds. The videos were 
projected onto a rear projection screen in the bore of the scanner using an Epson EB-
G5900 projector with a long throw lens. Participants viewed the videos using a 
mirror attached to the head coil. Videos were shown full screen (40 x 23cm and 
degrees of visual angle, 1920 x 1080 resolution). 
Prior to scanning, participants completed practice trials (one mentalizing and 
one non-mentalizing block) on a laptop outside of the scanner in order to familiarise 
them with the structure of the task. The actors shown in the practice blocks were not 
shown in the main experiment to avoid previous experience with the actors 
influencing decisions in the main experiment. 
5.3.4 Data acquisition  
A 3T GE HD Excite MRI scanner with an 8-channel phase array head coil tuned to 
127.4 MHz was used to acquire fMRI data. A gradient-echo EPI sequence was used 
to collect data from 38 interleaved axial slices (TR=3000ms, TE=35ms, voxel 
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size=2.25 x 2.25, flip angle =90º, FOV=288mm, matrix size= 128 x 128, slice 
thickness= 3mm). Localiser scans were carried out in order to align EPI images. 
High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images (TR=7.96ms, TE=3.05ms, voxel 
size= 1.13 x 1.13 mm, FOV=290mm, matrix size= 256 x 256, slice thickness=1mm) 
were also obtained. T1-weighted fluid-attenuated inversion recovery sequence (T1-
FLAIR) images with the same spatial prescription as the EPI data were collected to 
aid co-registration to structural images (voxel size=.56 x .56mm, matrix size=512 x 
512). The first three frames of each scan were discarded to allow time for 
magnetisation to stabilise. 
5.3.5 Psychological Assessments 
We used standardised psychological assessments to measure the level of autistic 
traits displayed by all participants (both those with and without a diagnosis of ASD). 
This was done so that behavioural and neural measures could be investigated in 
relation to the level of autistic traits displayed. This method was used rather than 
simply examining group differences based on diagnosis because of the high 
variability in levels of autistic traits known to exist within clinical and non-clinical 
populations (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Robinson et al., 2011; van 
Boxtel & Lu, 2013; Von Dem Hagen et al., 2011). Individuals without an ASD 
diagnosis but relatively high levels of autistic traits, exhibit subtler versions of the 
behavioural and neurological characteristics associated with ASD (Best, Arora, 
Porter, & Doherty, 2015; Di Martino et al., 2009; Lindell, Notice, & Withers, 2009; 
Ridley, Homewood, & Walters, 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013), including 
mentalizing deficits (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; 
Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016). Therefore, high variability in autistic traits 
within groups would mean high variability in behavioural and neural characteristics 
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(Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Gökçen et al., 2016; van 
Boxtel & Lu, 2013) and may prevent group differences being identified.  
Participants completed three psychological assessments after the scanning 
session; two self-report questionnaires and one interactive task. The questionnaires 
completed were the Autism Quotient (AQ) scale and the Social Responsiveness 
Scale (SRS-2). The task used was the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) 
which involves watching video clips of social interactions and subsequently 
answering questions about the thoughts and feelings of characters. These 
psychological tests have been shown to display good psychometric properties (Hurst 
et al., 2007; Skye McDonald et al., 2006; Wigham et al., 2012). The AQ, SRS-2 and 
TASIT scores were calculated and a one-way MANOVA was used to identify group 
differences in these scores. The scores on all psychological tests significantly 
differed between groups (see Table 5.3). In all cases, scores in the ASD group 
indicated higher levels of autistic traits/greater degree of social impairment.  
Table 5.3 
Participants' psychological test scores; group mean (SD) values 
  ASD TD p ηp2 
AQ 37.4 (8.04) 12.90 (6.23) <.001*** 0.75 
TASIT1 46.35 (10.92) 58.20 (4.26) <.001*** 0.35 
SRS2 114.75 (26.37) 35.85 (20.90) <.001*** 0.74 
 
1The TASIT scores were obtained from part 3 (social inference test), scores are out 
of 64. 
2 The reported SRS scores are the unstandardized, raw scores, where scores above 75 
reflect severe social impairment. 




A principal components analysis (PCA) was then performed on all the psychological 
test scores in order to obtain a single score for each participant that reflected the 
level of autistic traits that they displayed. The psychological test scores correlated 
with each other (all rs>.6) meaning that they were suitable for PCA. The Kasier-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling accuracy was above .6, Barlett’s test of sphericity 
was significant χ2(3)=100.03, p<.001 and the communalities were all .7 or above; 
this collectively supported the inclusion of all the psychological tests in the PCA. 
PCA with varimax rotation was used. Only one factor had an eigenvalue above 
Kaiser’s criteria of 1 (2.51) and this factor explained 83.56% of the variance in 
psychological test scores. Consequently, only one factor was extracted and this 
factor was labelled ‘autistic traits’. 
5.3.6 Behavioural analysis 
The numbers of correct responses on the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks were 
calculated for each participant. Linear regression analyses were used to investigate 
relationships between autistic traits and performance on both tasks.  
5.3.7 MRI analysis 
fMRI analyses were conducted using FEAT v5.98 (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
Firstly, slice-timing correction, spatial smoothing (6 mm FWHM), motion correction 
(MCFLIRT, FSL) and temporal high-pass filtering were applied. Brain extraction 
was completed using the FSL brain extraction tool (BET).  The individual data were 
then analysed using a general linear model (GLM) with two regressors: 
‘mentalizing’ and ‘non-mentalizing’. Parameter estimates were created for each 
condition by regressing the hemodynamic response against a box-car regressor 
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showing the onset and offset of each video convolved with a gamma response 
function. 
In order to identify areas that displayed higher levels of activation during the 
mentalizing blocks compared to the non-mentalizing blocks, statistical images were 
created for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast. Functional data for each 
participant were firstly registered to the participant’s high-resolution T1-image 
(using the T1-FLAIR image as an intermediate step to aid co-localisation) and then 
data were registered onto the standard MNI brain (ICBM152). Individual participant 
data were entered into a higher-level analysis using a mixed-effects design (FLAME; 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fs), cluster thresholded at z<3.1, p<.001. Group-level 
analyses were conducted with 1) autistic traits and 2) mentalizing performance as 
covariates in order to examine differences in brain activity which corresponded with 
autistic traits or performance.  
Functional connectivity analysis 
Regions of interest (ROIs) for regions associated with the MNS and 
mentalizing system were defined using the areas of peak activation for the 
mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast when thresholded at z > 3.1, p< 0.001. ROI 
masks were drawn using FSLView software (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) and 
fslmaths commands were used to restrain the masks to voxels which were active (z > 
3.1) for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast. The ROIs were: bilateral inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral inferior parietal lobe (IPL), bilateral temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ) and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). ROIs were labelled 
based on comparisons to regions identified in existing fMRI studies (Becchio et al., 
2012; Liew, Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011), meta-analyses (Schurz et al., 2014; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009) and using the Juelich histological atlas from the FSL 
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anatomy toolboxes as a reference (Eickhoff et al., 2005). The time series of 
activation was extracted from each ROI for both mentalizing and non-mentalizing 
blocks.  
Time series correlations were calculated for ROIs within the MNS, within the 
mentalizing system and between MNS and mentalizing system ROIs for each 
participant.  
Prior to statistical analysis, correlations were then transformed using a Fisher’s z 
transform to ensure a normal distribution (Fisher, 1921). In order to explore task and 
regional differences in connectivity both within each system individually and 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system, we performed repeated measures 
ANOVAs for within system connectivity (task x connection) and a repeated 
measures ANOVA for between system connectivity (task x MNS region x 
mentalizing system region). The relationships between the degree of mentalizing-
induced functional connectivity changes and autistic traits were then examined using 
linear regression analyses.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Behavioural performance 
The performance of participants on the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks was 
measured during the fMRI scan.  Scores on these tasks (mentalizing: M=32.45, SD= 
4.0); non-mentalizing: M=34.53, SD=2.81) were then correlated with autistic traits.  
Figure 5.2 shows that the level of autistic traits that participants displayed predicted 
their performance on the mentalizing task (F(1,38)=5.50, p=.02, R2=.13, 95% CI [-
2.65, -.20]).  A similar relationship was not evident for the non-mentalizing task 




Figure 5.2 Relationships between autistic traits and behavioural performance. Linear 
regression analyses showed that autistic traits significantly predicted performance on 
the mentalizing task [F(1,38)=5.50, p=.02, R2=.13] but not the non-mentalizing task 
[F(1,38)=.01, p=.94, R2<.001]. The curved lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
5.4.2 Brain response during mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks. 
A group analysis across all participants was performed on the response to the 
mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks relative to baseline.   Figure 5.3 shows that 
similar patterns of activation were elicited during both the mentalizing and non-
mentalizing blocks, indicating that our stimuli were well matched across conditions. 
During both mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks, activity was evident in regions 
of visual (posterior occipital lobe, lateral occipital lobe, fusiform gyrus) and motor 
cortex (pre-central gyrus, supplementary motor area), reflecting the visual and motor 
components of the tasks.  There was also activity in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior parietal lobe 
(SPL), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) that reflects regions more often 
associated with the mentalizing and MNS. The coordinates of the peak activation are 




Figure 5.3  Whole-brain group analysis showing regions that were active during the 
mentalizing (red-yellow) and non-mentalizing (blue) tasks compared to baseline. 
Both tasks elicited bilateral activation in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), supplementary 
motor area (SMA), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), fusiform gyrus (FG), lateral 
occipital cortex (LOC), precentral gyrus (preCG) and the superior parietal lobe 
(SPL). Images thresholded at z > 3.1, p<0.001. MNI co-ordinates (x, y, z): -32, 6, 20. 
 Table 5.4 
Areas of peak activation during the mentalizing task compared to baseline (p < 
0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons) 
    Peak MNI co-ordinates 
Contrast Anatomical Region  BA  x y z  t-value 
Mentalizing task>baseline EVC 18 -6 -82 -6 8.50 
 
Left LOC 18 -22 -92 12 8.33 
 
Left M1 6 -26 -10 52 8.13 
 
Right LOC 37 48 -70 -2 8.13 
 
Left ventral stream 18 -14 -76 -14 7.64 
 
Left SPL 7 -34 -48 54 7.53 
 
Right ventral stream 37 30 -52 -14 6.9 
 
Right SPL 7 16 -66 58 6.71 
 
Right M1 6 24 -8 54 6.62 
 
Left SMA 6 -6 0 52 6.35 
 
Left PCC  31 -14 -26 40 6.08 
 
Left IPL 40 -54 -28 36 5.92 
 
Right SMA 6 8 6 52 5.38 
 
Right TPJ 39 62 -44 20 5.08 
 
Left IFG 44/6 -54 4 28 5.03 
 
Right IFG 44/6 -48 0 28 4.9 
 
Right IPL 40 54 -26 36 4.26 
 
Left TPL 22 -44 -40 18 4.25 
 
Right PCC 31 14 -28 42 4.03 
 
Abbreviations: EVC; early visual cortex, LOC; lateral occipital cortex, M1; primary 
motor cortex, SPL; superior parietal lobe, SMA; supplementary motor area, PCC; 
posterior cingulate cortex, IPL; inferior parietal lobe, TPJ; temporoparietal junction, 
IFG; inferior frontal gyrus. 
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Next, we asked whether there were differences in the response to the 
mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions.  Figure 5.4 shows that significantly 
higher activation was evident in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), 
bilateral IFG, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), bilateral TPJ, bilateral IPL and bilateral 
SMA during mentalizing blocks. The SMA has been shown to display mirror 
properties (Confalonieri et al., 2012; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 
2012; Porro et al., 1996) and neuroimaging (Mainieri et al., 2013) and lesion studies 
(Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; Stuss, 2001) have shown OFC involvement 
in mentalizing tasks. Therefore, although these regions are not ‘core’ regions of 
either system, they are considered to be regions of the extended MNS and 
mentalizing system respectively. In order to support that our IFG and IPL ROIs are 
core areas of the MNS, the locations of these ROIs were compared with areas 
displaying activity for successful>unsuccessful contrast. Figure 5.5 shows the 
overlap between our ROIs and the statistical map for successful>unsuccessful 
contrast, therefore providing support that these areas are part of the MNS. The non-
mentalizing>mentalizing contrast identified activation in the left primary 
somatosensory cortex (S1) and the cingulate gyrus. The co-ordinates of peak 
activation for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing and non-mentalizing>mentalizing 





Figure 5.4 Whole-brain group analysis of regions showing higher activity during the 
mentalizing task compared to the non-mentalizing task. Higher activation was found 
in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), bilateral 
supplementary motor area (SMA) and bilateral inferior parietal lobe (IPL). Images 
are thresholded at z > 3.1, p< 0.001. MNI co-ordinates: 2, 18, 4. 
 
Figure 5.5 Whole-brain group analysis of regions showing higher activity during the 
presentation of successful actions compared to unsuccessful actions in the non-
mentalizing task with A) IPL ROIs (yellow) and B) IFG ROIs (blue) overlaid onto 
the statistical map. Our IFG and IPL ROIs defined using the mentalizing>non-
mentalizing contrast overlap with areas identified by the successful>unsuccessful 
contrast, supporting the labelling of our ROIs as MNS regions. Images are 




Areas of peak activation for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast (p < 0.001 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons) 
    Peak MNI co-ordinates 
Contrast 
Anatomical 
Region  BA  x y z  t-value 
Mentalizing>non-mentalizing 
      
 
Right OFC 47 52 32 -8 5.72 
 
Left OFC 47 -50 24 -4 5.60 
 
Right SMA 6 6 18 56 4.71 
 
Right IFG  44 52 20 12 4.36 
 
Right TPJ 37 56 -52 10 4.19 
 
dmPFC 9 4 48 38 4.11 
 
Left IFG  44 -52 14 20 3.79 
 
Left IPL 39 -62 -46 28 3.54 
 
Right IPL 40 62 -42 24 3.53 
 
Left SMA 6 -6 12 60 3.51 
 
Left TPJ 21 -52 -50 4 3.47 
       Non-mentalizing>mentalizing CG 23 0 -42 36 4.65 
 
Left S1 1 -52 -22 46 3.93 
       Associated with mentalizing score Right dmPFC 9 10 42 28 3.52 
(Positively correlated) Right SMA 6 20 -8 60 3.40 
 
Right SPL 7 18 -56 52 3.39 
 
Left SPL 7 -16 -52 50 3.36 
       Associated with mentalizing score No areas. 
     (Negatively correlated) 
       
Abbreviations: OFC; orbitofrontal cortex, SMA; supplementary motor area, IFG; 
inferior frontal gyrus, TPJ; temporoparietal cortex, dmPFC; dorsomedial prefrontal 





Superior performances on the mentalizing task correlated with higher levels 
of activation in dmPFC, SMA and bilateral SPL (see Table 5.5). No brain areas 
showed activation which was negatively correlated with autistic traits. 
5.4.3 Differences in functional connectivity during mentalizing and non-mentalizing 
tasks. 
We compared functional connectivity between regions that showed more activity 
during the mentalizing compared to the non-mentalizing blocks.  These regions can 
be divided into associated with the MNS (IFG, IPL, SMA; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) and the mentalizing system (TPJ, dmPFC, OFC; Frith & Frith, 2006). 
Table 5.6 
Sizes of ROIs used in the functional connectivity analysis 
  Voxels Volume (mm³) 
dmPFC 1031 8248 
Left TPJ 43 344 
Right TPJ 177 1416 
Left OFC 1551 12408 
Right OFC 1520 12160 
Left IFG 191 1528 
Right IFG 144 1152 
Left IPL 19 152 
Right IPL 22 176 
 
First, we asked whether there was a difference in functional connectivity 
within each system during the mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.  The time-
course of response in each region associated with the MNS or the mentalizing 
system was correlated with the time-course of each of the other regions associated 
with the MNS or mentalizing system.  This analysis was performed separately for 
the mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.  Figure 5.6 shows the connectivity 
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between regions associated with the MNS and mentalizing system during 
mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.  We asked whether connectivity during the 
mentalizing blocks was higher than during the non-mentalizing blocks.  Connectivity 
between areas associated with the MNS significantly differed between different 
regions [F(2,78)=25.26, p<.001, ηp2=.39], but connectivity was not significantly 
higher during mentalizing blocks compared to non-mentalizing blocks 
[F(1,39)=1.27, p=.27, ηp2=.03] and the comparative strength of different connections 
did not change across mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks [F(2,78)=.15, p=.89, 
ηp2=.004]. Similarly, the strength of connectivity between areas of the mentalizing 
system were significantly different between different regions [F(2,78)=49.36, 
p<.001, ηp2=.56], but connectivity did not differ across tasks [F(1,39)=2.17, p=.15, 
ηp2=.05] and the relative strength of connectivity between these regions did not alter 
as a function of the task [F(2,78)=.81, p=.45, ηp2=.02].   
Next, we asked whether there was a difference in functional connectivity 
between the MNS and mentalizing system.  Figure 5.7 shows the functional 
connectivity between the mentalizing and MNS regions. A 3-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant interaction between task and mentalizing system region [F(2,78)=3.37, 
p=.04, ηp2=.08], a significant interaction between MNS and mentalizing system 
regions [F(4,156)=2.65, p<.001, ηp2=.44] as well as main effects of MNS region 
[F(2,78)=88.15, p<.001, ηp2=.69]  and mentalizing system region [F(2,78)=38.40, 
p<.001, ηp2=.50].  
Individual ANOVAs for each mentalizing system region were then 
conducted in order to examine which areas of the mentalizing system showed 
differences in functional connectivity across tasks. The dmPFC showed differences 
in connectivity across tasks (F(1,39)=5.81, p=.02, ηp2=.13] and between MNS 
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regions [F(2,78)=100.30, p<.001, ηp2=.72] but the relative strength of connectivity 
with different MNS regions did not change as a result of experimental task 
[F(2,78)=1.21, p=.30, ηp2=.03]. Paired t-tests revealed that connectivity was 
significantly higher between dmPFC and IFG [t(39)=2.01, p=.05] and between 
dmPFC and SMA [t(39)=2.33, p=.03] during the mentalizing task. Connectivity 
between dmPFC and IPL was not significantly different across tasks [t(39)=1.28, 
p=.21]. 
The OFC showed  significantly different levels of functional connectivity 
with different MNS regions [F(2,78)=23.04, p<.001, ηp2=.37] but connectivity did 
not significantly differ across tasks [F(1,39)=.10, p=.76, ηp2=.002] and the relative 
strength of connectivity between OFC and different MNS regions did not differ 
across tasks [F(2,78)=.36, p=.68, ηp2=.009]. 
The TPJ did show significantly different levels of functional connectivity 
with areas associated with the MNS across tasks [F(1,39)=1.14, p=.29, ηp2=..03], 
between MNS regions [F(2,78)=.92, p=.41, ηp2=.02] and there was no significant 





Figure 5.6 Mentalizing-induced changes in functional connectivity within the 
mentalizing system and the MNS. Functional connectivity between regions within 
the MNS and within the mentalizing system did not significantly differ across tasks. 
 
Figure 5.7 Mentalizing-induced changes in functional connectivity between areas of 
the MNS and the mentalizing system. Higher connectivity was found between the 
dmPFC and the IFG [t(39)=2.01, p=.05] and between dmPFC and SMA [t(39)=2.33, 
p=.03] during mentalizing blocks. 
These results suggest that connectivity between the dmPFC and IFG and 
between dmPFC and SMA play an important role in mentalizing. In the final 
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analysis, we asked whether the connectivity between these regions is predicted by 
the level of autistic traits.  To do this, we performed linear regression analyses. 
Autistic traits were shown to significantly predict the degree to which connectivity 
between dmPFC and IFG was increased during mentalizing blocks. Adults with high 
levels of autistic traits showed reduced mentalizing-induced changes in functional 
connectivity between IFG and dmPFC [F(1,38)=5.61, p=.02, R2=.13; See Figure 
5.8]. Autistic traits did not significantly predict mentalizing-induced changes in 
functional connectivity between SMA and dmPFC [F(1,38)=.03, p=.87, R2=.001]. 
 
Figure 5.8 The significant negative relationship between autistic traits and the 
degree of mentalizing-induced functional connectivity between dmPFC and IFG. 
Linear regression analysis found that autistic traits significantly predicted the 
mentalizing-induced change in functional connectivity between dmPFC and IFG: 
[F(1,38)=5.61, p=.02, R2=.13]. The curved lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  
Due to reports of increased right IFG connectivity with dmPFC when 
inferring the internal states of others from their actions (Rudie et al., 2012; Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012a; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b; Tettamanti et al., 2017), the 
possibility of lateralisation in the increased connectivity found between IFG and 
dmPFC was explored by comparing functional connectivity between IFG and 
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dmPFC across tasks for each hemisphere separately. Functional connectivity was 
increased between right IFG and dmPFC during the mentalizing task [t(39)=2.05, 
p=<.05] but not between left IFG and dmPFC [t(39)=.57, p=.57]. The degree of 
mentalizing-induced increase in connectivity between right IFG and dmPFC was 
significantly predicted by the level of autistic traits that participants displayed 
[F(1,38)=5.34, p=.02, R2=.12]. 
5.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to identify whether functional connectivity between areas 
associated with the MNS and the mentalizing system is higher when inferring the 
social intentions of others from their actions and whether differences in functional 
connectivity between these systems may underlie the mentalizing difficulties 
associated with ASD. Inferring others’ social intentions (mentalizing task) elicited 
higher levels functional connectivity between the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC; mentalizing system) and regions associated with the MNS (inferior frontal 
gyrus - IFG and supplementary motor area - SMA). Moreover, adults with high 
levels of autistic traits were impaired on the mentalizing task and this corresponded 
with reduced functional connectivity between IFG and dmPFC. Together, these 
results suggest that reduced connectivity between areas associated with the MNS and 
the mentalizing system may underlie the difficulties in inferring social intentions 
experienced by adults with ASD. 
Our findings highlight the importance of both areas associated with the MNS 
and the mentalizing system in inferring social intentions from actions. Higher levels 
of activation were found in regions associated with the MNS and the mentalizing 
system during mentalizing blocks compared to non-mentalizing blocks. These 
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regions included the dmPFC, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), IFG and inferior 
parietal lobe (IPL). Behavioural performance was also correlated with increased 
activity in the dmPFC and the SMA during the mentalizing task. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies, which have identified higher levels of activity in 
areas associated with the MNS and mentalizing system when inferring social 
intentions from hand actions (Becchio et al., 2012; Chambon, Domenech, et al., 
2017).  
A number of theories have been proposed to explain the role of the MNS 
when mentalizing.  Our data are not consistent the mirroring-first theory (Hamilton 
& Marsh, 2013; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011).  This proposes that, although 
action processing in the MNS is a necessary prerequisite for mentalizing, the MNS 
does not process internal state information. According to this theory equivalent 
levels of MNS activation would be expected during the mentalizing and non-
mentalizing blocks, because both tasks involved watching hand action videos. In 
contrast to the mirroring first theory, the motor simulation theory proposes that the 
MNS internally simulates observed actions and this is sufficient to infer the internal 
state of others (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007). This theory would predict higher 
MNS activation during the mentalizing block than the non-mentalizing block and a 
strong correlation between MNS activity and mentalizing performance. Our findings 
show higher responses in areas associated with the MNS during the mentalizing task, 
consistent with the motor simulation theory.  However, although levels of response 
in the SMA correlated with performance on the mentalizing task, we did not find any 
correlation between activity in the core regions associated with the MNS (IFG, IPL) 
and mentalizing performance. We also found that activity in the mPFC correlated 
with mentalizing performance and connectivity between areas associated with the 
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MNS and MS is higher when mentalizing. These data are more consistent with the 
dual-process theory  of mentalizing which proposes that both the MNS and the 
mentalizing system have roles in inferring the internal states of others from their 
actions (de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). This theory suggests that 
the MNS converts kinematic information into internal state information which can 
then be actively interpreted in the mentalizing system. This theory would predict 
higher MNS activation during the mentalizing task compared to the non-mentalizing 
task and that activation in the mentalizing system would correlate with mentalizing 
performance but there would not be a strong correlation between MNS activation 
and behavioural performance.     
As well as providing evidence to support a role areas associated with the 
MNS in processing social intentions, our data provide support for the importance of 
connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system when inferring social 
intentions. Our data show increased connectivity between dmPFC and IFG as well as 
increased connectivity between dmPFC and SMA when inferring the social 
intentions of others from their actions. Previous studies have also shown increased 
functional connectivity between areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system when 
inferring internal states from the actions of others (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, 
Bara, & Walter, 2014; Lombardo et al., 2010; Marsh et al., 2010; Sperduti, 
Guionnet, Fossati, & Nadel, 2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b; Trapp et al., 
2014; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith, & Braun, 2009). The most commonly reported 
connection between areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system when inferring 
others’ internal states from their actions has been between dmPFC and right IFG 
(Rudie et al., 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012; 
Tettamanti et al., 2017). These studies have shown increased connectivity between 
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right IFG and dmPFC when inferring motive underlying observed actions (Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012b), when inferring the reasons for displays of emotion in movie 
clips (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a) and when viewing emotional facial expressions 
(Rudie et al., 2012). Follow-up analyses on our data suggest that the increase in IFG 
connectivity with dmPFC in our study was also right-lateralised.  
In contrast, previous studies which have used mentalizing tasks which did not 
involve viewing others’ actions e.g. imaging social actions (Trapp et al., 2014) or 
when making mental state inferences from passages of text (Lombardo et al., 2010; 
Tettamanti et al., 2017) have reported connectivity between left IFG/ventral 
premotor cortex (vPMC) and the mPFC. Collectively, these data suggest that 
inferring internal states from observed actions may elicit functional connectivity 
between right IFG and mPFC but inferring internal states in the absence of visual 
action information (e.g. from passages of text) may elicit connectivity between the 
left IFG/vPMC and mPFC. This suggestion of lateralisation of MNS connectivity 
with the mPFC is supported by a recent study which showed increased functional 
connectivity between the right IFG and dmPFC when inferring communicative 
intentions from gestures but between left IFG and dmPFC when inferring 
communicative intentions from passages of text (Tettamanti et al., 2017). 
Knowledge of brain areas which show increased functional connectivity 
when inferring social intentions is important for understanding the neural basis of 
deficits associated with ASD. Our behavioural data show that adults with high levels 
of autistic traits were impaired at inferring the social intentions of others from their 
actions, but there was no significant relationship between autistic traits and 
performance on the non-mentalizing task. These data imply the existence of a 
mentalizing-specific deficit in individuals with high levels of autistic traits rather 
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than a more generalised deficit in the ability to perform experimental tasks. These 
data compliment findings from previous studies that have shown mentalizing-
specific deficits in adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014) and individuals with high 
levels of autistic traits (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; 
Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016), including difficulties inferring the social 
intentions of others (Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017; Happé, 1994; Moran et 
al., 2011). 
In addition to the behavioural deficits we found, participants with high levels 
of autistic traits also exhibited reduced functional connectivity between IFG and 
dmPFC during mentalizing blocks. These data compliment findings of reduced 
functional connectivity between the MNS and mentalizing system in individuals 
with ASD when inferring intentions from passages of text (Mason et al., 2008) or 
from comic strips (Kana et al., 2014). However, this is the first study to investigate 
differences in functional connectivity in adults with ASD when inferring the 
intentions of others from their actions. Identifying neural differences in adults with 
ASD when inferring others’ intentions from their actions is important for 
understanding the neural basis of the mentalizing deficits these individuals 
experience because adults with ASD show consistent difficulties inferring aspects of 
someone’s internal state from their actions but not in the absence of human action 
(Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski, Enticott, et al., 2016; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De 
Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015; Spek 
et al., 2010). Neuroimaging studies have shown different patterns of functional 
connectivity between areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system in typically 
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developing individuals when mentalizing in the presence of human action compared 
to in the absence of action information (Lombardo et al., 2010; Spunt & Lieberman, 
2012b; 2012c; Tettamanti et al., 2017). The reduced functional connectivity found 
between IFG and dmPFC in adults with high levels of autistic traits could underlie 
difficulties individuals with ASD have in inferring others’ social intentions from 
their actions.  
It has been proposed that inferring the social intentions of others from their 
actions requires the integration of contextual information and prior experience with 
action kinematics (Chambon, Domenech, et al., 2017b; de Lange et al., 2008; Jacob 
& Jeannerod, 2005; Liew et al., 2011; Mainieri et al., 2013). Existing fMRI studies 
have provided evidence that action context and prior expectations about an 
upcoming action are processed in the mPFC (Alexander & Brown, 2011b; Becchio 
et al., 2012; Chambon, Domenech, et al., 2017b; Cooper et al., 2010; Fogelson et al., 
2009; Forster & Brown, 2011) and IFG activation has been associated with inferring 
intentions based on kinematic cues (Becchio et al., 2012; Buccino et al., 2007; 
Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Herbet et al., 2014). Therefore, 
reduced connectivity between the mPFC and IFG in adults with high levels of 
autistic traits may result in reduced integration of kinematic and contextual 
information, leading to difficulties inferring social intentions (de Lange et al., 2008; 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012c; Uddin et al., 2007). The 
theory of reduced integration of action context and kinematic information in ASD is 
supported by the results of a meta-analysis which concluded that adults with ASD 
are significantly impaired on mentalizing tasks that involve integrating information 
regarding others’ internal states with surrounding context (Baez et al., 2012). 
Additionally, previous behavioural studies have found atypical utilisation of prior 
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experience relative to incoming sensory information in adults with ASD when 
inferring social intentions from actions (Chambon, Farrer, et al., 2017) and children 
with ASD show impaired abilities to infer intentions when this requires processing 
of both contextual information and kinematic information (Boria et al., 2009). These 
data imply that integration of prior expectations and incoming sensory information is 
atypical in ASD during action observation. This reduced integration may result from 
reduced functional connectivity between IFG and dmPFC and consequently give rise 
to poorer abilities to infer others’ social intentions from their actions. 
This study focussed on investigating relationships between autistic traits and 
both behavioural and neural differences rather than potential group differences in 
behavioural and neural measures. We conducted the analyses in this way because 
ASD is a spectrum condition and high levels of variability in autistic traits exist 
within clinical and non-clinical populations (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; Robinson et al., 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013; Von Dem Hagen et al., 2011). 
Individuals with relatively high but not clinically significant levels of autistic traits 
have been shown to display subtler versions of the behavioural and neurological 
characteristics associated with ASD (Best, Arora, Porter, & Doherty, 2015; Di 
Martino et al., 2009; Lindell, Notice, & Withers, 2009; Ridley, Homewood, & 
Walters, 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013) including mentalizing deficits (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2014; 
Happé, 1994; Kana et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2011). Therefore, high variability in 
autistic traits within ASD and TD groups could reduce the chances of observing 
group differences in behavioural and neural characteristics associated with ASD. Our 
data show that the significant relationships between autistic traits and both abilities 
to infer social intentions and the degree of mentalizing-induced changes in functional 
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connectivity would not be significant if participants were analysed as two distinct 
groups (see supplementary material). The participants in this study displayed a range 
of autistic traits rather than the existence of two discrete groups (see Figures 5.2 and 
5.6) meaning that variability within ASD and TD groups likely reduced the ability to 
observe group differences. Our data suggest that, in comparison to investigating 
potential group differences, examining the relationship between autistic traits and 
neural and behavioural measures is a more sensitive method, which can identify 
characteristics associated with high levels of autistic traits which are not identified 
when simply investigating group differences. 
In conclusion, activation in areas associated with the MNS and the 
mentalizing system as well as increased functional connectivity between these two 
systems was found when inferring social intentions from their actions of others. 
Adults with high levels of autistic traits displayed reduced abilities to infer social 
intentions and exhibited reduced connectivity between these systems. Our data 
highlight the possibility that reduced connectivity between areas associated with the 
MNS and the mentalizing system could underlie the difficulties adults with ASD 




Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The studies presented in this thesis aimed to identify the brain regions involved in 
inferring the social intentions of others from their actions, the nature of difficulties in 
inferring social intentions associated with ASD and the neural basis of these deficits. 
First, a behavioural study found adults with ASD were impaired in explicitly but not 
implicitly inferring the social intentions of others from their actions. Second, the 
results of a TMS study suggested that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is involved 
in inferring others’ intentions from their actions but only at the end of observed 
actions. Third, a combined TMS-EEG experiment found reduced right MNS activity 
in individuals with high levels of autistic traits when inferring social intentions but 
left MNS activity correlated with behavioural performance. Finally, an fMRI study 
found increased functional connectivity between areas of the MNS and the 
mentalizing system when inferring social intentions which was reduced in adults 
with high levels of autistic traits. Collectively, the results of these studies provide 
evidence to support that the MNS has a role in inferring others’ intentions and 
reduced functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system in 
adults with high levels of autistic traits may underlie difficulties in explicitly 
inferring the social intentions of others from their actions. 
6.1 MNS involvement in mentalizing 
The data presented in this thesis suggest that the MNS has a role in processing the 
intentions of others from their actions but not actively interpreting intentional 
information. Higher levels of MNS activation were found in the first TMS 
experiment (Chapter 3) and the fMRI experiment (Chapter 5) when inferring others’ 
social intentions compared to when viewing similar actions but performing a non-
 190 
	
mentalizing task which suggest that the MNS is involved in processing intentional 
information. These data provide evidence against the mirroring-first theory which 
states that although motor simulation is a necessary prerequisite for mentalizing, the 
MNS does not process internal state information (Hamilton & Marsh, 2013). The 
mirroring-first theory was constructed based on fMRI studies showing  increased 
MNS activation when actions were viewed which had with unusual kinematic 
profiles but increased mentalizing system, not MNS, activation when actions with 
unusual intentions were viewed (Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008). However, 
despite the evidence provided for higher MNS activation during mentalizing tasks 
from the experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 5, this task-related difference in 
MNS activity was not found in the TMS-EEG experiment presented in Chapter 4. 
There are a couple of factors that may explain why a mentalizing-induced increase in 
MNS activity was not found in this experiment. First, TMS was applied to the left 
hemisphere in this experiment. In our first TMS experiment (Chapter 3), the right 
hemisphere was stimulated and a mentalizing-induced increase in MEP sizes 
(reflecting increased MNS activity) was found at the end of observed actions. The 
time point in which larger MEP sizes were found in this experiment was then used as 
the time point for stimulation in the TMS-EEG study but a mentalizing-induced 
increase in MEP sizes was not found. Therefore, the mentalizing-induced increase in 
MNS activity found at the end of observed actions in the first TMS experiment may 
restricted to the right-hemisphere. A second reason why a mentalizing-induced 
increase in MNS activity might not have been found in the TMS-EEG experiment is 
that the index of MNS activity used for our EEG data (mu suppression) may reflect 
activity in the extended MNS rather than core areas associated with the MNS 
(Arnstein et al., 2011; Cheyne et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2009). Previous MEG studies 
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(Cheyne et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2009) and a combined MRI-EEG study (Arnstein 
et al., 2011) suggest that mu suppression corresponds to activation in the primary 
somatosensory cortex (S1). S1 has been shown to display mirror properties 
(Confalonieri et al., 2012; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Porro 
et al., 1996) but is not considered a ‘core’ region associated with the MNS 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). In comparison, TMS-
induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) measure increased excitability in M1 
which is considered to be the result of excitatory cortico-cortical connections from 
prefrontal MNS areas (IFG/ventral premotor cortex (vPMC); Fadiga, Craighero, & 
Olivier, 2005; Loporto, McAllister, Williams, Hardwick, & Holmes, 2011). 
Therefore, the larger TMS-evoked MEPs during the mentalizing task in Chapter 3 as 
well as the fMRI (Chapter 5) suggest that higher activation was elicited in core 
frontal regions associated with the MNS during the mentalizing task. If mu 
suppression reflects S1 activation then the EEG data do not contradict these findings. 
Data from all the studies presented in this thesis therefore suggest that activity in 
core regions associated with the MNS is higher when inferring the social intentions 
of others from their actions but not S1, part of the extended MNS, and the 
temporally-specific increase in activation in core MNS areas identified at the end of 
observed actions may be right-lateralised. 
Despite the higher levels of activation found in core areas associated with the 
MNS when mentalizing than when performing a non-mentalizing task, mentalizing 
performance was not significantly related to the level of MNS activity in our TMS 
experiment (Chapter 3), the TMS data from the TMS-EEG study (Chapter 4) or 
activity in core regions associated with the MNS in the fMRI experiment (Chapter 
5). These data oppose the motor simulation theory of mentalizing which states that 
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MNS activation alone is sufficient in order to infer others’ internal states (Rizzolatti 
& Sinigaglia, 2007). The motor simulation is based on empirical evidence showing 
actions with different intentions exhibit different kinematic profiles and these 
different kinematic profiles can be used to successfully infer the intentions of others 
(Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 
2011). The motor simulation theory would predict that activity in core regions 
associated with the MNS would be directly related to behavioural performance when 
inferring other individuals’ intentions. In contrast, the EEG data from the TMS-EEG 
experiment do show a relationship between mentalizing performance and left-
lateralised mu suppression. Differences in the methods used to measure MNS 
activity may account for these different results. Given that mu suppression likely 
reflects activity in S1 (Arnstein et al., 2011; Cheyne et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2009) 
then the EEG data do not contradict the finding that activity in core areas associated 
with the MNS are not associated with superior abilities to infer the social intentions 
of others from their actions. 
The lack of a significant relationship between activation in the core MNS 
areas and mentalizing performance but higher levels of MNS activation when 
inferring social intentions compared to completing a non-mentalizing task, suggest 
the MNS has a role in processing the internal states of others but not actively 
interpreting this information. This is potentially consistent with a proposed dual-
process hypothesis of mentalizing in the presence of human action which states that 
the MNS is involved in pre-reflective processing of internal state information 
embedded within action kinematics whereas the mentalizing system actively infers 
the internal states motivating observed actions (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & 
Bekkering, 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). Spunt and Lieberman generated the 
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dual-process hypothesis based on results from their fMRI studies in combination 
with classic social psychology theory of social casual attribution (Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012a). Data from their fMRI studies found both MNS and mentalizing 
system activation during mentalizing tasks, increased connectivity between these two 
systems when mentalizing, particularly when action information was available, but 
only mentalizing system activation increased in response to increased mentalizing 
demand of experimental tasks (Spunt & Lieberman, 2011; Spunt & Lieberman, 
2012a; 2012b). Spunt and Lieberman argued that these data reflected the importance 
of both the MNS and the mentalizing system in inferring internal states of others but 
that these systems have different roles. Social casual attribution theory states that 
when inferring internal states from actions, incoming sensory information must be 
translated into internal state information (Gilbert, 1998). Additionally, previous 
fMRI studies provided evidence that IFG encodes contextual information which 
indicates the actors’ intentions (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2008). 
Collectively, these data and social causal attribution theory led them to hypothesise 
that the MNS translates kinematic information into internal state information at the 
subconscious level and passes internal state information to the mentalizing system 
for this to be actively interpreted. 
6.2 Connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system  
As well as providing evidence to support a role of the MNS in inferring the social 
intentions of others from their actions, the data presented in this thesis indicate that 
connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system is important for this task. 
Increased functional connectivity between the dmPFC (region of the mentalizing 
system) and both IFG and SMA (regions of the MNS) was found when inferring the 
social intentions of others in the fMRI experiment (Chapter 5). The increased 
 194 
	
connectivity found between areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system 
compliments findings of previous fMRI studies which have shown increased 
functional connectivity between these systems when inferring others’ internal states 
from their actions (Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Lombardo et 
al., 2010; Marsh et al., 2010; Sperduti, Guionnet, Fossati, & Nadel, 2014; Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2012b; Trapp et al., 2014; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith, & Braun, 
2009). 
The most commonly reported connection between MNS and mentalizing 
system areas in the previous literature when inferring internal states from actions has 
been between dmPFC and right IFG (Rudie et al., 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; 
2012b; Tettamanti et al., 2017). Further analyses carried out on our fMRI data imply 
that the increased connectivity between IFG and dmPFC found when inferring social 
intentions is also lateralised to right IFG. These data highlight the possibility of a 
right-hemisphere lateralisation of functional connectivity between the IFG and 
dmPFC when inferring internal states of others from their actions. In contrast, 
previous studies that have used mentalizing tasks which do not involve viewing 
others’ actions e.g. imagining social actions (Trapp et al., 2014) or inferring the 
mental states of characters from passages of text (Lombardo et al., 2010) have 
elicited higher functional connectivity between left IFG or left vPMC and the mPFC. 
The IFG and vPMC occupy similar regions of the cortex and some previous studies 
have combined these areas and referred to one core frontal region of the MNS 
(IFG/vPMC;Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Mehta, Thirthalli, Basavaraju, 
Gangadhar, & Pascual-Leone, 2013; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). Collectively, these 
data suggest that inferring others’ internal states from observed actions may elicit 
greater functional connectivity between IFG/cPMC in the right hemisphere and 
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mPFC but inferring internal states in the absence of visual action information may 
elicit greater connectivity between left IFG/vPMC and the mPFC. This suggestion of 
lateralisation of MNS connectivity with the mPFC is supported by the results of a 
recent study which investigated patterns of functional connectivity when inferring 
communicative intentions from both gestures and passages of text (Tettamanti et al., 
2017). This study found increased connectivity between right IFG and mPFC when 
inferring communicative intentions from gestures but increased connectivity between 
left IFG and mPFC when inferring communicative gestures from passages of text. 
6.3 Nature of connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system  
The timing of MNS activity identified in Chapter 3 suggests that connectivity 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system when inferring others’ intentions, may 
be best conceptualised within a predictive coding framework. The late timing of 
MNS activity when inferring the social intentions of others from their actions, 
identified in Chapter 3, provides evidence against the stages of intentional 
information processing proposed by the dual-process and mirroring-first models. 
Both of these models suggest that internal state information is only derived in the 
mentalizing system after MNS involvement. However, the data presented in this 
thesis in combination with the existing literature suggest that information about an 
individual’s internal state is processed in the mentalizing system first before MNS 
involvement. The results from our first TMS experiment (Chapter 3) suggest that 
others’ social intentions are only signalled by the MNS once they have been fully 
revealed at the end of observed actions. Previous behavioural studies have shown 
that others’ intentions can be inferred from the early kinematics of the action before 
the outcome is evident at the end (Manera, Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 
2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). The data presented in this thesis therefore 
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suggest that intentional information is processed elsewhere before the MNS, and this 
may fit within a predictive coding framework. 
The predictive coding theory of MNS functioning states that action context is 
signalled to the MNS prior to motor simulation, in order for predictions to be made 
about the outcome of upcoming actions (Kilner et al., 2007). The predictive coding 
model is based on empirical evidence showing that when observing actions, EEG 
signals reflecting motor preparation are generated (Kilner et al., 2004), suggesting 
the intended outcome of observed actions are predicted in order to prepare the 
appropriate response. Additionally, increased muscle activation in observer’s mouths 
has been found when observing grasp-to-eat actions but not grasp-to –place actions 
before the outcome of the actions are shown (Cattaneo et al., 2007). This suggests 
that predicted intentions of observed actions are encoded in the observer’s MNS. The 
predicted outcome response model of mPFC function was constructed by Alexander 
and Brown based on neuroimaging studies providing evidence that the mPFC 
encodes both predicted outcomes of observed actions and prediction errors 
(Alexander & Brown, 2011). The predicted outcome response model suggests that 
the mPFC forms predictions about upcoming actions based on surrounding context 
and prior experience (Alexander & Brown, 2011). The predictive coding theory of 
MNS functioning in combination with the predicted outcome response model of 
mPFC function therefore imply that inferences regarding the internal state 
underlying an action are formed in the mPFC first, based on previous experience and 
contextual information, before MNS involvement. Neuroimaging studies have 
provided evidence that prior expectations about upcoming actions and action context 
are processed in the mPFC (Alexander & Brown, 2011b; Becchio et al., 2012; 
Chambon, Domenech, et al., 2017b; Cooper et al., 2010; Fogelson et al., 2009; 
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Forster & Brown, 2011) and event-related potential (ERP) studies have provided 
evidence to show mPFC activation as early as 200ms after stimulus onset during 
mentalizing tasks (Van der Cruyssen, Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos, & Van Overwalle, 
2009; Van Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2007; Van Overwalle, Van 
den Eede, Baetens, & Vandekerckhove, 2009). These data and the late timing of 
MNS involvement in processing intentional information found in our TMS data 
(Chapter 3) is consistent with the predictive coding framework. 
The increased MNS activation we identified at the end of observed actions 
could reflect signalling of prediction error once the actual intentions of the observed 
actions have been revealed by the kinematics of the action. The predictive coding 
theory of MNS functioning proposed by Kilner suggests that signalling of prediction 
error is confined within the MNS but existing neuroimaging data and the predicted 
outcome response model of mPFC functioning imply that the mPFC also signals 
prediction errors (Alexander & Brown, 2014; Jahn et al., 2014; Malekshahi et al., 
2016; Zarr & Brown, 2016). This raises the possibility that prediction errors formed 
in the MNS may be signalled to the mPFC. 
6.4 Mentalizing impairments in ASD 
The behavioural data presented in this thesis suggest that ASD is associated with 
difficulties explicitly inferring social intentions of others from their actions. The 
behavioural experiments presented in Chapter 2 assessed both implicit and explicit 
abilities of adults with ASD to infer the social intentions of others using the same 
naturalistic stimuli and behavioural outcome measures for both tasks. The results of 
these experiments suggest that adults with ASD are significantly impaired at 
explicitly but not implicitly inferring the social intentions of others from their 
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actions. The behavioural data from our fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 5 also 
show that adults with high levels of autistic traits are significantly impaired at 
explicitly inferring the social intentions of others from their actions, supporting the 
association between ASD and this explicit mentalizing deficit. In contrast, the 
behavioural data from the TMS-EEG experiment presented in Chapter 4 show no 
relationship between autistic traits and abilities to explicitly infer the social 
intentions of others from their actions. This conflicting result may have been due to 
the comparatively lower levels of autistic traits displayed by the participants in the 
TMS-EEG experiment (see Table 6.1) and therefore there may not have been a wide 
enough range of autistic traits in this participant sample to detect a relationship 
between autistic traits and behavioural performance. When the behavioural data from 
all experiments are combined, higher levels of autistic traits significantly predict 
poorer explicit mentalizing performance [F(1,99)=7.09, p<.01, R2=.07]. Adults with 
an ASD diagnosis (n=41) also display significantly poorer explicit mentalizing 
abilities compared to adults without an ASD diagnosis [n=61; t(43.58)=-2.46, 
p=.02]. The combined data from all studies therefore support the association between 






Psychological test scores across all studies with ASD participant; mean (SD) values 
  ADOS AQ SRS  TASIT* 
Chapter 2: Behavioural 
experiment 5.3(3.34) 25.3 (11.9) 75.8 (39.96) 54.3 (6.93) 
Chapter 4: TMS-EEG 
experiment 4.70 (3.28) 21.24(10.91) 60.83 (36.03) 55.19 (4.99) 
Chapter 5: fMRI 
experiment N/A 25.15 (14.29) 75.3 (46.34) 52.28 (10.15) 
     
     *higher values indicate lower levels of autistic traits 
  A trend was found between higher levels of autistic traits and poorer abilities 
to implicitly infer the social intentions of others from their actions in Chapter 2. It is 
possible that with a larger sample size, a significant relationship between autistic 
traits and implicit mentalizing performance would be found. However, the much 
larger effect size for the explicit task (r=.39) compared to the implicit task (r=.11) 
further supports the existence of a significant explicit mentalizing deficit but no clear 
implicit mentalizing deficit in these adults with ASD. Additionally, the TMS 
experiment presented in Chapter 3 did not find a significant relationship between 
autistic traits and implicit mentalizing performance in individuals without ASD 
diagnoses.  
The finding of impaired explicit mentalizing but no clear deficit in implicit 
mentalizing performance contradicts data from the existing literature which suggest 
that adults with ASD display consistent implicit but not explicit mentalizing 
difficulties (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Rosenblau et al., 2015; 
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Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). However, the comparison between 
implicit and explicit mentalizing abilities in the previous literature is confounded by 
differences in the methods used to measure mentalizing abilities, the aspects of 
someone’s internal state being inferred and the stimuli used. The use of simplistic 
stimuli in explicit tasks may have allowed some individuals with ASD to explicitly 
mentalize, perhaps with the help of learned strategies, which are less useful in more 
complex, naturalistic settings. The measurement of implicit mentalizing abilities 
using eye-tracking data alone rather than measurable behavioural outcomes may 
have also contributed to the existence of a consistent implicit mentalizing deficit 
(Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009); atypical fixation patterns are often 
reported for adults with ASD when processing social stimuli, even in the absence of 
impaired behavioural performances (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Rutherford & Towns, 
2008; Spezio et al., 2007). Our results suggest that differences in the stimuli and the 
methods used to measure mentalizing abilities may have contributed to the apparent 
difference in explicit and implicit mentalizing abilities in adults with ASD in the 
existing literature. However, our behavioural study is the first to measure implicit 
abilities of adults with ASD to infer the intentions of others; previous studies 
measuring implicit mentalizing abilities in adults with ASD have assessed abilities to 
infer mental states or false beliefs (Rosenblau et al., 2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; 
Senju et al., 2009). It is possible that adults with ASD display greater impairments in 
inferring certain aspects of someone’s internal state compared to others. Inferring 
different aspects of someone’s internal state may involve different processes (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; Pineda & Hecht, 2009) and different brain regions have been 
shown to be active depending on the mentalizing task being performed (Gobbini et 
al., 2007; Pineda & Hecht, 2009). Therefore, adults with ASD may exhibit neural 
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atypicalities which impair their abilities to perform certain internal state inferences 
more than others. 
6.5 Evidence against the theory of reduced mentalizing system activity in ASD 
The fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 4 provides evidence suggests mentalizing 
system activation is not reduced in adults with ASD when inferring others’ 
intentions from their actions. These data contradict previous findings of reduced 
mentalizing system activation during mentalizing tasks in adults with ASD (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Happé et al., 1996; Holt et al., 2014; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, 
Minshew, & Just, 2009). However, some previous fMRI studies have also found no 
differences in mentalizing system activation (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015; Kana et al., 
2014; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Vander Wyk, Hoffman, & Pelphrey, 2014) or higher 
mentalizing system activation (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; Mason, Williams, Kana, 
Minshew, & Just, 2008) in adults with ASD during mentalizing tasks. Our data 
provide evidence against the hypothesis that reduced mentalizing system activation 
is the neurobiological basis for the social impairments associated with ASD. 
The absence of reduced mentalizing system activation is supported by 
behavioural data which show that adults with ASD do not show consistent 
impairments on mentalizing tasks which do not involve human action (Kana et al., 
2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der 
Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010); these tasks do not 
consistently activate the MNS and consequently, mentalizing system activation alone 
without MNS activation is considered to be sufficient in order to complete these 
tasks (Castelli et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; White et al., 
2014). Adults with ASD show more consistent deficits on mentalizing tasks that 
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involve inferring internal states from others’ actions (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De 
Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015) 
which suggest greater impairments on mentalizing tasks which elicit MNS activity as 
well as mentalizing system activation. However, it could also be argued that tasks 
involving inferring internal states from human actions are more complex than 
inferring internal states of characters in passages of text or from still images of 
people’s eyes and that increased task difficulty resulted in poorer performances 
rather than specific action-related deficits. In dispute of this argument, in the studies 
which found action-specific mentalizing deficits, ASD participants were IQ matched 
with control participants, meaning increased task difficulty should have resulted in 
equal reductions in performance across both groups if a specific deficit was not 
present. 
6.6 Mixed results regarding reduced MNS activation associated with ASD  
The results of the studies presented in this thesis are inconsistent regarding whether 
activity in the MNS is reduced in adults with high levels of autistic traits when 
mentalizing. The broken mirror neuron theory would predict reduced MNS 
activation during mentalizing tasks in adults with high levels of autistic traits and 
this would underlie the poorer mentalizing performances observed. A number of 
previous studies have found reduced MNS activation in adults with ASD when 
mentalizing (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Hadjikhani et al., 2009; Holt et al., 2014; 
Kana et al., 2014; Wicker et al., 2008). However, the existing literature is also 
inconsistent, with some studies reporting typical levels of MNS activation (Kana et 
al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; Vander Wyk et al., 2014) 
and others reporting increased MNS activation (Libero et al., 2014; Mason et al., 
2008) in adults with ASD during mentalizing tasks. The results of the TMS 
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experiment presented in Chapter 3 suggest that the level of MNS activation when 
inferring the social intentions of others is not related to the level of autistic traits 
displayed in typically developing individuals. However, this experiment did not 
include participants with a diagnosis of ASD and therefore we may not have had a 
wide enough range of both autistic traits and levels of MNS activation to find a 
relationship between these two variables. The fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 
5 and the TMS data from the TMS-EEG experiment in Chapter 4 also show no 
relationship between autistic traits and MNS activation; these studies had participant 
populations which included both individuals with and without ASD diagnoses. In 
contrast, the EEG data from the TMS-EEG experiment did show a significant 
negative relationship between autistic traits and right-lateralised MNS activation. 
The relationship between right-lateralised mu suppression and autistic traits may 
reflect a right-lateralised decrease in the extended MNS, possibly S1, when 
mentalizing. However, this evidence is limited because the fMRI data (Chapter 5) 
did not show reduced activation in these areas in individuals with high levels of 
autistic traits when mentalizing and therefore this result was not replicated. Overall, 
the data from the studies presented in this thesis provide little evidence to support the 
existence of reduced MNS in adults with high levels of autistic traits when inferring 
the social intentions of others from their actions, opposing the broken mirror neuron 
theory. 
The lack of a consistent finding of reduced MNS activation in the presence of 
explicit mentalizing deficits could provide support for the visual inference model 
which suggests that internal states underlying others’ actions are inferred in the 
mentalizing system without MNS involvement (Hamilton & Marsh, 2013). In 
support of this theory, some previous mentalizing tasks, not involving human action 
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processing, have not elicited MNS activation (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000; 
Castelli et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011; Van 
Overwalle et al., 2009; White, Frith, Rellecke, Al-Noor, & Gilbert, 2014), suggesting 
mentalizing does not require MNS activation and that MNS activation may simply 
reflect action processing. This theory would suggest that dysfunction in other brain 
areas, other than the MNS, underlie mentalizing deficits associated with ASD. This 
would be consistent with the theory that mentalizing system dysfunction, rather than 
MNS dysfunction underlies mentalizing deficits in ASD (Frith, 2001; Hamilton, 
2009) or that the mentalizing deficits associated with ASD are attributable to more 
generalised deficits such as executive functioning (Hill, 2004; White 2013). 
However, the higher levels of MNS activation found during mentalizing compared to 
non-mentalizing tasks in Chapters 3 and 5 as well as the relationship between MNS 
activation and mentalizing performance in Chapter 4 suggest that the MNS does 
have a role in inferring the intentions of others from their actions. 
6.7 Atypical connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system in ASD 
The data from the studies presented in this thesis suggest that perhaps connectivity 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system is dysfunctional rather than activation 
in either system individually. The lack of evidence to support reduced mentalizing 
system and MNS activation in adults with high levels of autistic traits in our studies 
was unexpected; due to the mentalizing difficulties associated with ASD (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Chung, Barch, & Strube, 2014; 
Frith, 2001; Holt et al., 2014; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999) and activation in both 
systems reliably found when inferring internal states from actions (Becchio et al., 
2012; Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; de Lange, Spronk, 
Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & 
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D’Esposito, 2010; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b), reduced activation in both 
systems was predicted. However, the theory of reduced connectivity between these 
two systems rather than reduced activation in either system individually 
compliments the existing behavioural data which suggest impairments are more 
pronounced when reliance on connectivity between these systems is higher. The 
finding of reduced connectivity between the dmPFC and IFG in adults with high 
levels of autistic traits, in Chapter 5, supports the results of previous studies which 
have shown reduced connectivity between these two systems in individuals with 
ASD when mentalizing (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015; Kana et al., 2014; Mason et al., 
2008; Rudie et al., 2012b). Reduced connectivity between IFG and the mPFC 
specifically, has been reported in adults with ASD when inferring intentions from 
comic strips (Deshpande, Libero, Sreenivasan, Deshpande, & Kana, 2013), when 
inferring intentions and emotions from passages of text (Mason et al., 2008) and 
during rest (Itahashi et al., 2014; Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008). However, our 
fMRI study was the first to investigate patterns of functional connectivity when 
inferring others’ social intentions from their actions in adults with ASD. Adults with 
ASD show consistent deficits on mentalizing tasks involving human action but not 
mentalizing tasks which do not involve action processing (Kana et al., 2009; 
Kirkovski, Enticott, et al., 2016; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der 
Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015; Spek et al., 2010) and a 
previous neuroimaging study showed higher connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system when inferring internal states from actions rather than text 
(Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). Similarly, adults with ASD have shown consistent 
impairments when inferring social intentions but not inferring immediate motor 
goals (known as 'motor intentions'; Aldridge et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; 
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Broekhof et al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2001; Cole, Slocombe & Barraclough, 2017; 
Fisher et al., 2013). It has been proposed that because motor intentions are directly 
related to observed actions, kinematic processing without the integration of 
contextual information may be sufficient to infer these intentions (Catmur, 2015; 
Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Therefore connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system may not be required when inferring motor intentions, unlike 
when inferring social intentions (Liew et al., 2011; Mainieri et al., 2013; Spunt & 
Leiberman, 2012c; de Lange et al., 2008). These data suggest that mentalizing 
impairments in ASD are more pronounced when the reliance on connectivity 
between the MNS and the mentalizing system is higher and therefore support our 
finding of reduced functional connectivity between these systems in adults with 
ASD. 
Reduced functional connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system but typical activation in the MNS could also explain the findings of an 
explicit mentalizing deficit but absence of a clear implicit mentalizing deficit in 
Chapter 2. If internal state information embedded in action kinematics is 
subconsciously processed in the MNS before being actively interpreted in the 
mentalizing system, as has been previously proposed (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, 
Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012b). Typical MNS activation in 
adults with ASD could allow these individuals to select the preferable action 
between a choice of two actions (required for our implicit mentalizing task) but not 
explicitly infer aspects of someone’s internal state, which is proposed to require 
kinematic information to be signalled from the MNS to the mentalizing system (de 
Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012c). 
Therefore, according to the dual-process theory, intact implicit mentalizing abilities 
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in the presence of explicit mentalizing deficits may reflect intact MNS functioning 
but dysfunctional connectivity between the two systems.  
6.8 Mentalizing deficits explained in terms of the predictive coding framework 
The possibility that reduced functional connectivity between the MNS and the 
mentalizing system may underlie difficulties inferring others’ social intentions, in 
adults with high levels of autistic traits, could potentially be explained within a 
predictive coding framework. The predictive coding model in combination with the 
predicted outcome response model would suggest that top-down connectivity from 
the mPFC to the MNS is important for integrating prior expectations about an action 
outcome with incoming sensory information. The neuroimaging data and the 
predicted outcome model also suggest that the mPFC signals prediction errors as 
well as the MNS, implying that prediction errors, improving future predictions, may 
be signalled from the MNS to the mPFC (Alexander & Brown, 2011a; Jahn et al., 
2014; Malekshahi et al., 2016; Zarr & Brown, 2016). If this combined model 
correctly characterises connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system 
and connectivity between these two systems is dysfunctional in individuals with 
ASD then these individuals would be expected to display impairments in integrating 
expectations with incoming kinematic information (impaired top-down connectivity) 
and impaired abilities to update associations between kinematics and internal states 
(dysfunctional bottom-up connectivity). 
The theory of impaired integration of prior expectations and incoming 
kinematic information in ASD compliments the findings of a recent behavioural 
study which found that adults with ASD display dysfunctional integration of 
incoming sensory information and prior expectations and this correlated with the 
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degree of social impairment (Chambon et al., 2017). Another previous behavioural 
study showed children with ASD were impaired at inferring intentions when this 
involved integrating contextual information with kinematic information but not when 
intentions could be inferred based on contextual information alone (Boria et al., 
2009). Finally, a meta-analysis which investigated mentalizing deficits in adults with 
Asperger’s concluded that these individuals are significantly impaired on 
mentalizing tasks that involve integrating information regarding others’ internal 
states with surrounding context (Baez, et al., 2012). Previous behavioural studies 
have also provided evidence to support the suggestion that abilities to update future 
predictions of upcoming actions may be impaired in ASD; children and adolescents 
with ASD have shown reduced abilities to predict the outcome of others’ actions and 
displayed no benefit when shown familiar actions, unlike typically developing 
individuals (Zalla, Labruyère, Clément, & Georgieff, 2010). Another experiment 
showed that after observing a communicative action, typically developing 
individuals displayed improved visual discrimination of a complimentary responsive 
gesture which was masked compared to when viewing this masked gesture after a 
non-communicative action was shown (von der Lune et al., 2016). Adults with ASD 
did not exhibit improved recognition of the masked responsive gesture after being 
shown the communicative gesture (von der Lune et al., 2016). Data from both 
studies suggest that prior expectations about upcoming actions are not efficiently 
updated as a result of previous experience. These behavioural data support the 
proposal that integration of prior expectations and incoming information is reduced 
in ASD as well as impaired abilities to update predictions about upcoming actions 
based on previous experience. These difficulties, which may result from reduced 
connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing system, may underlie difficulties 
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adults with high levels of autistic traits experience in inferring others’ social 
intentions. 
6.9 Particular importance of the right MNS underlying deficits associated with 
ASD 
It is possible that reduced connectivity of right IFG, in particular, underlies the 
mentalizing difficulties experienced by adults with ASD. The data from our fMRI 
study suggest that increased connectivity between dmPFC and IFG when inferring 
social intentions is lateralised to right IFG and this mentalizing-induced increase in 
connectivity is reduced in adults with high levels of autistic traits. Previous fMRI 
studies have shown increased functional connectivity between dmPFC and right IFG 
when inferring internal states of others from their actions (Rudie et al., 2012; Spunt 
& Lieberman, 2012a; 2012b; Tettamanti et al., 2017) and adults with ASD show 
consistent impairments in inferring internal states of others from their actions 
(Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Rosenblau et al., 
2015; Schuwerk et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). In contrast, increased functional 
connectivity has been reported between dmPFC and left MNS regions when 
inferring others’ internal states in the absence of human action (Lombardo et al., 
2010; Tettamanti et al., 2017; Trapp et al., 2014) and adults with ASD have not 
shown consistent impairments in inferring internal states in the absence of human 
action (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2015; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De 
Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010). The theory 
of reduced right-lateralised IFG connectivity in adults with ASD when mentalizing, 
compliments the findings of a previous study found reduced connectivity of the right 
IFG in adults with ASD when inferring intentions from a comic strip (Deshpande et 
al., 2013). Data from resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) studies have also shown atypical 
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connectivity between right IFG and areas of the mentalizing system in individuals 
with ASD (Fishman et al., 2014; Itahashi et al., 2014; Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008; 
Rudie et al., 2012a; Shih et al., 2010), providing evidence for right-lateralised 
dysfunction in these individuals irrespective of task. The reduced mu suppression 
found in adults with high levels of autistic traits in our TMS-EEG experiment 
(Chapter 4) was also right-lateralised which further supports the concept of right-
lateralised MNS dysfunction. Therefore, our data in conjunction with the existing 
rsfMRI, fMRI and behavioural data suggest that dysfunctional connectivity between 
right IFG and the mentalizing system may be of particular importance in underlying 
the mentalizing deficits associated with ASD.  
6.10 Potential gender differences 
The cumulative data from all studies presented in this thesis suggest that 
impairments in explicitly inferring the intentions of others from their actions 
associated with ASD may only be experienced by males and not females. Across all 
studies in this thesis, males with higher levels of autistic traits displayed poorer 
explicit mentalizing performances [F(1,56)=17.37, p<.001, R2=.24] and males with 
ASD (n=25) exhibited significantly poorer performances than typically developing 
males [n=33; t(30.20)=-2.39, p=.02]. However, these differences were not seen in 
females with high levels of autistic traits [F(1,42)=.41, p=.52, R2=.01] or females 
with ASD [n=16, TD= 28; t(17.96)=-.77, p=.45]. Research into gender differences in 
ASD is extremely limited due to small sample sizes of females with ASD as four 
times as many males have a diagnosis of ASD than females (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2014). One previous study found that males but not females 
with ASD were impaired at inferring others’ mental states from still images of their 
eyes (Holt et al., 2014) and another study found atypical neural activation in males 
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but not females with ASD whilst inferring mental states of animated triangles 
(Kirkovski et al., 2015). However, no previous studies have investigated gender 
differences in abilities to infer others’ internal states from their actions in adults with 
ASD or gender differences in brain activation patterns during these tasks.  
Every experiment presented in this thesis had a relatively large proportion of 
female ASD participants compared to previous studies but each study is still 
individually underpowered in their ability to accurately report gender differences. 
However, the data in both the behavioural experiment presented in Chapter 2 and the 
fMRI experiment in Chapter 5 show the same gender difference in explicit 
mentalizing abilities as seen in the overall data set. Initial analysis of potential 
gender differences in the relationship between autistic traits and the degree of 
mentalizing-induced increased functional connectivity between dmPFC and right 
IFG in the fMRI data suggest that there were no differences between male and 
female participants [males: F(1,22)=3.17, p=.09, R2=.13; females: F(1,14)=2.06, 
p=.17, R2=.13]. The relationship between autistic traits and right-lateralised mu 
suppression in the EEG data from the TMS-EEG experiment (Chapter 4) was 
significant in males [F(1,21)=5.24, p=.03, R2=.20] but not females [F(1,15)=.40, 
p=.54, R2=.03]. Males with high levels of autistic traits showed reduced right-
lateralised mu suppression (indicating reduced MNS activity) during the mentalizing 
task. Due to the small samples of females in each study, these results are 
preliminary. However, potential gender differences in brain activation and functional 
connectivity when inferring others’ internal states from their actions is an area worth 
exploring with larger sample sizes; especially as the cumulative behavioural data 




6.11 Using the continuous measure of autistic traits 
Examining the relationship between the continuous measurement ‘autistic traits’ and 
behavioural and neural characteristics associated with ASD, may be a more sensitive 
method than investigating group differences in behavioural and neural measures. The 
studies presented in this thesis investigated the relationship between the continuous 
variable of autistic traits and both neural and behavioural measures because ASD is a 
spectrum condition and therefore high variability in levels of autistic traits within 
both clinical and non-clinical populations may have prevented differences associated 
with high levels of autistic traits being found across groups (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Robinson et al., 2011; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013; Von Dem Hagen 
et al., 2011). Data from both our TMS-EEG study (Chapter 4) and our fMRI study 
(Chapter 5) suggest that investigating differences associated with autistic traits is a 
potentially more sensitive method than investigating group differences; the 
significant findings of reduced right-lateralised MNS activity (Chapter 4) and 
reduced connectivity between dmPFC and right IFG (Chapter 5) would not have 
been significant if participants were only analysed in terms of participant groups. 
Measuring levels of autistic traits displayed by all participants may therefore be an 
effective method of assessing neural differences associated with ASD that would not 
be identified in group comparisons due to within group variability. 
6.12 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations associated with the studies presented in this thesis. 
First, although the sample sizes of all studies presented in this thesis are comparable 
to similar existing studies, the sample sizes were all relatively small. The small 
sample sizes may have contributed to the limited evidence we found to support a 
 213 
	
relationship between MNS activity and mentalizing performance as well as the, 
perhaps inconsistent, findings regarding the relationship between autistic traits and 
levels of MNS activation. The smaller sample size in the TMS data, compared to the 
EEG data, in the TMS-EEG experiment may have contributed to the lack of 
significant relationships in the TMS data between MNS activation and both autistic 
traits and behavioural performance whilst significant relationships were found in the 
EEG data. However, the small effect sizes found for the relationships between MNS 
activity and both behavioural performance and autistic traits in all studies, suggest 
that significant relationships would not have been found even with larger sample 
sizes. The Bayes factors calculated in the TMS experiment (Chapter 3) also suggest 
that significant relationships between MNS activity and both autistic traits and 
mentalizing performance were unlikely to be found regardless of sample size.  
Another possible reason why significant relationships may not have been 
found between MNS activity and behavioural measures is that only high-functioning 
adults with ASD were included in all studies; these individuals may have developed 
compensatory strategies which improve behavioural performance and therefore alter 
the relationship between neural measures and performance. If different cognitive 
methods are used by these individuals in order to infer social intentions, these may 
also utilise different brain regions and therefore compensatory strategies could 
influence patterns of neural activity. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the 
results of the studies presented in this thesis can be generalised to younger or lower-
functioning populations who may not have developed compensatory strategies. 
However, the eye-tracking data in all of our studies suggest no differences in fixation 
patterns and our fMRI data (Chapter 5) show identical brain regions were activated 
in both individuals with high and low levels of autistic traits, with the exception of 
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reduced functional connectivity during the mentalizing task. These data suggest that 
the participants in our study were likely using equivalent methods to infer social 
intentions; adults with high levels of autistic traits were just less effective at utilising 
these techniques. 
Despite the inclusion of only high-functioning adults with ASD, a number of 
ASD participants both the TMS-EEG experiment and the fMRI were taking 
psychotropic medication. Due to the high comorbidity of depression, ADHD and 
anxiety in ASD, the inclusion of individuals taking these medications is common in 
the ASD literature (Enticott, Rinehart, Tonge, Bradshaw, & Fitzgerald, 2010; 
Enticott et al., 2013; Kirkovski et al., 2016; Oberman, Pascual-Leone, & Rotenberg, 
2014). Psychotropic medications have been shown to increase baseline measures of 
corticospinal excitability in TMS experiments (Gilbert et al., 2006; Minelli et al., 
2010) and increase functional cortico-cortical connectivity in fMRI data sets (Linke, 
Olson, Gao, Fishman, & Müller, 2017; Narayanan et al., 2010). However, there were 
no group differences in baseline measures of corticospinal excitability in our TMS 
data and participants with high levels of autistic traits displayed reduced rather than 
increased functional connectivity in our fMRI experiment. It is possible that if only 
unmedicated participants had been included in our fMRI experiment then we would 
have observed a greater difference in functional connectivity between the MNS and 
the mentalizing system in adults with high levels of autistic traits. 
The exclusive inclusion of high-functioning adults meant that performances 
on the non-mentalizing tasks were very high in all experiments meaning that the 
mentalizing-specific behavioural deficit we found in individuals with high levels of 
autistic traits may have been due to non-mentalizing task performances being at 
ceiling and thus preventing a relationship between autistic traits and non-mentalizing 
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task performance being identified. However, the relationships between neural 
measures and autistic traits support the existence of a mentalizing-specific deficit 
associated with ASD; reduced mu suppression (Chapter 4) and reduced connectivity 
between IFG and dmPFC (Chapter 5), in adults with high levels of autistic traits, 
were found during the mentalizing task but not the non-mentalizing task. The 
mentalizing-specific deficit we found in adults with high levels of autistic traits also 
compliments findings from previous studies which have shown mentalizing-specific 
behavioural impairments in adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & Colburn, 2014) and individuals with high 
levels of autistic traits (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; 
Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016). As well as high performances on the non-
mentalizing tasks in our studies, performances on the mentalizing task were very 
high in the first TMS study (Chapter 3; mean proportion of correct responses= .94, 
SD=.10) perhaps because this study did not include individuals with a diagnosis of 
ASD. The high performances on the mentalizing task in this study may therefore 
have contributed to the absence of relationships between mentalizing score and both 
autistic traits and MNS activity in this experiment.  
Although the hand actions shown in the mentalizing and non-mentalizing 
tasks in our studies had very similar kinematics, they were not identical. These small 
kinematic differences between the actions shown in different tasks, in principal, may 
have contributed to higher levels of MNS activation found in the mentalizing task 
compared to the non-mentalizing task in Chapters 3 and 5. However, the larger 
TMS-induced MEP sizes reported in Chapter 3 during the mentalizing task were 
found at the end of observed actions when the muscles recording from were not 
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contracted in the observed action. Therefore, if MEP sizes were only dependent on 
the kinematics of the observed action, smaller MEP sizes would be predicted at this 
time point (as was found in the non-mentalizing task at this time point). Larger MEP 
sizes at this time point therefore imply a role of the MNS in inferring social 
intentions beyond basic kinematic processing. The fMRI experiment, presented in 
Chapter 5, showed clumsy actions in both the mentalizing and the non-mentalizing 
tasks. If the comparison of brain activation across tasks is restricted to activity 
recorded during the observation of clumsy actions, higher activation is found in right 
IFG and right SMA when these actions were shown during the mentalizing task 
compared to the non-mentalizing task (see Figure 6.1). These data provide further 
support for the finding of higher MNS activation when mentalizing. 
 
Figure 6.1 Whole-brain group analysis of regions showing higher activity during the 
presentation of clumsy actions during the mentalizing task compared to the non-
mentalizing task. Higher activation was found in the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) and right supplementary motor area (SMA). 
It is possible that the timing of MNS activation differs depending on the 
explicitness of task instructions. Chapter 3 investigated MNS activation during a 
more implicit task and therefore the timing of MNS activation identified may not 
apply to mentalizing tasks with directly explicit instructions. The differences in the 
nature of the tasks in Chapter 3 and 4, may have contributed to the inconsistent task-
IFG 
SMA SMA SMA 
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related differences in MNS activity in the TMS data. However, previous studies 
which have investigated mentalizing system activation during mentalizing tasks have 
shown identical timing of mentalizing system activation across implicit and explicit 
tasks (Van der Cruyssen et al., 2009; Van Duynslaeger et al., 2007) suggesting that 
the timing of neural activation may generalise across mentalizing tasks irrespective 
of task instructions. 
Finally, the temporal and spatial resolution of the imaging techniques used 
did not allow us to visualise areas of brain activity at different time points during the 
task so although our data provide evidence to suggest social intention processing 
within the MNS and the mentalizing system is best conceptualised within a 
predictive coding framework, we cannot draw firm conclusions regarding the precise 
timing of interactions between the MNS and the mentalizing system. However, 
separately, the high temporal resolution of TMS allowed us to identify the timing of 
right MNS activation, and the high spatial resolution of fMRI allowed us to identify 
the areas of the MNS and the mentalizing system that display greater functional 
connectivity during this task. This information can help us to start to delineate 
between different models of connectivity between the MNS and the mentalizing 
system.  
6.13 Ideas for future research 
In attempt to fully characterise the interplay between areas of the MNS and the 
mentalizing system when inferring the social intentions of others from their actions, 
a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study could be conducted. The very high 
temporal resolution and the reasonable spatial resolution of this technique, allows the 
timing of activation in different brain areas to be identified. If the predictive coding 
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framework is an accurate characterisation of information processing whilst inferring 
the social intentions from actions then mPFC activation would be predicted before 
MNS activation. It would also be beneficial to examine potential differences in the 
timing of activation across both implicit and explicit tasks to investigate whether 
task instructions alter interactions between the MNS and the mentalizing system. A 
previous MEG study which investigated the timing of activation in areas of the MNS 
and the mentalizing system when explicitly inferring intentions from cartoon comic 
strips (Vistoli, Brunet-Gouet, Lemoalle, Hardy-Baylé, & Passerieux, 2011) found 
simultaneous activation in both systems during the early stages of intentional 
processing. The authors conclude these data provide evidence against the traditional 
view that intentional information processing is exclusively ‘bottom-up’ from the 
MNS to the mentalizing system (Vistoli et al., 2011). However, a similar study has 
not been conducted when naturalistic, video stimuli are used. 
It would also be useful to identify whether adults with ASD exhibit greater 
impairments at inferring certain aspects of someone’s internal state than others or 
whether the results of previous studies are confounded by differences in the stimuli 
used and the explicitness of the task instructions. The abilities of adults with ASD to 
explicitly infer different aspects of someone’s internal state such as their mental 
states, beliefs and emotions could be assessed using naturalistic, complex video 
stimuli. Furthermore, differences in patterns of brain activation and functional 
connectivity when making these different internal inferences should be explored. 
Inferring different aspects of someone’s internal state appear to activate different 
brain regions (Gobbini et al., 2007; Pineda & Hecht, 2009). However, neuroimaging 
studies have not investigated differences across tasks when using the same stimuli. 
The stimuli used in mentalizing tasks, not only affect the difficulty of the task but 
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appear to alter the lateralisation of functional connectivity between areas of the MNS 
and the mentalizing system (Tettamanti et al., 2017). Identifying the brain areas 
involved in making different internal state inferences as well as identifying how 
changing the stimuli alters the neural signatures of these internal state inferences will 
help uncover the different cognitive methods used to perform these different 
mentalizing tasks. Additionally, by pinpointing the aspects of mentalizing in which 
adults with ASD are impaired, we can start to uncover the particular areas of neural 
dysfunction underlying these impairments. 
The cumulative behavioural data from all studies presented in this thesis 
suggest that gender differences are an interesting avenue to explore in future studies. 
Males with high levels of autistic traits, unlike females, appear to exhibit difficulties 
inferring the social intentions of others from their actions and may therefore show 
more prominent neural differences e.g. reduction in functional connectivity between 
the MNS and the mentalizing system. Females with ASD may show less pronounced 
neural differences when inferring others’ social intentions from their actions or 
display compensatory activity in other cortical areas. 
6.14 Conclusions 
The data from the studies presented in this thesis suggest that the MNS is involved in 
processing information regarding the internal states of others. However, MNS 
activity does not appear to correlate with abilities to explicitly infer the social 
intentions of others from their actions, suggesting that the MNS does not have a role 
in actively interpreting internal state information. Functional connectivity between 
the MNS and the mentalizing system appears to increase when inferring the social 
intentions of others from their actions and our data imply that connectivity between 
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these systems may be best conceptualised within a predictive coding framework. We 
found that ASD is associated with deficits in explicitly inferring the social intentions 
of others from their actions and that connectivity between mPFC (mentalizing 
system) and IFG (MNS) is dysfunctional in adults with high levels of autistic traits. 
According to the predictive coding model, reduced connectivity between the mPFC 
and IFG may result in reduced integration of prior expectations with incoming 
kinematic information and, or reduced abilities to use previous experience to update 
future predictions about others’ actions. Therefore, reduced connectivity between the 
MNS and the mentalizing system may underlie some of the social difficulties that 





A.1 Supplementary Data from Chapter 4 
A.1.1 Behavioural data 
There were no significant group differences in behavioural performance in either the 
mentalizing (H(2)=1.92, p=.38) or the non-mentalizing task (H(2)=4.70, p=.10). 
However, across all participants, performance was significantly poorer on the 
mentalizing task than the non-mentalizing task (T=537, p<.001, r=.70). There were 
no significant relationships between autistic traits and behavioural performance; see 
supplementary Figure A.1. 
A.1.2 TMS data 
A.1.2.1 Preliminary analysis of the TMS data 
There were no group differences in motor threshold values, no significant differences 
in baseline levels of corticospinal excitability before and after the experiment and no 
differences in the number of excluded MEPs both between groups and tasks (see 
below). 
A.1.2.2 Motor thresholds 
A one-way ANOVA showed that the 1mv motor thresholds were not significantly 
different between low AQ (M=49.47, SD=4.9), high AQ (M=51.29, SD=10.36) and 
ASD (M=45.89, SD=7.40) groups [F(2, 35)=1.29, p=.29, ηp2=.07]. 
An independent samples t-test identified that within the ASD group, motor 
threshold values were not significantly different between medicated (M=44.00, 
SD=4.90) and non-medicated (M=47.50, SD=10.66) participants [t(6)=.60, p=.57]. 
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A.1.2.3 Differences in Baseline Corticospinal Excitability 
Three participants (one from each group) were not included in this section of the 
analysis because their post-experiment baseline corticospinal excitability measures 
were invalid (>50% MEPs in the FDI muscle <.2mV). For two of the participants 
this was due to the ‘hot spot’ for the FDI being particularly difficult to maintain and 
the post-experiment baseline was missing for one participant due to an error when 
acquiring the data. 
A (3 x 2) repeated measures ANOVA found that baseline MEP sizes in the 
FDI muscle were not significantly different before and after the experiment across all 
participants (F(1, 30)=3.62, p=.07, ηp2=.11), there were no significant differences in 
baseline MEP sizes between groups (F(2, 30)=.56, p=.58, ηp2=.04) and there was no 
significant interaction between participant group and the time point in which 
baseline measures were taken (F(2, 30)=.18, p=.84, ηp2=.01). 
There were no significant group differences in pre-experiment (H(2)=2.23, 
p=.33) and post-experiment (H(2)=.53, p=.77)  baseline MEP sizes in the ADM 
muscle. Additionally, baseline MEPs in the ADM muscle were not significantly 
different before and after the experiment (T=218, p=.26, r=-.19) across all 
participants. 
A.1.2.4 Excluded MEPs 
There were no significant group differences in the number of excluded MEPs in the 
mentalizing task[H(2)=1.60, p=.45] or the non-mentalizing task [H(2)=3.59, p=.17]. 
There was also no significant difference in the number of MEPs that were excluded 
between the two tasks across all participants [T=78, p=.49, r=-.12]. 
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A.1.2.5 ADM data 
Motor resonance in the ADM muscle was not significantly different between the 
mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks [T=374, p=.33, r=.16]. There were also no 
group differences in ADM motor resonance values in the mentalizing task 
[H(2)=.96, p=.62] or the non-mentalizing task [H(2)=1.67, p=.43]. 
A.1.3 EEG data 
A.1.3.1 Excluded Epochs 
There was a significant group difference in the number of video epochs excluded 
from the non-mentalizing task [H(2)=8.79, p=.01]. Pairwise comparisons with 
adjusted p values identified significantly more non-mentalizing video epochs were 
excluded in the low AQ group than the ASD group (p=.019) but there were no other 
significant group differences (High AQ & ASD groups: p=1.00; low & high AQ 
groups: p=.06). 
There were no significant group differences in the number of epochs 
excluded for any of the other epoch types [mentalizing videos: H(2)=3.35, p=.19, 
fixation cross in the mentalizing task: H(2)=1.93, p=.38, fixation cross in the non-
mentalizing task: H(2)=2.66, p=.26]. 
Across all participants, there were significant differences in the number of 
epochs excluded between epoch types [χ2(3)=16.01, p<.01]. Subsequent Wilcoxon 
tests found that a larger number of non-mentalizing video epochs were excluded 
compared to the mentalizing video epochs (T=51.01, p<.01, r=.50), the fixation cross 
epochs in the mentalizing task (T=54.50, p<.001, r=-.58) or fixation epochs in the 
non-mentalizing task (T=119, p<.01, r=-.48). There were no other significant 
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differences in the number of epochs excluded between different epoch types 
(mentalizing videos vs mentalizing fixation: T=198.50, p=.14, r=-.23; mentalizing 
fixation vs non-mentalizing fixation: T=309.50, p=.39, r=.13; mentalizing videos vs 
non-mentalizing fixation: T=260, p=.52, r=-.10). 
A.1.3.2 8-10Hz Data 
Pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values showed that mu suppression in the 8-
10Hz range at F3 during the non-mentalizing task was significantly lower in the high 
AQ group than the ASD group (p=.03, r=-.51) or the low AQ group (p=.01, r=.54). 
Only the difference between the high AQ and low AQ groups was significant once 
the significance threshold had been adjusted using the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (p=.02).There was no significant group difference between the 
low AQ group and the ASD group (p=1.00, r=.02). 
Mu suppression in the 8-10Hz range during the non-mentalizing task at FCz 
was significantly lower in the high AQ group than the ASD group (p=.04, r=-.49) but 
this did not survive the Bonferroni correction. Levels of mu suppression were not 
significantly different between the low & high AQ groups (p=.10, r=.40) or the low 
AQ group and the ASD group (p=1.00, r=-.09) at FCz during the non-mentalizing 
task. 
There were no significant group differences in mu suppression during the 
mentalizing task at F3: H(2)=.34, p=.84, FCZ: H(2)=5.65, p=.06 or during the non-
mentalizing task at F4: H(2)=3.38, p=.19]. 
A.1.3.3 10-12Hz Data 
There were no significant group differences in mu suppression in the 10-12Hz 
frequency band during either task at any of the cortical sites [mentalizing task: F3: 
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H(2)=.92, p=.63; FCZ: H(2)=.10, p=.95; F4: H(2)=.94, p=.62; non-mentalizing task: 
F3: H(2)=.42, p=.81; FCZ: H(2)=.58, p=.75; F4: H(2)=.82, p=.67]. There were also 
no significant differences in mu suppression in the 10-12Hz band between tasks at 
any of the cortical sites across all participants (F3: T=526, p=.12, r=.24; FCZ: 
T=511, p=.18, r=.21; F4: T=404, p=.94, r=-.13). 
A.1.4 Eye-tracking data 
A.1.4.1 Hand ROI 
When task-related differences were investigated using data from the clumsy actions 
alone, the number (T=229, p<.01, -.45) and duration (T=264, p=.01, -.38) of 
fixations made during the mentalizing task were still significantly higher than the 
non-mentalizing task. 
There were no significant group differences in the number or duration of 
fixations within the hand ROI in the mentalizing task[number of fixations: 
H(2)=1.89, p=.39; duration: H(2)=3.59, p=.17] or the non-mentalizing task[number 
of fixations: H(2)=2.25, p=.32; duration: H(2)=4.21, p=.12]. 
A.1.4.2 Head ROI 
When task-related differences were investigated using data from the clumsy actions 
alone, significantly more fixations were made within the head ROI during the 
mentalizing task (T=284, p=.02, r=-.35) but the total duration of fixations in the head 
ROI was not significantly different between tasks (T=344, p=.12, r=-.24). 
There were no significant group differences in the number or duration of 
fixations within the head ROI in the mentalizing task [number of fixations: 
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H(2)=.82, p=.66; duration: H(2)=1.46, p=.48] or the non-mentalizing task [number 
of fixations: H(2)=3.10, p=.21; duration: H(2)=3.49, p=.17]. 
A.1.4.3 Poker Chip ROI 
When the borderline significant difference in the number of fixations in the poker 
chip ROI was investigated using the clumsy actions alone this difference was 
significant (T=278, p=.03, r=-.33; significantly more fixations were made during the 
mentalizing task than the non-mentalizing task). 
There were no significant group differences in the number or duration of 
fixations within the poker chip ROI in the mentalizing task [number of fixations: 
H(2)=1.45, p=.48; duration: H(2)=.65, p=.72]  or the non-mentalizing task[number 
of fixations: H(2)=1.79, p=.41; duration: H(2)=1.81, p=.41]. 
A.1.5 Relationships between data from different techniques 
A.1.5.1 TMS and behavioural performance 
Motor resonance values for the FDI muscle during the mentalizing task[F(1,33)=.11, 
p=.75, R2<.01] and the non-mentalizing task[F(1,33)=.91, p=.35, R2=.03] did not 
significantly predict performances on these tasks. 
A.1.5.2 EEG and behavioural performance 
The degree of mu suppression in the 8-10Hz frequency band at the other cortical 
sites and the 10-12Hz frequency band at all cortical sites during the mentalizing task 
did not significantly predict mentalizing performance [8-10Hz at FCZ: F(1,38)=2.77, 
p=.10, R2=.07; F4: F(1,38)=3.61, p=.07, R2=.09; 10-12Hz: F3: F(1,38)=.34, p=.57, 
R2<.01; FCZ: F(1,38)=.40, p=.53, R2=.01; F4: F(1,38)=.44, p=.51, R2=.01]. 
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Performances on the non-mentalizing task were not significantly predicted by 
the degree of mu suppression at any cortical site in either frequency band [8-10Hz: 
F3: F(1,38)=3.26, p=.08, R2=.08; FCZ: F(1,38)=1.98, p=.17, R2=.05; F4: 
F(1,38)=.76, p=.39, R2=.02; 10-12Hz: F3: F(1,38)=.03, p=.87, R2<.01; FCZ: 
F(1,38)=.05, p=.83, R2<.01; F4: F(1,38)=.16, p=.69, R2<.01]. 
A.1.5.3 EEG and TMS 
FDI motor resonances during the mentalizing task did not predict levels of mu 
suppression at any of the cortical sites in either frequency band: 8-10Hz: 
F3:[F(1,30)=.17, p=.68, R2<.01] FCZ: [F(1,30)=.48, p=.50, R2=.02] F4: 
[F(1,30)<.01, p=.96, R2<.01]; 10-12Hz: F3:[F(1,30)=.22, p=.65, R2<.01] FCZ: 
[F(1,30)=.17, p=.69, R2<.01] F4: [F(1,30)=.21, p=.65, R2<.01]. 
FDI motor resonances during the non-mentalizing task also did not predict 
levels of mu suppression at any of the cortical sites in either frequency band: 8-10Hz: 
F3: [F(1,30)=.25, p=.62, R2<.01]  FCZ: [F(1,30)=.42, p=.52, R2=.01]  F4: 
[F(1,30)<.001, p=.99, R2<.001]; 10-12Hz: F3:[F(1,30)=.05, p=.82, R2<.01] FCZ: 
[F(1,30)=.02, p=.90, R2<.01] F4: [F(1,30)=.06, p=.80, R2<.01]. 
A.1.5.4 Eye-tracking and behavioural 
Mentalizing performances were not predicted by the number of fixations or total 
duration of fixations within any of the ROIs during the mentalizing task [number of 
fixations: hand [F(1,41)=1.67, p=.20, R2=.04]; head [F(1,41)=1.43, p=.24, R2=.03]; 
poker chip [F(1,41)=.06, p=.82, R2<.01]; duration of fixations: hand [F(1,41)=1.90, 
p=.18, R2=.04]; head [F(1,41)=1.04, p=.31, R2=.03]; poker chip The total duration of 
fixations within the ROIs other than the poker chip ROI and the number of fixations 
within all the ROIs during the non-mentalizing task did not significantly predict 
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performance on the non-mentalizing task [duration: hand F(1,41)=.54, p=.47, 
R2=.01; head F(1,41)=.20, p=.65, R2<.01; number of fixations: hand F(1,41)=.81, 
p=.38, R2=.02; head [F(1,41)=.01, p=.91, R2<.001 and poker chip F(1,41)=2.08, 
p=.16, R2=.05. 
 [F(1,41)=.14, p=.72, R2<.01]. 
A.1.5.5 Eye-tracking & EEG 
A.1.5.6 8-10Hz Data 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at F3 during the mentalizing task did not significantly 
predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number of fixations: 
hand: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.97, R2<.001]; head: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.97, R2<.001];  poker 
chip: [F(1,38)=.16, p=.67, R2<.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)<.01, 
p=.96, R2<.001]; head: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.94, R2<.001]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.97, 
p=.33, R2=.03]. 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at F3 during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.28, p=.60, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.25, p=.62, R2<.01]; 
poker chip: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.98, R2<.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.16, p=.69, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.50, p=.49, R2=.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=.08, p=.78, R2<.01]. 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at F4 during the mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.04, p=.84, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=1.63, p=.21, 
R2=.04]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.43, p=.52, R2=.01]; total duration: hand: 
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[F(1,38)<.001, p=.97, R2<.001]; head: [F(1,38)=.63, p=.43, R2=.02]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)<.01, p=.95, R2<.001]. 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at F4 during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.08, p=.79, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.31, p=.58, R2<.01]; 
poker chip: [F(1,38)=.07, p=.80, R2<.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.03, p=.86, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.45, p=.51, R2=.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=.08, p=.79, R2<.01]. 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at FCZ during the mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.44, p=.51, R2=.01]; head: [F(1,38)=1.06, p=.31, 
R2=.03]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=2.92, p=.10, R2=.07]; total duration of fixations: 
[F(1,38)=.04, p=.85, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.47, p=.50, R2=.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=2.04, p=.16, R2=.05]. 
Mu suppression (8-10Hz) at FCZ during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.28, p=.60, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.04, p=.84, R2<.01]; 
poker chip; [F(1,38)<.01, p=.95, R2<.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.14, p=.71, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.18, p=.67, R2<.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=.05, p=.83, R2<.01]. 
A.1.5.7 10-12Hz Data 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at F3 during the mentalizing task did not significantly 
predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number of fixations: 
hand: [F(1,38)=.04, p=.85, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.13, p=.72, R2<.01]; poker chip: 
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[F(1,38)=.49, p=.49, R2=.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.11, p=.74, 
R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.98, R2<.001]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.62, p=.44, 
R2=.02]. 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at F3 during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.67, p=.42, R2=.02]; head: [number of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=1.82, p=.19, R2=.05]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.19, p=.67, R2<.01]; total 
duration of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.73, p=.40, R2=.02]; head: [F(1,38)=1.64, 
p=.21, R2=.04]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.06, p=.81, R2<.01]. 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at FCZ during the mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.27, p=.60, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.57, p=.45, R2=.02]; 
poker chip: [F(1,38)=3.49, p=.07, R2=.08]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.16, p=.69, R2<.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.02, p=.89, R2<.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=3.94, p=.05, R2=.09]. 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at FCZ during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.54, p=.47, R2=.01]; head: [F(1,38)=.04, p=.84, R2<.01]; 
poker chip: [F(1,38)=.03, p=.86, R2<.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.6`, p=.44, R2=.02]; head: [F(1,38)=.10, p=.76, R2<.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=.21, p=.65, R2<.01]. 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at F4 during the mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)<.01, p=.93, R2<.001]; head: [F(1,38)=.68, p=.41, 
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R2=.02]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=1.31, p=.26, R2=.03]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)<.01, p=.98, R2<.001]; head: [F(1,38)=.09, p=.76, R2<.01]; poker chip: 
[F(1,38)=1.42, p=.24, R2=.04]. 
Mu suppression (10-12Hz) at F4 during the non-mentalizing task did not 
significantly predict the number or duration of fixations in any of the ROIs [number 
of fixations: hand: [F(1,38)=.62, p=.44, R2=.02]; head: [F(1,38)=3.38, p=.07, 
R2=.08]; poker chip: [F(1,38)=.45, p=.51, R2=.01]; total duration of fixations: hand: 
[F(1,38)=.85, p=.36, R2=.02]; head: [F(1,38)=2.47, p=.12, R2=.06]; poker chip: 




A.2 Supplementary Data from Chapter 5: Group Comparisons 
A.2.1 Behavioural data 
Data screening identified that the behavioural data were not normally distributed 
even after a log transformation had been applied so Mann-Whitney U tests were 
conducted in order to investigate potential group differences. There were no 
significant group differences in behavioural performance in either the mentalizing 
(U=146.00, p=.15, r=-.24) or the non-mentalizing task (U=149.00, p=.17, r=-.24; see 
supplementary Table S1 for descriptive statistics).  
A.2.2 Brain activation 
No brain areas showed significantly higher levels of activation in TD participants 
compared to ASD participants at the p<.001 significance level (uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons). 
A.2.3 Functional connectivity 
The reduced dmPFC-IFG connectivity identified associated with high levels of 
autistic traits was not significant when participants were analysed in terms of ASD 
and TD groups t(38)=-1.34, p=.77. Additionally, no group difference was found in 





A.3 Supplementary Tables 
Table S.1 
Behavioural performances for Chapter 4: Median (IQR) values 
  Mentalizing task  Non-mentalizing task 
Low AQ 77.00 (5.00) 80.00 (1.00) 
High AQ 76.00 (7.00) 79.00 (1.00) 




A.4 Supplementary Figures 
 
Figure A.1 Relationship between autistic traits and behavioural performance for 
Chapter 4. There was no significant relationship between autistic traits and 
performance on the mentalizing task nor the non-mentalizing task. 
 
 
Figure A.2 Whole-brain group analysis of brain areas in which activity correlated 
with mentalizing score. Activation in dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and 
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